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1 - 10 of 22 (0.29 seconds)Section 147 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Mahmood Ali And 2 Others vs State Of U.P. And 2 Others on 8 July, 2022
There is allegation of aggression by Pradhans and interfering in
the official duty and the charge sheet is already there and in view of
that, even the Court is trying to read the things in between the lines, is
not finding the case of interference and in view of that, the judgment
relied by Mr. Gadodia, the learned counsel for the petitioners in
Cr.M.P.No.3385 of 2013 in Mahmood Ali and Others v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others (supra) is not helping the petitioners in
Cr.M.P.No.3385 of 2013. The other cases relied by Mr. Gadodia, the
learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in Cr.M.P.No.3385 of 2013
where the facts are different and in view of that, the Court has interfered
in those judgments which are also not helping the petitioners in
Cr.M.P.No.3385 of 2013. The law is well settled regarding interference by
the High Court with the investigation of a case. The extraordinary power
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or inherent power under
section 482 Cr.P.C cannot be exercised by the High Court either to
prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice. The power of quashing a criminal proceeding can be
exercised sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of
the rare case.
Section 19 in The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 [Entire Act]
Om Prakash & Ors vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr on 26 September, 2012
He further submits
that the petitioners were discharging the official duty and Section 197
Cr.P.C is attracted and to buttress his argument, he relied in the case of
Om Prakash and Others v. State of Jharkhand through the
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Secretary, Department of Home, Ranchi and Another, (2012) 12
SCC 72 and referred to paragraph nos.32, 34 and 41 of the said
judgment which are quoted below:
Surinderjit Singh Mand & Anr vs State Of Punjab & Anr on 5 July, 2016
8. Relying on the above judgment, he submits that law and
order situation is there and in view of that, the authorities have acted
bonafidely and in view of that, this judgment is applicable so far the
petitioner namely, Amit Kumar and other petitioners in Cr.M.P. No.1008 of
2016 are concerned. On the same point, he further relied in the case of
Surinderjit Singh Mand and Another v. State of Punjab and
Another, (2016) 8 SCC 722, and referred to paragraph nos.30 and 31
of the said judgment, which are quoted below:
Amal Kumar Jha vs State Of Chhatisgarh & Anr on 26 April, 2016
Interestingly, the proposition laid down in Rakesh
Kumar Mishra (supra) was distinguished in paragraph
49 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal, before the
Court made the observations in paragraph 50 extracted
above.
Parkash Singh Badal And Anr vs State Of Punjab And Ors on 6 December, 2006
50. But the above contention in our opinion is far-
fetched. The observations contained in paragraph 50 of
the decision in Parkash Singh Badal (supra) are too
general in nature and cannot be regarded as the ratio
flowing out of the said case. If by their very nature, the
offences under sections 420, 468, 471 and 120B cannot
be regarded as having been committed by a public
servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge
of official duty, the same logic would apply with much
more vigour in the case of offences under the PC Act.
Section 197 of the Code does not carve out any group
of offences that will fall outside its purview. Therefore,
the observations contained in para 50 of the decision
in Parkash Singh Badal cannot be taken as carving out
an exception judicially, to a statutory prescription. In
fact, Parkash Singh Badal cites with approval the
other decisions (authored by the very same learned
Judge) where this Court made a distinction between an
act, though in excess of the duty, was reasonably
connected with the discharge of official duty and an act
which was merely a cloak for doing the objectionable
act.
Matajog Dobey vs H. C. Bhari(With Connected Appeal) on 31 October, 1955
9. Coming to the second question, it is now well settled
by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Matajog
Dobey v. H.C. Bhari [AIR 1956 SC 44 : (1955) 2 SCR 925] that
in the matter of grant of sanction under Section 197 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure the offence alleged to have been
committed by the accused must have something to do, or
must be related in some manner, with the discharge of
official duty. In other words, there must be a reasonable
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connection between the act and the discharge of official
duty; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the
accused could lay a reasonable claim, but not a pretended or
fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance
of his duty. In the said case it had been further held that
where a power is conferred or a duty imposed by statute or
otherwise, and there is nothing said expressly inhibiting the
exercise of the power or the performance of the duty by any
limitations or restrictions, it is reasonable to hold that it
carries with it the power of doing all such acts or employing
such means as are reasonably necessary for such execution,
because it is a rule that when the law commands a thing to
be done, it authorises the performance of whatever may be
necessary for executing its command.