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1 - 10 of 15 (0.39 seconds)Section 57 in The Trade Marks Act, 1999 [Entire Act]
Section 91 in The Trade Marks Act, 1999 [Entire Act]
Section 23 in The Trade Marks Act, 1999 [Entire Act]
Baddula Lakshmaiah & Others vs Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple & Others on 20 February, 1996
48. The scope of an LPA stands tellingly underscored in the
following passage from Baddula Lakshmaiah v. Sri Anjaneya Swami
Temple21:
Smt. Bachahan Devi & Anr vs Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur & Anr on 5 February, 2008
"A letters patent appeal as permitted under the letters patent is
normally an intra-Court appeal whereunder Letters Patent Bench,
sitting as a Court of Correction, corrects its own orders in exercise
20 Refer Arvind Kumar Jaiswal v. Devendra Prasad Jaiswal Varun, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 146,
Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa, (2021) 11 SCC 277, and Bachahan Devi v. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur,
(2008) 12 SCC 372
21 (1996) 3 SCC 52
Signature Not Verified
LPA 575/2025
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 20 of 25
KUMAR
Signing Date:25.02.2026
15:47:42
of the same jurisdiction as was vested in the single Bench. Such is
not an appeal against an order of a subordinate Court. In such
appellate jurisdiction the High Court exercises the powers of a
Court of Error. So understood, the appellate power under the
Letters Patent is quite distinct, in contrast to what is ordinarily
understood in procedural language".
Santosh Hazari vs Purushottam Tiwari (Dead) By Lrs on 8 February, 2001
55. The Supreme Court, in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam
Tiwari24, has defined "substantial", albeit in the context of the
expression "substantial question of law", as meaning "having
substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable".
There is no reason why this same understanding of the expression
"substantial" should not inform the interpretation of the expression as
used in the proviso to Rule 37.
Section 13 in The Trade Marks Act, 1999 [Entire Act]
Section 2 in The Trade Marks Act, 1999 [Entire Act]
Nazir Ahmad vs Emperor (No. 2) on 16 June, 1936
32. Mr. Sindhwani refutes Mr. Sai Deepak's contention that the
period of one month stipulated in Rule 100(1) was directory. He
submits that Section 57(4) specifically required the Registrar to serve
notice "in the prescribed manner". "Prescribed" is defined in Section
2(s) as prescribed by Rules made under the Act. As such, the period of
one month envisaged in Rule 100(1) of the Rules is to be regarded as
mandatory, applying the principle enunciated by the Privy Council in
Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor17.