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1 - 6 of 6 (0.28 seconds)The Hindu Women's Rights To Property Act, 1937
Bhagwati Prasad Sah And Others vs Dulhin Rameshwari Juerand Another on 7 May, 1951
The burden, therefore, to prove that the two branches still continued to be joint would lie upon Ramadhar Rai. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, has urged that in the above decision there is a further proposition that "there is no presumption en the plaintiff's side too that because one
"member of the family separated himself, there has been separation with regard to all. It would be a question of fact to be determined in each case upon the evidence relating to the intention of the parties whether there was a separation amongst the other coparceners or that they remained united. The burden would undoubtedly lie on the party who asserts the existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which he claims relief."
Anant Bhikappa Patil vs Shankar Ramchandra Patil on 26 July, 1943
'Again it is to be remembered that the adopted son is the continuator of his adoptive father's line exactly as an aurasa son and that an adoption, so far as the continuity of the line is concerned, has a retrospective effect: whenever the adopting may be made there is no hiatus in the continuity of the line. In fact as West and Buhler point out in their learned treatise on Hindu Law (3rd edition, p. 996, note (a) ), the Hindu lawyers do not regard the male line to be extinct or a Hindu to have died without
male issue until the death of the widow renders the continuation of the line by adoption impossible. It may be mentioned that both these cases arose out of disputes raised by the adopted son after the disruption of the joint family and vesting of the estate in the heir other than the adopted son. Varadachariar J. in Umayal's case AIR 1945 FC 25 also relied upon the principle in Anant's case 70 Ind App 232 : (AIR 1943 PC 196) to which I have referred above. In AIR 1945 Pat 87, dispute arose among the heirs of one Narayan Sao who died leaving valuable properties. On a point of fact it was stated in the judgment at page 88:
Moni Dei vs Hadibandhu Patra And Anr. on 25 January, 1955
It is thus apparent that the real point for consideration in that case was the applicability of Section 3 (2) of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act and not Section 3 (1). Section 3 of the Act runs thus : --
Radhi Bewa And Anr. vs Bhagwan Sahu And Ors. on 9 February, 1951
The occasion for the Full Bench reference arose because the Special Bench of that Court in the case of Radhi Bewa v. Bhagawan Sahu, AIR 1951 Orissa 378, had held that Section 3 (2) of the Act is retrospective in operation and, consequently, the widow of a Hindu who had died before the Act came into force would be entitled to her husband's share in the joint family if it continued till the date when the partition was demanded. The specific question with regard to the meaning of "separate property" occurring in Sub-section (1) of Section 3 was not considered in that case.
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