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1 - 10 of 26 (0.05 seconds)Section 9 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Section 13 in THE COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT, 2015 [Entire Act]
The Trade Marks Act, 1999
The Companies Act, 1956
M/S Mohan Meakin Limited vs A.B. Sugars Limited on 10 October, 2013
The
Delhi High Court, in the case of Mohan Meakin Ltd. v. A.B. Sugars
Ltd.6, while considering the action of rival marks "OLD MONK"
Neon Laboratories Ltd vs Themis Medicare Ltd on 16 September, 2014
and 'TOLD MOM XXX RUM", analysed the marks OLD MONK
and TOLD MOM XXX RUM held that if they are repeatedly
spoken, they may not appear similar; however, it is not the test of
microscopic examination in the court room but how they would be
pronounced and will be phonetically similar where they are used.
Learned Single Judge of this Court, in the case of Neon Laboratories
Ltd. v. Themis Medicare Ltd.7, after comparing the plaintiff's mark
'LOX' and the defendant mark 'XYLOX', observed that defendant's
mark XYLOX is substantially and deceptively similar to the
plaintiff's mark LOX and, accordingly, granted injunction.
Ruston & Hornsby Ltd vs The Zamindara Engineering Co on 8 September, 1969
38. The peculiar facts in Meso were that various
international brands were using the mark along with their house
mark. The decision in the case Meso will have to be understood in
the facts of the case as noted in the decision itself. The decision in
Meso was rendered in the facts of that case, and no absolute
proposition as the impugned order refers to was laid down. Having
relied upon the decision of Meso thus, the impugned order does not
indicate as to what will be the position in the case at hand. No
decision is cited before us laying down an absolute proposition that
even though a mark constitutes as a trademark under Section 2(1)
(zb), if it is used with a house name, will not infringe a registered
trademark in cases of all premium consumer products, irrespective of
the factual situation of the case. If such an absolute proposition is
accepted, almost every registered trademark in premium consumer
products will be vulnerable. On the other hand, the impugned order
does not refer to a series of decisions holding that mere addition of a
word or a mark to an objected mark would not by itself make any
31 COMAPEAL(L) 10963.21..doc
difference to the action for infringement. These are : the decision of
the Supreme Court in Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. The Zamindara
Engineering Co.9; the decision of the learned Single Judge of this
Court in the case of Pidilite Industries Ltd. v. Jubilant Agro
Consumer Products Ltd.10; the decision of the Division Bench of the
Madras High Court in Rhizome Distilleries Pvt. Ltd v. Union of
India11 ; and the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High
Court in K.R. Chinnikrishna Chetty v. K. Venkatesa Mudaliar ,12.
Therefore the direct conclusion that the use of house marks in all
circumstances in expensive consumer products of all types will
obviate the likelihood of confusion as a proposition was not correct
in law. Consequently, factual inquiry about the facts of the present
case is missing in the impugned order.
Pidilite Industries Limited vs Jubilant Agri & Consumer Products ... on 13 January, 2014
38. The peculiar facts in Meso were that various
international brands were using the mark along with their house
mark. The decision in the case Meso will have to be understood in
the facts of the case as noted in the decision itself. The decision in
Meso was rendered in the facts of that case, and no absolute
proposition as the impugned order refers to was laid down. Having
relied upon the decision of Meso thus, the impugned order does not
indicate as to what will be the position in the case at hand. No
decision is cited before us laying down an absolute proposition that
even though a mark constitutes as a trademark under Section 2(1)
(zb), if it is used with a house name, will not infringe a registered
trademark in cases of all premium consumer products, irrespective of
the factual situation of the case. If such an absolute proposition is
accepted, almost every registered trademark in premium consumer
products will be vulnerable. On the other hand, the impugned order
does not refer to a series of decisions holding that mere addition of a
word or a mark to an objected mark would not by itself make any
31 COMAPEAL(L) 10963.21..doc
difference to the action for infringement. These are : the decision of
the Supreme Court in Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. The Zamindara
Engineering Co.9; the decision of the learned Single Judge of this
Court in the case of Pidilite Industries Ltd. v. Jubilant Agro
Consumer Products Ltd.10; the decision of the Division Bench of the
Madras High Court in Rhizome Distilleries Pvt. Ltd v. Union of
India11 ; and the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High
Court in K.R. Chinnikrishna Chetty v. K. Venkatesa Mudaliar ,12.
Therefore the direct conclusion that the use of house marks in all
circumstances in expensive consumer products of all types will
obviate the likelihood of confusion as a proposition was not correct
in law. Consequently, factual inquiry about the facts of the present
case is missing in the impugned order.
Rhizome Distilleries Pvt. Ltd vs Union Of India on 5 November, 2015
38. The peculiar facts in Meso were that various
international brands were using the mark along with their house
mark. The decision in the case Meso will have to be understood in
the facts of the case as noted in the decision itself. The decision in
Meso was rendered in the facts of that case, and no absolute
proposition as the impugned order refers to was laid down. Having
relied upon the decision of Meso thus, the impugned order does not
indicate as to what will be the position in the case at hand. No
decision is cited before us laying down an absolute proposition that
even though a mark constitutes as a trademark under Section 2(1)
(zb), if it is used with a house name, will not infringe a registered
trademark in cases of all premium consumer products, irrespective of
the factual situation of the case. If such an absolute proposition is
accepted, almost every registered trademark in premium consumer
products will be vulnerable. On the other hand, the impugned order
does not refer to a series of decisions holding that mere addition of a
word or a mark to an objected mark would not by itself make any
31 COMAPEAL(L) 10963.21..doc
difference to the action for infringement. These are : the decision of
the Supreme Court in Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. The Zamindara
Engineering Co.9; the decision of the learned Single Judge of this
Court in the case of Pidilite Industries Ltd. v. Jubilant Agro
Consumer Products Ltd.10; the decision of the Division Bench of the
Madras High Court in Rhizome Distilleries Pvt. Ltd v. Union of
India11 ; and the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High
Court in K.R. Chinnikrishna Chetty v. K. Venkatesa Mudaliar ,12.
Therefore the direct conclusion that the use of house marks in all
circumstances in expensive consumer products of all types will
obviate the likelihood of confusion as a proposition was not correct
in law. Consequently, factual inquiry about the facts of the present
case is missing in the impugned order.