Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 10 of 10 (0.61 seconds)
Rani Choudhury vs Lt. Col. Suraj Jit Choudhury on 24 August, 1982 cites

Swantraj & Ors vs State Of Maharashtra on 5 February, 1974

No doubt the provision described as an "Explanation", but as is well known it is not the rubric which decisively defines the true nature of a statutory provision. Its true nature must be determined from the content of the provision, its import gathered from the language employed, and the language construed in the context in which the 377 provision has been enacted. In the present . case, the rule in Heydon's case,(l) approval of and applied by this Court in Swantraj & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (2) and many other cases, is attracted. What was the law before the amendment, what was the mischief and defect for which the law did not provide, what remedy has Parliament resolved and appointed to cure the mischief, and the true reason of the remedy.
Supreme Court of India Cites 5 - Cited by 35 - V R Iyer - Full Document

Chaudhri Abdul Majid vs Jawahir Lal on 7 April, 1914

In support of the view taken by the High Court, the High Court referred to and relied on the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Chandri Abdul Majid (supra). The decision of the Privy Council, in our opinion, has no material bearing on the question involved in the present appeal. In the case before the Privy. Council, the Judicial Committee was concerned with the question as to the commencement of the period of limitation in respect of a decree passed by the Trial Court, affirmed by the High Court on appeal and a further appeal therefrom to the Privy Council was dismissed by the Privy Council for non- prosecution of the appeal. The appellant before the Privy Council was in the position of a mortgagor and the Respondents of mortgagees under a mortgage dated 3rd September, 1868. In 1889 a suit was commenced before the Subordinate Judge of Allahabad to enforce that mortgage and on the 12th May, 1890, a decree was passed by him for the sale of the property unless payment was made on or before the 12th August, 1890. An appeal was brought from that decree to the High Court and on the 8th April, 1893 that appeal was dismissed and the decree of the Subordinate Judge was confirmed. The mortgagor obtained leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee but did not prosecute his appeal; and on the 13th May, 1901, the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution. The Mortgagor decree-holder made an application to the Subordinate Judge on the 11th June, 1909 for an order absolute to sell the mortgaged properties; it appears that an 386 order had been 'made on the said application for execution in favour of the decree-holder and ultimately the validity of the execution proceedings went to the Privy Council for consideration. The main argument before the Privy Council was that the decree which was sought to be enforced had been constructively turned into a decree of the Privy Council by virtue of the dismissal of the appeal by the Privy Council on 13.5.1901 for non-prosecution of the appeal and the period of limitation, therefore, was 12 years from 13.5.1901. The Judicial Committee rejected this contention holding that the order dismissing the appeal for want of prosecution did not deal judicially with the matter of the suit and could in no sense be regarded as an order adopting or confirming the decision appealed from. The Judicial Committee held that as there was no decree by the Judicial Committee adopting or confirming the decision appealed from, and as there was never any stay of the decree passed by the High Court affirming the decree of the Subordinate-Judge, the period of limitation will run from the date of the passing of the decree by the High Court and the period will be three years from the date of the decree! passed by the High Court. The Privy Council allowed the appeal holding that the application dated 11.6.1909 for sale of the mortgaged properties was barred by limitation. While considering the question whether the period of limitation should be effective from the date of the dismissal of the appeal by the Judicial Committee for non prosecution thereof, the Judicial Committee had made the following observations:
Bombay High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 31 - Full Document

Messrs Mela Ram & Sons vs The Commissioner Of Income-Tax,Punjab on 21 February, 1956

In the present case, the appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation. That it was an appeal even though barred by time is clear from M/s. Mela Ram & Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax,(1) where Venkataram Ayyar, J., speaking for the court, after referring to Nagendranath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey,(2) Raja Kulkarni and Ors. v. The State of Bombay(3) and Promotho Nath Roy v. W.A. Lee(4) held that "an appeal presented out of time is an appeal, and an order dismissing it as time-barred is one passed in appeal." There can be no dispute then that in law what the respondent did was to file an appeal and that the order dismissing it as time-barred was one disposing of the appeal.
Supreme Court of India Cites 41 - Cited by 167 - N H Bhagwati - Full Document

Raja Kulkarni And Others vs The State Of Bombay on 24 November, 1953

In the present case, the appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation. That it was an appeal even though barred by time is clear from M/s. Mela Ram & Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax,(1) where Venkataram Ayyar, J., speaking for the court, after referring to Nagendranath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey,(2) Raja Kulkarni and Ors. v. The State of Bombay(3) and Promotho Nath Roy v. W.A. Lee(4) held that "an appeal presented out of time is an appeal, and an order dismissing it as time-barred is one passed in appeal." There can be no dispute then that in law what the respondent did was to file an appeal and that the order dismissing it as time-barred was one disposing of the appeal.
Supreme Court of India Cites 26 - Cited by 98 - G Hasan - Full Document

Promotho Nath Roy vs W.A. Lee on 5 August, 1919

In the present case, the appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation. That it was an appeal even though barred by time is clear from M/s. Mela Ram & Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax,(1) where Venkataram Ayyar, J., speaking for the court, after referring to Nagendranath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey,(2) Raja Kulkarni and Ors. v. The State of Bombay(3) and Promotho Nath Roy v. W.A. Lee(4) held that "an appeal presented out of time is an appeal, and an order dismissing it as time-barred is one passed in appeal." There can be no dispute then that in law what the respondent did was to file an appeal and that the order dismissing it as time-barred was one disposing of the appeal.
Calcutta High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 16 - Full Document
1