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1 - 10 of 18 (0.32 seconds)Section 120A in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 120B in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 109 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar vs State Of Maharashtra(And Connected ... on 18 March, 1963
"From an analysis of the section, it will be seen that
Sec.10 will come into play only when the court is satisfied
that there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more
persons have conspired together to commit an offence. There
should be, in other words, a prima facie evidence that the
person was a party to the conspiracy before his acts can be
used against his co-conspirator. One such prima facie
evidence exists, anything said, done or written by one of
the conspirators in reference to the common intention, after
the said intention was first entertained, is relevant
against the others. It is relevant not only for the purpose
of proving the existence of conspiracy, but also for proving
that the other person was a party to it. It is true that
the observations of Subba Rao, J. in Sardul Singh Caveeshar
v. State of Maharashtra, (1964) 2 SCR 378 lend support to
the contention that the admissibility of evidence as between
co-conspirators would be liberal than in English Law. The
learned Judge said (at 390):
Suresh Chandra Bahri vs State Of Bihar on 13 July, 1994
After referring to the judgments in NMMY Momin v.
State of Maharashtra [AIR 1971 SC 885] and State (Delhi
Admn) v. V.C. Shukla [AIR 1980 SC 1382] it was held in
S.C. Bahri's case (Supra) as under: "A cursory look to the
provisions contained in S.120-A reveal that a criminal
conspiracy envisages an agreement between two or more
persons to commit an illegal act or an act which by itself
may not be illegal but the same is done or executed by
illegal means. Thus the essential ingredient of the offence
of criminal conspiracy is the agreement to commit an
offence. In a case where the agreement is for
accomplishment of an act which by itself constitutes an
offence, then in that event no overt act is necessary to be
proved by the prosecution because in such a fact situation
criminal conspiracy is established by proving such an
agreement. In other words, where the conspiracy alleged is
with regard to commission of a serious crime of the nature
as contemplated in S.120-B read with the provisio to
sub-sec.(2) of S.120-A of the IPC, then in that event mere
proof of an agreement between the accused for commission of
such a crime alone is enough to bring about a conviction
under S.120-B and the proof of any overt act by the accused
or by any one of them would not be necessary. The
provisions in such a situation do not require that each and
every person who is a party to the conspiracy must do some
overt act towards the fulfilment of the object of
conspiracy, the essential ingredient being an agreement
between the conspirators to commit the crime and if these
requirements and ingredients are established the act would
fall within the trapping of the provisions contained in
S.120-B since from its very nature a conspiracy must be
conceived and hatched in complete secrecy, because otherwise
the whole purpose may frustrate and it is common experience
and goes without saying that only in very rare cases one may
come across direct evidence of a criminal conspiracy to
commit any crime and in most of the cases it is only the
circumstantial evidence which is available from which an
inference giving rise to the conclusion of an agreement
between two or more persons to commit an offence may be
legitimately drawn."
Noor Mohammad Mohd. Yusuf Momin vs State Of Maharashtra on 24 March, 1970
After referring to the judgments in NMMY Momin v.
State of Maharashtra [AIR 1971 SC 885] and State (Delhi
Admn) v. V.C. Shukla [AIR 1980 SC 1382] it was held in
S.C. Bahri's case (Supra) as under: "A cursory look to the
provisions contained in S.120-A reveal that a criminal
conspiracy envisages an agreement between two or more
persons to commit an illegal act or an act which by itself
may not be illegal but the same is done or executed by
illegal means. Thus the essential ingredient of the offence
of criminal conspiracy is the agreement to commit an
offence. In a case where the agreement is for
accomplishment of an act which by itself constitutes an
offence, then in that event no overt act is necessary to be
proved by the prosecution because in such a fact situation
criminal conspiracy is established by proving such an
agreement. In other words, where the conspiracy alleged is
with regard to commission of a serious crime of the nature
as contemplated in S.120-B read with the provisio to
sub-sec.(2) of S.120-A of the IPC, then in that event mere
proof of an agreement between the accused for commission of
such a crime alone is enough to bring about a conviction
under S.120-B and the proof of any overt act by the accused
or by any one of them would not be necessary. The
provisions in such a situation do not require that each and
every person who is a party to the conspiracy must do some
overt act towards the fulfilment of the object of
conspiracy, the essential ingredient being an agreement
between the conspirators to commit the crime and if these
requirements and ingredients are established the act would
fall within the trapping of the provisions contained in
S.120-B since from its very nature a conspiracy must be
conceived and hatched in complete secrecy, because otherwise
the whole purpose may frustrate and it is common experience
and goes without saying that only in very rare cases one may
come across direct evidence of a criminal conspiracy to
commit any crime and in most of the cases it is only the
circumstantial evidence which is available from which an
inference giving rise to the conclusion of an agreement
between two or more persons to commit an offence may be
legitimately drawn."
Girja Shankar Misra vs State Of U.P on 3 September, 1993
In Girja Shankar Misra v.
State of U.P. [AIR 1993 SC 2618] though it was found that
there were serious misunderstanding between the deceased and
the appellant because of the illicit relationship between
the appellant and the wife of the deceased, yet the Court
held that despite the fact that the appellant had a motive,
he could not be held responsible for hatching a conspiracy.
