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1 - 9 of 9 (0.35 seconds)Section 307 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 353 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Amir Hussain vs State Of U.P. on 31 March, 1975
When a murderous assault by many hands with many knives has ended fatally, it is legally in permissible to dissect the serious one from others and seek to salvage those whose stabs have not proved fatal. When people play with knives and lives, the circumstance that One man's stab falls on a Jess or more vulnerable part of the person of the victim is of no consequence to fix the guilt for murder Conjoint complicity is the inevitable inference when a glory group animated by lethal intent accomplish their purpose cumulatively. Section 34 IPC fixing constructive liability conclusively silences such a refined plea of extrication See Amir Hussein v. State of UP ; Sdaina Singh v. State of Rajasthan Lord Summer's classic legal short hand for constructive criminal liability, expressed in the Miltonic verse 'they also serve who only stand and wait' a fortiori embraces cases of common intent instantly formed, triggering a plurality of persons into an adventure in criminality, some hitting, some missing, some splitting with he? tile heads, some spilling drops of blood. Guilt goes with community of intent coupled with participatory presence or operation No. finer justice niceties can be pressed into service to nullify or jettison the plain punitive purpose of the Penal Code.
Section 304 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Ramchander And Anr. vs State Of Rajasthan on 2 April, 1969
In Ramchander v. State of Rajasthan 1970 RLW 118 the Division Bench of this Court considered this question in para 10 and it was observed that.
Section 354 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Mahbub Shah vs Emperor on 31 January, 1945
Common intention within the meaning of Section 34 I.P.C. implies a prearranged plan. To convict the accused of a crime with the help of Section 34, I.P.C. the burden is upon the prosecution to prove that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged plan. It is no doubt difficult, if not impossible to procure direct evidence to establish the intention of an accused person. Intention has to be inferred from his act or conduct or other relevant circumstances of the case. There is also a distinction between the same or similar intention and common intention and an inference of common intention within meaning of the term in Section 34, I.P.C., should not bs reached, unless it is a necessary inference deducible from the circumstances of the case: vide Mahbub Shah v. Emperor (supra). Whereas here is no indication whatever or premeditation or of a pre-arranged plan, the mere feet that the two accused were seen at the spot or tint the two accused fired as a result of which one died and two others received simple injuries could not be held sufficient to prove or to infer a common intention. Common intention referred to in Section 34 presupposes a prior meeting of the minds. This does nit mean that there must be a long interval of time between the formation of the common intention & the doing of the act. It is also not necessary to adduce direct evidence of the common intention. The common intention may conveniently be inferred from the surrounding circumstances & the conduct of the parties. The existence of the common intention shared by the accused persons is, on ultimate analysis, a question of fact. At any rate, the crucial circumstance is that the plan must precede the act constituting the offence.
Gajjan Singh vs State Of Punjab on 3 March, 1976
In Gajjan Singh v. State of Punjab it was observed as under:
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