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1 - 10 of 21 (0.25 seconds)Section 36 in The Indian Stamp Act, 1899 [Entire Act]
Hindustan Steel Ltd vs M/S. Dalip Construction Company on 18 February, 1969
21. In any event, counsel for the plaintiff has stated that the plaintiff is
willing to furnish the required stamp duty along with the penalty for the
unstamped SPA (Ex. PW1/3). Accordingly, the plaintiff is directed to
6
Hindustan Steel Ltd Vs. Dilip Construction Company (1969) 1 SCC 597
7
Union Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar AIR 1997 SC 3
Digitally
signed by
AYUSH
Suit No 521/20 Pg 27 of 31 AYUSH SHARMA
SHARMA Date:
The Indian Stamp Act, 1899
Section 35 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Mohinder Kaur vs Sant Paul Singh on 1 October, 2019
17. Regarding the objection of unstamped power of attorney, the
defendant's counsel relied on Gurmeet Singh (Supra), Mohinder Kaur
(Supra), and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (Supra). In Janki Bhojwani, the
court held that a power of attorney holder who has acted in accordance
with the power granted may testify on behalf of the principal regarding
those acts. However, he cannot testify about acts performed by the
principal personally, nor can he provide testimony regarding matters of
which only the principal has personal knowledge and should be cross-
examined. Similar observations were made in Mohinder Kaur concerning
the authority of a power of attorney holder. In the present case, it is
significant that the defendant, in his written statement on page 6, expressly
stated:
Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani & Anr vs Indusind Bank Ltd. & Ors on 6 December, 2004
17. Regarding the objection of unstamped power of attorney, the
defendant's counsel relied on Gurmeet Singh (Supra), Mohinder Kaur
(Supra), and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (Supra). In Janki Bhojwani, the
court held that a power of attorney holder who has acted in accordance
with the power granted may testify on behalf of the principal regarding
those acts. However, he cannot testify about acts performed by the
principal personally, nor can he provide testimony regarding matters of
which only the principal has personal knowledge and should be cross-
examined. Similar observations were made in Mohinder Kaur concerning
the authority of a power of attorney holder. In the present case, it is
significant that the defendant, in his written statement on page 6, expressly
stated:
Bharat Bhushan Gupta vs Pratap Narain Verma on 16 June, 2022
22. The next objection pertains to the valuation of the suit for the
purpose of jurisdiction and court fees. The defendant's counsel argued that
the suit property must be assessed at market value for the relief of
possession, thereby requiring ad valorem court fees. However, this
argument is baseless and unsustainable. The fundamental principle
remains: once a licensee, always a licensee, meaning a licensee cannot
deny or exclude the possession of the licensor. This suit primarily seeks
possession, and the plaintiff is not precluded from seeking recovery of
possession merely because the relief has not been framed as a mandatory
injunction. The nature of the present suit, makes its evident on the face of
the record that the plaintiff has sought the possession of the suit property
alleging that the defendant is her tenant / licensee at a monthly license fee
of Rs.9,000/- per month. It is the nature of the relief which is decisive of
the question of the suit valuation as held in the judgment of Bharat
Bhushan Gupta (supra). As a necessary corollary, the market value does
not become decisive of suit valuation merely because an immovable
property is the subject matter of the litigation. In view thereof, the plaintiff
has properly valued the suit for claiming possession and has paid the
Digitally
signed by
AYUSH
Suit No 521/20 Pg 28 of 31 AYUSH SHARMA
SHARMA Date:
Mool Chand Bakhru & Anr vs Rohan & Others on 29 January, 2002
remains unpaid out of the total sale consideration of Rs. 18,00,000/-.
Before evaluating the conflicting claims, it is important to highlight that a
plea of part performance based on an oral agreement to sale is
unsustainable in law. Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
('TP Act') states that if a person contracts to transfer immovable property
for consideration through a written agreement, signed either by them or on
their behalf, and if the terms necessary for the transfer can be ascertained
with reasonable certainty, then the transferee--having taken possession of
the property or any part thereof in part performance of the contract--can
protect their possession. This protection extends only if the transferee,
already in possession, continues to do so in furtherance of the contract and
has either performed or is willing to perform their part of the agreement.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Mool Chand Bakhru & Anr. v. Rohan &
Ors.1, held that a written agreement is a fundamental prerequisite for
invoking the equitable doctrine of part performance under Section 53A of
the TP Act. The court observed: