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1 - 10 of 23 (0.33 seconds)Section 34 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 134 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Syed Ibrahim vs State Of Andhra Pradesh on 27 July, 2006
In the respect the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case Syed Ibrahim
Vs. State of AP (2006) 10 SCC 601 has held that doctrine of Falsus in Uno Falsus in
obmnibus (False in one thing, false in everything) has no application in India and a
witness who speaks untruth in some aspect cannot be branded as a liar because in
India witnesses cannot help giving embrodiery to their story despite the fact they have
no intention to speak untruth and it is the duty of the court to segregate truth from
falsehood. Observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in para 10 of the
judgment are noteworthy in this context which reads as under
``Stress was laid by the accusedappellants on the non acceptance of evidence
tendered by PW1 to a large extent to contend about desirability to throw out entire
prosecution case. In essence prayer is to apply the principle of "falsus in uno falsus in
omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. Even
if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to
prove guilt of an accused, his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of Court to
separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open
to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been
found to be deficient, or to be note wholly credible. Falsity of material particular
would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in
omnibus" has no application in India and the witness or witnesses cannot be branded
as liar(s). The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has not received general
acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a
rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be
disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the
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question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of
circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule of evidence.
Vadivelu Thevar vs The State Of Madras(With Connected ... on 12 April, 1957
In this respect similar observations were also made by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in the case of Vedivelu Thevar Vs. State of Madras, 1957 AIR 614
1957 SCR 981, wherein, in a murder trial two out of three eye witnesses had turned
hostile and the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India had upheld the conviction of the
accused on the sole testimony of the remaining single eyewitness. In this case
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India had made an observation that the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 did not prescribe that any minimum number of witnesses were required to
prove any particular fact and if the sole testimony of a single witness who is a reliable
witness is rejected or not relied then the courts would indirectly encourage
suborination (perjury) of witnesses that is, the witness will be encouraged to commit
perjury. Paras 11 and 13 of the judgment reproduced below are noteworthy in this
regard
``11. In view of these considerations, we have no hesitation in holding that the
FIR No. 365/01
19
contention that in a murder case, the court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is
much too broadly stated. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act has categorically laid
it down that " no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the
proof of any fact." The legislature determined, as long ago as 1872, presumably after
due consideration of the pros and cons, that it shall not be necessary for proof or
disproof of a fact, to call any particular number of witnesses. In England, both before
and after the passing of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there have been a number of
statutes as set out in Sarkar's I Law of Evidence 9th Edition, at pp. 1 100 and 1 101,
forbidding convictions on the testimony of a single witness. The Indian Legislature
has not insisted on laying down any such exceptions to the general rule recognized in
s. 134 quoted above. The section enshrines the well recognized maxim that " Evidence
has to be weighed and not counted". Our Legislature has given statutory recognition
to the fact that administration of justice may be hampered if a particular number of
witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in
the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of
uncommon occurrence, where determination of guilt depends entirely on
circumstantial evidence. If the Legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses,
cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the
crime, would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes
into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the
quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted
or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there is no
legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. Even as the
guilt of an accused person may be proved by the testimony of a single witness, the
innocence of an accused person may be established on the testimony of a single
witness, even though a considerable number of witnesses may be forthcoming to
testify to the truth of the case for the prosecution. Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound
and well established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not
with the quantity of the evidence necessary for, proving or disproving a fact.
Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three
categories, namely:
Section 379 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 9 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Gubbala Venugopalaswamy And Ors vs State Of Andhra Pradesh on 6 April, 2004
It was further illuminated in the
Zahira H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat [2004 (4) SCC 158], Ram Udgar Singh v. State
of Bihar [2004(10) SCC 443], Gorle S. Naidu v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2003 (12)
SCC 449] and in Gubbala Venugopalswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2004 (10)
SCC 120].''
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24
In the present case, in fact, the sole witness Ramesh Kumar has not made
any false statement on any aspect or material fact related to the offence in question or the
identity of the accused. He has not even given any embroidery to his story. He had
merely got confused during his examination in chief and had wrongly deposed that the
accused was the person who had told him about his currency which has allegedly fallen
on the road and the witness had himself clarified his mistake and had categorically
deposed that the accused was not the person who had told him about the fallen currency
notes but was the person who had retained him to facilitate the escape of his accomplice
who had run away with the bag of his employer.