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1 - 10 of 11 (0.22 seconds)Mranalini B. Shah And Anr. vs Bapalal Mohanlal Shah on 1 May, 1978
13. It is in the aforesaid manner that the Appellate Bench proceeded to pass decree for possession against petitioner-tenant. It is submitted that the legal position with regard to giving of time when there was a continuous dispute of standard rent and permitted increases and when annual liability to pay education cess was admitted, was not taken into consideration at all and even the ratio in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mranalini (supra) was not properly applied while passing the decree for eviction. It would, therefore, be necessary to deal with that part of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner-tenant.
The Delhi Rent Act, 1995
Malganbhai Rasulbhai vs Pushpavadan Manilal Desai (Since ... on 29 July, 1985
In my view, the submission that S. 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act confer a substantive right in the landlord for claiming possession of the rented premises, cannot be accepted and no different view of the provision from the view that has been expressed by Ravani, J. in the case of Malganbhai v. Pushpavadan (supra) is possible.
The Amending Act, 1897
Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed vs Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai on 22 October, 1963
Reference is firstly made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vora Abbasbhai v. Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai reported in (1964) 5 GLR 55 : (AIR 1964 SC 1341). In that case the Supreme Court was concerned with almost similar facts - situation with regard to the arrears of rent being the ground of eviction and with regard to the facts that would fall within the ambit of S. 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act except that here the liability to pay education cess is of the petitioner-tenant. The plaintiff of that case to deliver the possession of the demised premises as the defendant failed to pay rent since October 1, 1955 at the rate of Rs. 70/- per month. The defendant by his letter dated 7-12-1956 (within one month from the receipt of the notice) contended inter alia that the stipulated rent was excessive. The tenant moved the Court for fixation of standard rent of the demised premies under S. 11 of the rent Act. During the pendency of that application on January 8, 1956 the defendant deposited in Court Rs. 500/-. On January 27, 1957 the plaintiff instituted the suit for eviction. On February 14, 1957 the defendant applied for fixation of interim rent so long as the standard rent of the suit property was not fixed, in order to enable him to deposit the amount in the Court without prejudice to his contentions. The Court passed order directing the defendant to deposit the arrears at the rate of Rs. 51/- p.m. within 15 days from that date. Pursuant to the order, the defendant deposited Rs. 200/- on March 2, 1956 and deposited diverse other sums from time to time which by February 11, 1958 aggregated to Rs. 1,479/- . No further steps were taken in the application for fixation of standard rent, but the proceeding of the standard rent was amalgamated with the suit as the inquiry about the appropriate standard rent had also to be made in the suit. On March 28, 1958, the trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for a decree in ejectment and fixed the standard rent at the rate of Rs.50/- p.m. Taking into account the aggregate amount deposited, the Court held that the defendant was not liable to be evicted for non-payment of standard rent and that in any event it was established that the defendant was ready and willing to pay the amount of 'standard rent and permitted increases within the meaning of S. 12(l) of the Act. In appeal to the District Court, proper standard rent was held to be Rs. 70/and it was further held that the rent had not been paid by October 1, 1955 and that tenant was not entitled to get credit of Rs. 150/- spent by him for 'electric installation'. However, it was held that pursuant to the order of Court, at first instance, the interim rent was deposited by the defendanttenant and, therefore, he complied with the requirements of S. 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act and he had otherwise proved his readiness and willingness to pay the amount of interim rent and permitted increases. The District Court, therefore, confirmed the decree of the trial Court in so far as it related to the claim for possession. The matter was carried to the High Court of Gujarat and there the decree of the District Court was reversed directing the defendant-tenant to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the premises within four months from the date of the order. In the view of the High Court the defendant was not ready and willing to pay the standard rent and permitted increases on the date of the suit and that he did not comply with the requirements of S. 12(3)(b) of the Act, because he had not deposited in Court the amount of standard rent at the rate determined by the order of the District Court and had not paid even the interim rent at the rate fixed by the Court at first instance. In the context of such facts, the Supreme Court proceeded to consider the provisions of S. 5 (clause 10A), S. 10, S. 12(l), S. 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act inter alia the other provisions thereof.
Section 11 in The Delhi Rent Act, 1995 [Entire Act]
Ganpat Ladha vs Sashikant Vishnu Shinde on 21 February, 1978
Reliance was placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the earlier judgment in the case of Ganpath Ladha v. Shashikant Vishnu Shinde, (1978) 19 GLR 502: (AIR 1978 SC 955). It was held that word "regularly" appearing in clause (b) of S. 12(3) enjoins a payment or tender characterised by reasonable punctuality, that is to say, one made at regular times or intervals. The regularity contemplated may not be a punctuality, of clock-like precision and exactitude, but it must reasonably conform with substantial proximity at which the rent falls due. Even in the case of Mranalini the Supreme Court has not spoken of regularity to mean as punctuality or as clock like precision and exactitude. So, far as the present case is concerned apart from the fact that there was a continuance dispute with regard to permitted increases in the appeal itself and that admittedly the defendant was liable to pay education cess, the defendant-tenant made only lapse of tendering or depositing the amount of rent for a period after filing of appearance in the appeal up to June 13, 1978. But then, barring that, it is admitted, the defend ant-tenant made deposits of arrears of standard rent and permitted increases well in advance, with the result that even before this Court the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent could not dispute such fact.