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Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar And Ors vs State Of Maharashtra And Anr on 3 March, 1966

β€œIt is well settled now that a judgment of court can never be challenged under Articles 14 or 21 and therefore the judgment of the court awarding the sentence of death is not open to challenge as violating Article 14 or Article 21 as has been laid down by this Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra (supra) and also in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak21 , the only jurisdiction which could be sought to be exercised by a prisoner for infringement of his rights can be to challenge the subsequent events after the final judicial verdict is pronounced and it is because of this that on the ground of long or inordinate delay a condemned prisoner could approach this Court and that is what has consistently been held by this Court. But it will not be open to this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 32 to go behind or to examine the final verdict reached by a competent court convicting and sentencing the condemned prisoner and even while considering the circumstances in order to reach a conclusion as to whether the inordinate delay coupled with subsequent circumstances could be held to be sufficient for coming to a conclusion that execution of the sentence of death will not be just and proper.”
Supreme Court of India Cites 62 - Cited by 552 - P B Gajendragadkar - Full Document

Hari Vishnu Kamath vs Syed Ahmad Ishaque And Others on 9 December, 1954

30. The High Court, as we find, relied on the aforesaid decision to form the foundation that unless a Court or a tribunal is made a party, the proceeding is not maintainable. What has been stated in Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra), which 46 AIR 1954 Bom 33, 34 47 AIR 1955 Nag. 49 42 we have reproduced hereinbefore is that where plain question on issuing directions arises, it is conceivable that there should be in existence a person or authority to whom such directions could be issued. The suggestion that non-existence of a tribunal might operate as a bar to issue such directions is not correct as the true scope of certiorari is that it merely demolishes the offending order and hence, the presence of the offender before the Court, though proper is not necessary for the exercise of the jurisdiction or to render its determination effective.
Supreme Court of India Cites 24 - Cited by 1109 - Full Document
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