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Bhut Nath Mete vs The State Of West Bengal on 8 February, 1974 cites

J.N. Gupta vs State Of West Bengal And Anr. on 25 July, 1958

We emphasize this infirmity because routine summaries of files, marked as affidavits, appear in the returns to rules nisi, showing scant courtesy to the constitutional gravity of deprivation of civil liberty. In some cases where a valid reason for the District Magistrate's inability to swear affidavits directly has been furnished, this Court has accepted the concerned Deputy Secretary's affidavit. This should, however, be the exception, not the rule. We may refer in this context to the rulings in Ranjit Dam v. State of West Bengal, (1), J. N. Roy v. State of West Bengal, (2) and Shaik Hanif and others v. State of West Bengal.(3) We need not proceed further with this aspects, in the ultimate view we take on this writ petition. We are not persuaded that a speaking order should be passed by Government or- by the Advisory Board while approving or advising continuance of detention although a brief expression of the principal reasons is desirable. The communication of grounds, the right to make representation and the consideration thereof by the Advisory body made up of men with judicial experience the subject-matter being the deprivation of freedom, clearly implies a quasi-judicial approach. Indeed. where citizen's rights are affected by an authority, the question is not so much the mould into which the nature of the act should be fitted but the nature of the consequence which obligates impartiality, judicial evaluation and reasoned conclusion on facts. as distinguished from policy formulation and zealous imple- mentation regardless of two sides and weighing of evidence. Thebare bones of natural justice in this context need not be clothed with the ample flesh of detailed hearing and elaborate reasoning. It must be self-evident from the order that the substance of the charge and the essential answer in the representation have been impartially considered. We do not think that a speaking order like a regular Judicial performance is either necessary or feasible. Article 22(5) (1) A. I. R. (1972) SC 1753. (2) A. I. R. (1972) SC 2143. (3) Writ Petitions Nos. 1679 etc; judgment on February 1, 1974.
Calcutta High Court Cites 27 - Cited by 4 - Full Document

Shaik Hanif, Gudma Majhi & Kamal Saha vs State Of West Bengal on 1 February, 1974

We emphasize this infirmity because routine summaries of files, marked as affidavits, appear in the returns to rules nisi, showing scant courtesy to the constitutional gravity of deprivation of civil liberty. In some cases where a valid reason for the District Magistrate's inability to swear affidavits directly has been furnished, this Court has accepted the concerned Deputy Secretary's affidavit. This should, however, be the exception, not the rule. We may refer in this context to the rulings in Ranjit Dam v. State of West Bengal, (1), J. N. Roy v. State of West Bengal, (2) and Shaik Hanif and others v. State of West Bengal.(3) We need not proceed further with this aspects, in the ultimate view we take on this writ petition. We are not persuaded that a speaking order should be passed by Government or- by the Advisory Board while approving or advising continuance of detention although a brief expression of the principal reasons is desirable. The communication of grounds, the right to make representation and the consideration thereof by the Advisory body made up of men with judicial experience the subject-matter being the deprivation of freedom, clearly implies a quasi-judicial approach. Indeed. where citizen's rights are affected by an authority, the question is not so much the mould into which the nature of the act should be fitted but the nature of the consequence which obligates impartiality, judicial evaluation and reasoned conclusion on facts. as distinguished from policy formulation and zealous imple- mentation regardless of two sides and weighing of evidence. Thebare bones of natural justice in this context need not be clothed with the ample flesh of detailed hearing and elaborate reasoning. It must be self-evident from the order that the substance of the charge and the essential answer in the representation have been impartially considered. We do not think that a speaking order like a regular Judicial performance is either necessary or feasible. Article 22(5) (1) A. I. R. (1972) SC 1753. (2) A. I. R. (1972) SC 2143. (3) Writ Petitions Nos. 1679 etc; judgment on February 1, 1974.
Supreme Court of India Cites 17 - Cited by 59 - R S Sarkaria - Full Document
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