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1 - 10 of 10 (0.32 seconds)The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882
Section 106 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Section 114 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
The Northern Indian Ferries Act, 1878
Chandra Nath Mukherjee vs Chulai Pashi And Anr. on 1 December, 1958
In Chandra Nath v. Chulai Pashi, AIR 1960 Cal 40 it was held that when there is a forfeiture, that is, when the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter the lessor must give a notice in writing of his intention to determine the lease as provided in Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. It was further observed that the statutory requirement of notice specified in Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be waived by contract and must prevail, and since there was no such notice served by the plaintiff, the latter was held not entitled to treat the lease as determined.
Section 10 in The Factories Act, 1948 [Entire Act]
State Of Uttar Pradesh vs Satya Narain Prasad on 30 October, 1969
In this connection reference may also be made to State of U. P. v. Satya Narain, AIR 1970 SC 1199. In that case their Lordships were dealing with a notice of a cancellation of lease of tolls of public ferry under the Northern India Ferries Act, (1873). It was observed in the context of the relevant provisions of the Act that the notice of intention to cancel the lease cannot be an empty formality and the notice must be such that the lessee can safely act upon it and regulate his affairs. The notice was signed by an Executive Engineer and mentioned Section 10 of the Act, but it was not said in the notice that the officer had been authorised by the Government to give the notice. It was further observed that a notice under Section 10 of the Act must on its face show that what is being conveyed is Government's intention to cancel a lease, and that it is being conveyed either by Government itself or an officer duly authorised on its behalf. I am alive to the fact that their Lordships were dealing with a notice of cancellation of lease under Section 10 of the Ferries Act. But, in my opinion, the observations made by their Lordships apply to a considerable degree even in the case of a notice required to be served on the tenant under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. As already stated above, a notice of determination of tenancy under the Transfer of Property Act is also a statutory requirement and constitutes an important ingredient of the cause of action to file the suit.
Ramniranjan Prasad Tulshyan And Ors. vs Gajadhar Prasad And Ors. on 7 March, 1960
In Ramniranjan v. Gajadhar, AIR 1960 Pat 525 it was observed that the provision as to notice by the lessor has been inserted in Section 111(g) for the benefit of the lessee and is a protective stipulation which cannot be set at naught by the contract entered into between the parties; and construing the provisions of Section 111(g) in the context of the English principle of equity embodied in Section 114 of the Act, that a forfeiture clause for nonpayment of rent is merely security for the rent, the provision as to notice contained in the section cannot be waived by the act of parties. In this view of the matter it was held that there is no forfeiture of lease where the finding of fact is that a notice has not been given by the lessor to the lessee of the forfeiture of the tenancy for non-payment of rent even though an express term in the registered lease provides for an automatic forfeiture on non-payment of rent.
Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadeeshji vs Gappulal on 1 November, 1968
In support of his contention learned counsel placed strong reliance on a Single Bench decision of this Court Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji v. Gappulal, 1969 Raj LW 164 wherein it was observed that the test to determine the authority for the giving of a notice is whether the notice is such that the tenant may act upon it with safety or, in other words, that it is a notice which is binding on the landlord. It appears from the facts of that case that the landlord was the Idol of Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji, and the notice was given by the Devendra Prasad as the Adhikari of the temple of Shri Dwarkadeeshji. The defendant in the written statement admitted that Devendra Prasad was appointed as the Manager of the temple with power to look after the temple and it was found as a fact that the tenant was aware that Devendra Prasad was functioning as Manager of the property of the temple and had given the notice in that capacity. It was further found from the reply given by the defendant to the notice that he definitely considered Devendra Prasad to be the person who had authority to manage the temple. Other material was also put on the record in that case to show that the properties of the temple including the shops in dispute had been entrusted to Devendra Prasad for management with authority to realise rents. In these circumstances the notice was held to be valid. In the present case, however, I do not find any of these things. There is absolutely nothing on the record to show that Shri Jyoti Swaroop was the standing counsel of the Municipal Council and was thus authorised to serve notice on its behalf.
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