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1 - 10 of 27 (0.26 seconds)The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Mahomed Yasin Nurie vs Shripat Amrit Dange on 7 April, 1948
As against these authorities, Mr. Amin for the appellants invited our attention to a decision of this Court in Mahomed Yasin v. Shripat Amrit, 50 Bom. L.R. 171, the relevant observations being at page 475. The observations to which our attention was invited are these:
Major Robert Stuart Wauchope vs Emperor on 24 August, 1933
[19] Then as to the decision in Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor, 61 Cal. 168, to which our attention was invited by Mr. Amin for the appellants, it was laid down by their Lordships that even when the Legislature had put upon the ac-cused the burden of proving certain matter he was in a much more favorable position than the prosecution, because he was not in general called upon to prove them beyond a reasonable doubt, bat it was sufficient if he succeeded in proving a prim a facie case. It is to be remembered that this decision did not and could not lay down that even if the Court came to the conclusion that the story of an accused person was definitely untrue, it should be accepted on the ground of reasonableness. As a matter of fact, if the story is positively false, it cannot be reasonable in the circumstances of the case. The decision merely lays down, in another form, the principle of benefit of doubt. If the Court feels that the story of an accused does no5 necessarily seem to be true but appears reasonably true, it is really referring to a state of doubt, and. of course, the benefit of doubt has to be given to the accused. In this case it is not the position that the explanation of the accused in regard to p. 180 right onward of the cash book, Ex. L, does not merely appear to true. The position is that the explanation of the accused is definitely false. There cannot, therefore, be any reasonableness about it. There cannot be any question of the said explanation being oven prima facie sensible or probable. In these circumstances none of the two cases cited by Mr. Amin for the appellants really helps the appellants.
Section 17 in Government of India Act, 1935 [Entire Act]
J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs Emperor on 11 April, 1947
L.R. 352), J.K. Gas Plant & Co., Ltd. v. Emperor and Mahomed Yasin v. Shripat Amrit Dange. As it would presently be seen, we have no doubt that Mr. Master, to whom the duty of dealing with cases arising out of the demonetisations of high denomination notes was allocated by the Central Government, had applied his mind to the subject of this sanction. In our opinion, therefore, the second contention of Mr. Amin also fails, namely the contention based on the absence of words "for and on behalf of the Central Government" along with Mr. Master's signature at the foot of the sanction.
Section 7 in Government of India Act, 1935 [Entire Act]
Emperor vs J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. Ltd. on 20 December, 1946
In our opinion, that is the ratio of all the three decisions referred to above, namely, Emperor v. J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. (Rampur) Ltd., (49 Bom.
Emperor vs C.A. Mathews on 29 July, 1929
[14] Mr. Boovariwala has referred us to this case Emperor v. C A Mathews, not so much for contending that the evidence of an accomplice needs no corroboration --indeed, be concedes that it does require corrobo-ration--but for submitting that Bhat and Chhota-lal are not really accomplice witnesses and in any case were not accomplices is their own cause. It in contended that Bhat and Chhotalal are not guilty of the offence for which accused Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are tried. They were not guilty associates in the crime of making a false declaration under Section 7 of Ordinance III of 1946 and did not sustain such a relation to the criminal act of making a false declaration that they could be jointly indicted with the accused. In this context our attention was drawn to the observations of Glover J. who said (p. 20) :