The other important circumstance relied by the prosecution
and believed both by the trial and the High Court is the
presence of the appellant in the company of Accused No.1
near or about the place of occurrence on the date of
incident. It is true that a number of witnesses have
deposed that they had seen both the accused together on the
date of occurrence but it is equally true that such meeting
was not unusual as admittedly they were working together in
the plantation. Mere meeting would by itself not be
sufficient to infer the existence of a criminal conspiracy.
There is no suggestion, much less legal evidence to the
effect that both the accused were so intimate which would
have compelled Accused No.1 to agree to be a conspirator for
the killing of the deceased at the instance of the
appellant. The Accused No.1 is also not stated to be a
habitual criminal. There is no suggestion of the accused
No.1 being hired for the purpose of killing the deceased.
Ramakrishnan (PW3) did not support the case of the
prosecution of having seen both the accused sitting and
talking to each other near the bushes on the day of
occurrence. To a specific question as to whether he had
seen any other person going through the road towards the
side where Accused No.1 had gone, the witness emphatically
replied in the negative. Davis (PW5) stated that on the
date of occurrence he had seen Accused No.1 at about 2o
clock in the afternoon. In reply to a question as to
whether he had seen anyone-else going through the road while
Accused No.2 was talking to PW4, the witness replied "I have
not noticed". Nabeesa (PW6) who is the mother of the
deceased has stated that on the date of occurrence both the
accused were sitting near her house on some timber logs at
about 2 p.m. but at 2.45 p.m. she saw only Accused No.1
washing his knife near the stream which is on the southern
side of her house. What happened between 2.00 p.m. to 2.45
p.m. is not known to the witness. Her deposition is mainly
with respect to the relationship of the deceased with the
appellant. Jose (PW7) stated in the trial court that on the
date of occurrence at about 2.45 p.m., the appellant had
called him. He told him to come after some time. He went
there and talked to the appellant, George (PW8) and Mohanan
(PW10). He saw Jameela, deceased getting down from the bus
at about 2.30 p.m. She had gone to the house of her sister
Amina (PW9). He did not see Accused No.1 with Accused No.2.
He saw only the appellant, PW8, PW10 and some other people.
George PW8 stated that he saw appellant on the date of
occurrence at about 2.30 p.m. at the gate of his house.
Both the witness and the appellant had conversation on the
steps of the house of the witness. Appellant was there for
about half an hour. This statement of PW8 belies the
averments of other witnesses that the appellant committed
the crime in conspiracy with Accused No.1 at about 2.45 p.m.
Amina (PW9), the sister of the deceeased stated that she had
seen both the accused together sitting on the timber log
near the road. She did not see appellant accompanying the
accused No.1 thereafter. Devasi (PW11) Stated that on the
day of occurrence both the accused had come to his shop at
about 1 p.m. and each had one plate tapioca and meat.
Meharban (PW18) stated "I saw Accused No.2 at 2.30 p.m. at
the timber log. I did not see accused No.1. I saw A-2
calling PW-7 Jose. Then I saw he was talking with PW-8
George. That was about 2.45 in the afternoon. I saw A-1
following Jameela when she alighted the bus. Then I saw A-1
swiftly walking from eastern side to western side". This
statement of the prosecution witness does not suggest, even
by implication that both the accused were together on the
day of occurrence. The statement of the witnesses noticed
hereinabove may probabilise the presence of both the accused
together but does not prove beyond doubt that they were
together near the road at the place of occurrence on the
fateful day. Assuming they were together, would not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that they had met in
furtherance of the conspiracy to murder the deceased. We
are of the opinion that the prosecution did not succeed in
proving this circumstance beyond reasonable doubt.
Conviction of the appellant on the basis of the existence of
the alleged circumstance cannot be justified. The appellant
is entitled to the benefit of the reasonable doubt. The
High Court was, therefore, not justified to hold that the
accused persons had been seen together before and after the
incident when Jameela boarded the bus for the Hospital and
alighted at the bus stop around 2.30 p.m. The High Court
was also not justified to hold that there was no particular
reason for them to be together except as stated by the
prosecution. It has come in the prosecution evidence that
the witnesses and the accused were plantation workers and
would usually meet each other. In the absence of the
existence of circumstances suggesting the hatching of
criminal conspiracy, we are of the opinion that the
appellant could not have been convicted and sentenced with
the aid of Section 120B or Section 109 IPC. No fact or
circumstance with respect to the abetment attracting the
applicability of Section 109 IPF has been brought to our
notice. To prove the charge of abetment, the prosecution is
required to prove that the abettor had instigated for the
doing of a particular thing or engaged with one or more
other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of
that thing or intentionally aided by an act of illegal
omission, doing of that thing. The prosecution miserably
failed to prove the existence of any of the ingredients of
Section 107 IPC. Learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-State submitted that after the dismissal of the
appeal of Accused No.1, the charge of conspiracy against the
appellant should be deemed proved. We are not impressed
with such a submission particularly when the prosecution had
alleged that the said accused had committed the crime of
murder by stabbing the deceased with his knife. Merely
because the charge of conspiracy fails against the
appellant, it cannot be said that the conviction and
sentence awarded to the Accused No.1 was illegal.