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1 - 10 of 12 (0.28 seconds)Section 302 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 34 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Chinna Gowda vs State Of Mysore on 27 April, 1962
Assuming for the time being that it was the deceased party which went there to the house of the accused persons as a result of which the heated exchange of words took place and in the process, the deceased party gave some blows to some of the accused persons, then even, that circumstance and again standing by itself could never have justified the accused party to bring about the death of as many as five persons and injuring other five !! This comparatively trivial situation by itself can never, bring within its fold the fright of private defence". At the relevant point of time, the accused No. 2 was armed with an axe and the rest of the persons with sticks mounted lightning assault and in process even chased two persons in the house one of them killed, bringing about in all the death of five persons' and injuring five persons, in that case, at the initial 'stage, had the accused party stopped by attacking Jaysinh 'and Tarachand and the matter ended there only, then the rest of accused would not have been liable under Section 149, but all the accused persons knowing full-well that the accused No. 2 was armed with axe, has already done to death two persons lying on the ground, they still continued in the said assembly and in the frenzy brought about the death of other three persons by chasing and injuring five. This clearly goes to demonstrate that all the accused persons were ultimately bent upon liquidating all the five deceased persons who came in their way by injuring other five. Under such circumstances, the submission of Mr. Pardiwala that the accused had no previous knowledge, has no substance because the case would squarely fall within the purview of the second part of Section 149 of the IPC which lays down that if the offence is committed by any group of unlawful assembly and the members of that assembly knew to be likely to commit in prosecution of that common object, every individual who at the time of committing that offence was a member of the said assembly cannot escape the ultimate liability to be guilty of that offence. Thus, having considered each and every limb of the tenacious submissions made by Mr. Pardi wala with regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, as discussed above, it is indeed not possible for us to take a view different than the one already taken by the learned trial Judge.
Section 143 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 147 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 148 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Hallu And Others vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 19 March, 1974
In support of this contention, Mr. Pardiwala has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in case of Hallu v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1974 SC 1936 : 1974 Cri LJ 1385, which reads as under:-
Section 323 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Piara Singh vs State Of Punjab on 8 January, 1969
Their houses being in the neighbourhood adjoining to each other, their presence was absolutely natural. All the accused persons were quite well known to them. Their statements were recorded soon after the alleged incident. When under such circumstances the prosecution witnesses of whom some are ladies and illiterate Adivasis coupled with little discrepancies here and there, they witness the incident and accordingly while attributing some role to the accused persons, if they commit some honest, bona fide mistakes or make some omnibus statements involving all the persons armed with respective weapons, then in that case, it cannot be said that they are liars for the purpose of rejecting their evidence from being (taken into) consideration. Not only that but while appreciating the evidence of any witness, the Court cannot afford to be oblivious to the fact that there are two different type of witnesses. Firstly, that types of witnesses who are not related to the injured/deceased and had therefore seen the incident from little distance without emotionally not much disturbed. and secondly, that type of witnesses who are actually injured, and therefore bearing in, mind the instinct of self-preservation, and gripped with terror and fear their attention would stand focussed and consumed only in saving himself rendering it imposible to account entire and graphic scenario of the incident and thirdly the quality and degree of observation, memory, importance of event necessity of narration varies from witness to witness and accordingly there may not be exact precise exhausive description of event. Besides all these factors, time factor that is to say the time gap between the recording of statement by police and giving evidence before the Court is also certainly one of the circumstances which many a times dilutes the memory of witness has also got to be kept in mind while judging their veracity. Bearing all these quite obvious indisputable natural phenomena in mind, we have no difficulty in holding that though the evidence of some of the prosecution witnesses do suffer from pinpoint precision, none the less they appear to be quite honest and truthful as regard the allegation that as many as 5 persons came to be injured and five persons lost their lives instantaneously on the spot at the hands of the concerned accused. Further on being taken through the appreciation of evidence made by the learned trial Judge from para 32 onwards, it must be stated that the exemplary clarity with which the evidence of all the prosecution witnesses carne to be threadbare appreciated, calls for no interference by this Court and further by way of brevity and convenience, we would like to adopt the very said reasonings as a part of this judgment.