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1 - 10 of 26 (4.98 seconds)The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Smt. Kewal Pati vs State Of U.P And Ors on 6 April, 1995
(3) SCC 100), Kewal Pati (Smt.) v. State of U.P. and
Ors. (1995 (3) SCC 600), Inder Singh v. State of Punjab and
Ors. (1995(3) SCC 702), State of M.P. v. Shyamsunder Trivedi
and Ors. (1995 (4) SCC 262) and by now celebrated decision
in Shri D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (JT 1997 (1) SC 1)
seems to have caused not even any softening attitude to the
inhuman approach in dealing with persons in custody.
State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Shyamsunder Trivedi And Ors on 9 May, 1995
(3) SCC 100), Kewal Pati (Smt.) v. State of U.P. and
Ors. (1995 (3) SCC 600), Inder Singh v. State of Punjab and
Ors. (1995(3) SCC 702), State of M.P. v. Shyamsunder Trivedi
and Ors. (1995 (4) SCC 262) and by now celebrated decision
in Shri D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (JT 1997 (1) SC 1)
seems to have caused not even any softening attitude to the
inhuman approach in dealing with persons in custody.
Shri D.K. Basu,Ashok K. Johri vs State Of West Bengal,State Of U.P on 18 December, 1996
(3) SCC 100), Kewal Pati (Smt.) v. State of U.P. and
Ors. (1995 (3) SCC 600), Inder Singh v. State of Punjab and
Ors. (1995(3) SCC 702), State of M.P. v. Shyamsunder Trivedi
and Ors. (1995 (4) SCC 262) and by now celebrated decision
in Shri D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (JT 1997 (1) SC 1)
seems to have caused not even any softening attitude to the
inhuman approach in dealing with persons in custody.
Noor Khan vs State Of Rajasthan on 19 August, 1963
Merely because
the court witnesses were not permitted to be cross examined,
that is really of no consequence because their evidence was
not considered by the trial Court for recording conviction.
Merely because casualty medical register was not produced,
that is also not a factor to discard the register containing
the original reports of which a copy of the report was
produced. Non-supply of the copies of the statement did not
per se cause prejudice. Strong reliance was placed on a
decision of this Court in Noor Khan v. State of Rajasthan
(1964(4) SCR 521) for the said purpose.
Mohanlal Shamji Soni vs Union Of India And Another on 22 February, 1991
Coming to the plea that refusal to grant permission to
cross examine was impermissible in law, the parameters have
been indicated in Mohanlal Shamji's case supra. If the
Court has permitted the accused to lead the evidence the
mere denial of cross-examining the man by the accused cannot
be per se a vulnerable factor. In the present case, the
three police officials were not required to speak about the
case at hand in general. They were in fact required to state
about certain documents in terms of Section 174 of the Code.
It is of course true that when the permission has been
granted to cross examine, the accused could have produced
some materials to support his case. We need not go into this
aspect in detail because the trial Court itself has
permitted the accused to lead rebuttal evidence.
Ugar Ahir And Ors. vs The State Of Bihar on 6 March, 1964
The doctrine is a dangerous one specially in India for
if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected,
because witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some
aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal
justice would come to a dead-stop. Witnesses just cannot
help in giving embroidery to a story, however, true in the
main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to
what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely
because in some respects the Court considers the same to be
insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a
witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law
that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The
evidence has to be shifted with care. The aforesaid dictum
is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes
across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of
untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or
embellishment. (See Sohrab s/o Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The
State of Madhya Pradesh (1972 (3) SCC 751) and Ugar Ahir and
Ors. v. The State of Bihar (AIR 1965 SC 277). An attempt
has to be made to, as noted above, in terms of felicitous
metaphor, separate grain from the chaff, truth from
falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from
falsehood, because grain and chaff are inextricably mixed
up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new case
has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details
presented by the prosecution completely from the context and
the background against which they are made, the only
available course to be made is to discard the evidence in
toto.
Zwinglee Ariel vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 3 December, 1952
(See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR
1954 SC 15) and Balaka Singh and Ors. v. The State of
Punjab. (AIR 1975 SC 1962).
State Of Rajasthan vs Smt. Kalki & Anr on 15 April, 1981
As observed by this Court in
State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Anr. (AIR 1981 SC
1390), normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are
due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory
due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as
shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are
always there however honest and truthful a witness may be.
Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and
not expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the
category to which a discrepancy may be categorized.