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Rangappa vs Sri Mohan on 7 May, 2010

15 In 'RANGAPPA VS. SRI MOHAN', (2010) 11 SCC 441,  Page 22 of 31 R/CR.MA/30982/2017 ORDER the   Apex   Court   after   discussing   various  decisions   on   the   subject   held   that   the  presumption   mandated   by   Section   139   of   the   Act  does   indeed   include   the   existence   of   legally  enforceable debt or liability. This is of course  in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it  is   open   to   the   accused   to   raise   a   defence  wherein   the   existence   of   a   legally   enforceable  debt   or   liability   can   be   contested.   However,  there can be no doubt that there is an initial  presumption   which   favours   the   complainant.  Section   139   of   the   Act   is   an   example   of   a  reverse   onus   clause   that   has   been   included   in  furtherance   of   the   legislative   objective   of  improving   the   credibility   of   negotiable  instruments.   While   Section   138   of   the   Act  specifies   a   strong   criminal   remedy   in   relation  to   the   dishonour   of   cheques,   the   rebuttable  presumption   under   Section   139   is   a   device   to  prevent undue delay in the course of litigation.  However, it must be remembered that the offence  made   punishable   by   Section   138   can   be   better  described   as   a   regulatory   offence   since   the  Page 23 of 31 R/CR.MA/30982/2017 ORDER bouncing of a cheque is largely in nature of a  civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to  the   private   parties   involved   in   commercial  transactions.   In   such   a   scenario,   the   test   of  proportionality   should   guide   the   construction  and   interpretation   of   reverse   onus   clauses   and  the   accused/defendant   cannot   be   expected   to  discharge   an   unduly   high   standard   of   proof.   In  the   absence   of   compelling   justifications,  reverse   onus   clauses   usually   impose   an  evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.  Keeping this in view,  it is a settled  position  that   when   an   accused   has   to   rebut   the  presumption   under   Section   139,   the   standard   of  proof for doing so is that of 'preponderance of  probabilities'.   Therefore,   if   the   accused   is  able   to   raise   a   probable   defence   which   creates  doubts   about   the   existence   of   a   legally  enforceable   debt   or   liability,   the   prosecution  can fail. The accused can rely on the materials  submitted   by   the   complainant   in   order   to   raise  such   a   defence   and   it   is   conceivable   that   in  some   cases   the   accused   may   not   need   to   adduce  Page 24 of 31 R/CR.MA/30982/2017 ORDER evidence of his/her own.
Supreme Court of India Cites 11 - Cited by 9567 - K G Balakrishnan - Full Document

Rallis India Ltd vs Poduru Vidya Bhusan & Ors on 13 April, 2011

In   Rallis   India   Ltd.   v.   Poduru   Vidya   Bhushan,   this   Court   expressed   its   views   on  this point as under: (SCC p. 93, para 12)  "12. At the threshold, the High Court should   not   have   interfered   with   the   cognizance   of  the complaints having been taken by the trial   court.   The   High   Court   could   not   have   discharged   the   respondents   of   the   said   liability   at   the   threshold.   Unless   the   parties   are   given   opportunity   to   lead   evidence,   it   is   not   possible   to   come   to   a  definite  conclusion  as  to what  was the  date   when   the   earlier   partnership   was   dissolved   and since what date the respondents ceased to   be the partners of the firm."
Supreme Court of India Cites 7 - Cited by 141 - D Verma - Full Document

M/S Indus Airways Pvt. Ltd And Ors vs M/S Magnum Aviation Pvt Ltd And Anr on 7 April, 2014

