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1 - 10 of 11 (0.30 seconds)The Registration Act, 1908
Section 35 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Section 69 in The Registration Act, 1908 [Entire Act]
Bharat Indu vs Hakim Mohommad Hamid Ali Khan on 14 May, 1920
As was pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bharat Indu v. H.M.H. Ali Khan [1921] A.I.R. P.C. 93, the provisions of the Registration Act are very carefully designed to prevent forgeries and the procurement of conveyances or mortgages by fraud or undue influence, and though it may seem somewhat technical to insist upon exact compliance with the provision of the Act, it is necessary so to do. In the instant case, the Sub-Registrar had not complied with the requirements of Section 35(3) and that made his action of registering the document illegal.
The Indian Stamp Act, 1899
Union Of India (Uoi) vs Satyendra Nath Banerjee And Ors. on 9 December, 1954
9. Shri Banerjee did not seriously dispute the position that these rules were given the status of parts of the main Act by Section 69(2). But he contended that Rule 36 was in conflict with Section 35 and, therefore, on the authority of Union of India v. Satyendra Nath it should be held that Section 35 in the main Act must prevail over Rule 36, which was to be treated by fiction of law to be a part of the Act itself. This argument assumed that there was a conflict between Section 35 and Rule 36 but he was unable to show to me any such conflict. Reading Section 35 and Rule 36 together, it would be seen that Section 35(1) deals with cases where there is no dispute about registration because the execution of the document is admitted and, in such eases of admissions, Section 35(1) provides that the document must be registered. Section 35(2) is not relevant in this context as it only provides that the registering officer may, in order to satisfy himself that the persons appearing before him are the persons they represent themselves to be, or for any other purpose contemplated by this Act, examine any one present in his office. Section 35(3) covers cases where the Sub-Registrar must refuse registration cither because the executant denies its execution or because the executant appears to be a minor, an idiot or a lunatic, or because the person by whom the document purports to be executed is dead, and his representative or assign denies its execution. Rule 36, on the other hand, provides for cases in which the Sub-Registrar ought not to refuse registration where the executant, while admitting execution, challenges the binding nature of the transaction for certain reasons mentioned in the rule. Thus, this Rule 36 only covers cases, which are not provided for by Sub-section (1) and/or Sub-section (3) of Section 35, and it is not at all in conflict with Section 35 or any parts thereof. Consequently, this submission of Shri Banerjee that Section 35 must prevail over Rule 36 ought to stand rejected.
Section 14 in The Indian Contract Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Puran Chand Nahatta vs Manmotho Nath Mukherjee on 5 December, 1927
In Puran Chand v. Monmotho Nath [1928] A.I.R. P.C. 38 : S.C. 30 Bom. L.R. 783 it was pointed out in somewhat different circumstances that the words "the person executing" do not mean merely as ''a person signing a document"; they mean something more, namely, the person, who by a valid execution enters into obligation under the instrument. That would mean that a person executing the document agrees to bind himself by the recitals in the document. In the instant case, the document was a sale-deed according to the plaintiffs. But the defendants never admitted that they had signed it as a sale-deed and were saying on the contrary, that they had only signed the document as a bond in renewal of the old debts. Under these circumstances, the statement of the defendants before the Sub-Registrar could not possibly amount to an admission of execution but must be treated as a denial of execution.
Jogesh Prasad Singh And Ors. vs Ramchandar Prasad Singh And Ors. on 23 March, 1950
In Jogesh Prasad v. Ramchandar Prasad it was held that execution consists in signing a document written out and read over and understood, and does not consist of merely signing a name upon a blank sheet of paper. That would mean that execution was tantamount to knowing the obligation created by the document and accepting that obligation. That was not the case in the instant litigation and, therefore, the mere signature on a document, the contents of which were not known or were considered to be different from what they were, would not amount to an execution.