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1 - 8 of 8 (0.23 seconds)Section 146 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Ram Sumer Puri Mahant vs State Of U.P. And Ors. on 17 December, 1984
18. The law on this aspect has been settled by the Supreme Court in
Ram Sumer Puri Mahant vs. State of U.P, 1 (1985) SCC 427 wherein it
has been held:-
R.H. Bhutani vs Miss Mani J. Desai & Ors on 23 April, 1968
In R.H.Bhutani vs. Mani J.Desai & Ors, AIR 1968 SC 1444, the
Supreme Court has clarified that a Magistrate can initiate the proceedings
either on the police report or on other information. The relevant
paragraph of the decision referred to above is hereunder:-
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Sreeman Kumara Tirumalraja Bahadur, ... vs Sowcar Lodd Govind Doss Krishna Doss on 30 July, 1906
A similar
opinion has also been expressed
in Ganesh v. Venkataswara [(1964) 2 Cr LJ 100] where, relying
on Raja of Karvetnagar v. Sowear Lodd Govind Doss [(1906)
ILR 29 Mad 561] the Mysore High Court observed that law and
order being the concern of the police it is but natural that the
Magistrate should either be moved by the police or if moved by a
private party, he should call for a police report regarding the
likelihood of breach of peace. But the High Court of Madras in
the case of Raja of Karvetnagar [(1906) ILR 29 Mad 561] , did
not lay down any such proposition but merely sounded a note of
caution that in the absence of a police report the statements of an
interested party should not be relied on without caution and
without corroboration the proposition that the Magistrate before
proceeding under Section 145(1) must, as a rule, call for a police
WP(CRL)1968/2015 Page 9 of 15
report where he is moved by a private party or that the absence
of a police report is a sure indication of the absence of possibility
of breach of peace, is not warranted by the clear language of the
section which permits the Magistrate to initiate proceedings
either on the police report or "on other information". The words
"other information" are wide enough to include an application
by a private party. The jurisdiction under Section 145 being, no
doubt, of an emergency nature, the Magistrate must act with
caution but that does not mean that where on an application by
one of the parties to the dispute he is satisfied that the
requirements of the section are existent, he cannot initiate
proceedings without a police report. The view taken in the
aforesaid two decisions unnecessarily and without any warrant
from the language of sub-section (1) limits the discretion of the
Magistrate and renders the words "other information" either
superfluous or qualifies them to mean other information verified
by the police. In our view, once the Magistrate, having examined
the applicant on oath, was satisfied that his application disclosed
the existence of the dispute and the likelihood of breach of peace,
there was no bar against his acting under Section 145(1).
K. Ganesh And Ors. vs K. Venkataswara Iyer on 27 June, 1963
A similar
opinion has also been expressed
in Ganesh v. Venkataswara [(1964) 2 Cr LJ 100] where, relying
on Raja of Karvetnagar v. Sowear Lodd Govind Doss [(1906)
ILR 29 Mad 561] the Mysore High Court observed that law and
order being the concern of the police it is but natural that the
Magistrate should either be moved by the police or if moved by a
private party, he should call for a police report regarding the
likelihood of breach of peace. But the High Court of Madras in
the case of Raja of Karvetnagar [(1906) ILR 29 Mad 561] , did
not lay down any such proposition but merely sounded a note of
caution that in the absence of a police report the statements of an
interested party should not be relied on without caution and
without corroboration the proposition that the Magistrate before
proceeding under Section 145(1) must, as a rule, call for a police
WP(CRL)1968/2015 Page 9 of 15
report where he is moved by a private party or that the absence
of a police report is a sure indication of the absence of possibility
of breach of peace, is not warranted by the clear language of the
section which permits the Magistrate to initiate proceedings
either on the police report or "on other information". The words
"other information" are wide enough to include an application
by a private party. The jurisdiction under Section 145 being, no
doubt, of an emergency nature, the Magistrate must act with
caution but that does not mean that where on an application by
one of the parties to the dispute he is satisfied that the
requirements of the section are existent, he cannot initiate
proceedings without a police report. The view taken in the
aforesaid two decisions unnecessarily and without any warrant
from the language of sub-section (1) limits the discretion of the
Magistrate and renders the words "other information" either
superfluous or qualifies them to mean other information verified
by the police. In our view, once the Magistrate, having examined
the applicant on oath, was satisfied that his application disclosed
the existence of the dispute and the likelihood of breach of peace,
there was no bar against his acting under Section 145(1).
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