13 If,   one   looks   at   the   law   on   the   subject,   as  rendered   in   the   case   of  Indus   Airways   Private   Limited   vs.   Magnum   Aviation   Private   Limited,  Page 9 of 31 R/CR.MA/30982/2017 ORDER (2014) 12 SCC 539 it was a case of dishonour of  cheque   issued   towards   advance   payment.   The  appellant   purchaser   placed   two   purchase   orders  with   the   respondent   supplier   by   issuing   two  separate cheques towards advance payment. After  some time, deal between parties got cancelled as  goods were not supplied. The respondent supplier  tried to supply goods, but it was refused by the  appellant   purchaser.   Therefore,   a   complaint  under Section 138 of the NI Act was made by the  respondent   supplier.   The   trial   Court   issued  summons   and   it   was   challenged   by   the   appellant  purchaser before the Sessions Court. Issuance of  process   was   quashed   by   the   Sessions   Court.  However,   when   the   challenge   was   taken   to   the  High Court, it set aside the order passed by the  Sessions   Court   and   thereby,   the   matter   went­up  for   consideration   before   the   Apex   Court.   The  Apex   Court   observed   and   held   that   the  explanation   appended   to   Section   138   of   the   NI  Act explains the meaning of the expression 'debt  or   other   liability'   for   the   purpose   of   Section  138   of   the   NI   Act.   This   expression   means   a  Page 10 of 31 R/CR.MA/30982/2017 ORDER legally   enforceable   debt   or   other   liability.  Section   138   of   the   NI   Act   treats   dishonoured  cheque   as   an   offence,   if   the   cheque   has   been  issued   in   discharge   of   any   debt   or   other  liability   subsisting   on   the   date   of   drawing   of  the cheque. The relevant observations read thus:
Supreme Court of India Cites 4 - Cited by 384 - R M Lodha - Full Document

Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd vs Rajvir Industries Ltd. & Ors on 9 January, 2008

In   Suryalakshmi   Cotton   Mills   Ltd.   v.    Rajvir   Industries   Ltd.   [(2008)   13   SCC   678],   this   Court   has   made   the   following   observations   explaining   the   parameters   of   jurisdiction of the High Court in exercising   its   jurisdiction   under  Section   482  of   the   Code of Criminal Procedure: (SCC pp. 685­87,  paras 17 & 22) "17.   The   parameters   of   jurisdiction   of   the  High   Court   in   exercising   its   jurisdiction   under  Section   482  of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure is now well settled. Although it is   of wide amplitude, a great deal of caution is   also   required   in   its   exercise.   What   is   required   is   application   of   the   well­   known  legal principles involved in the matter.
Supreme Court of India Cites 15 - Cited by 205 - S B Sinha - Full Document

Hmt Watches Ltd vs M.A. Abida & Anr on 19 March, 2015

In   HMT   Watches   Ltd.   versus   M.A.   Abida,   relied   upon   on   behalf   of   the   respondent,   this   Court   dealt   with   the   contention that the proceedings under Section   138 were liable to be quashed as the cheques   were   given   as   "security"   as   per   defence   of   the accused. Negativing the contention, this   Court held :­  "10. Having heard the learned counsel for the   parties, we are of the view that the accused   (Respondent 1) challenged the proceedings of   criminal   complaint   cases   before   the   High   Court,   taking   factual   defences.   Whether   the   cheques   were   given   as   security   or   not,   or  whether   there   was   outstanding   liability   or   not   is   a   question   of   fact   which   could   have   been determined only by the trial court after   recording   evidence   of   the   parties.   In   our  opinion,   the   High   Court   should   not   have   Page 19 of 31 R/CR.MA/30982/2017 ORDER expressed its view on the disputed questions   of   fact   in   a   petition   under  Section   482  of  the Code of Criminal Procedure, to come to a   conclusion that the offence is not made out.  The High Court has erred in law in going into   the factual aspects of the matter which were  not   admitted   between   the   parties.   The   High  Court further erred in observing that Section   138(b)  of the NI  Act stood  uncomplied  with,   even   though   Respondent   1   (accused)   had   admitted that he replied to the notice issued   by   the   complainant.
Supreme Court of India Cites 10 - Cited by 233 - P C Pant - Full Document
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