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1 - 10 of 23 (0.29 seconds)The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Section 1 in The Representation Of The People Act, 1950 [Entire Act]
Kumara Nand vs Brijmohan Lal Sharma on 29 November, 1966
The result of the foregoing discussion is that this case
will have to be judged of under s. 1 00 ( 1 ) (d) and not
under s. 100 (1) (b). In the arguments before us Mr.
Chari conceded that some of the articles contain false
statements regarding the character and conduct of Mr. Patil.
He mentioned in this connection five articles. It is, not,
therefore, necessary to examine, each of the 16 articles
separately. If the conditions required by S. 100, (1) (d)
read with s. 123 (4) are satisfied, a corrupt practice
avoiding the election will be established. The first
condition is that the candidate's belief in the falsity of
the statements must be established That was laid down by
this Court in Kumara Nand v. Brijmohan Lal Sharma(1). The
second condition is that the result of the election in so
far as Mr. Fernandez is concerned must be shown to be
materially affected. Thus we have not only to see (a) that
the statement was made by an agent, (b) that it was false
etc., (c) that it related to the personal character and
conduct of Mr. Patil, (d) that it was reasonably calculated
to harm his chances but also (e) that it in fact materially
affected the result of the election in so far as Mr.
Fernandez was concerned. Of these (a) and (c) are admitted
and (b) is admitted by Mr. Fernandez because he said that he
did not believe that there was any truth in these
statements. The question next is whether they were
calculated to affect the prospects of Mr. Patil. Here there
can be no two opinions. These articles cast violent
aspersions and were false as admitted by Mr. Fernandez
himself. The course of conduct shows a deliberate attempt
to lower his character and so they must be held to be
calculated to harm him in his election. So far the
appellants are on firm ground. Even if all these findings
are in favour of the appellants, we cannot declare the
election to be void under S. 100(1) (d) (ii) unless we reach
the further conclusion that the result of the election in so
(1) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 127.
Sheopat Singh vs Ram Pratap on 28 August, 1964
"The sub-section requires : (i) publication of
any statement of fact by a candidate, (ii)
that fact is false, (iii) the candidate
believes it to be false or does not believe it
to be true, (iv) the statement is in relation
to the personal character or conduct of
another candidate; and (v) the said statement
is one being reasonably calculated to
prejudice the prospects of the other candi-
date's election. (See Sheopat Singh v. Ram
Pratap(1) This case thus lays down that the
person with whose belief the provision is
concerned is ordinarily the candidate who, if
we may say so, is responsible for the publi-
cation. The responsibility of the candidate
for the publication arises if he publishes the
thing himself. He is equally responsible for
the publication if it is published by his
agent. Thirdly he is also responsible where
the thing is published by any other person
but with the consent of the candidate or his
election agent. In all three cases the
responsibility is of the candidate and it is
ordinarily the candidate's belief that matters
for this purpose. If the candidate either
believes the statement to be false or does not
believe it to be true he would be responsible
under s. 123(4). In the present case. the
poem was not actually read by the appellant,
but it was read in his presence at a meeting
at which he was presiding by Avinash Chander.
In these circumstances. the High Court was
right in coming to the conclusion that the
recitation of the poem by Avinash Chander at
the meeting amounted to the publication of the
false statement of fact contained in it by
another person with the consent of the
candidate, and in this case, even of his
election agent who was also present at the
meeting., But the responsibility for such
publication in the circumstances of this case
is of the candidate and it is the candidate's
belief that matters and not the belief of the
person who actually read it with the consent
of the candidate. What would be the position
in a case where the candidate had no knowledge
at all of the publication before it was made
need not be considered for that is not so
here. It is not disputed in this case that
the statement that the respondent was the
greatest of all thieves, was false. It is
also not seriously challenged that the
appellant did not believe it to be true. The
contention that Avinash Chander's belief
should have been proved must therefore fail."
Chandi Prasad Chokhani vs The State Of Bihar on 24 April, 1961
In Chandi
Prasad Chokhani v. State of Bihar(3) it was held that the
powers of amendment were extensive but they were controlled
by the law laid down in the Representation of the People
Act. It was again emphasised that a new ground or charge
could not be made the ground of attack as that made a new
petition.
Nani Gopal Swami vs Abdul Hamid Choudhury And Anr. on 5 January, 1959
Mr. Jethamalani contended in further support that there was
a clear similarity in the statements and utterances of Mr.
Fernandez and Mr. Atrey. He inferred a high probability of
concept between them. In this connection he referred in
particular to the speech of Mr. Fernandez at Shivaji Park
and the conduct of Shanbhag, one of his workers, in
following up what Mr. Fernandez had said. We shall refer to
this last part later on which a considerable part of the
time of the Court was spent, although we had ruled out the
amendment with regard to the speech at Shivaji Park. Mr.
Jethamalani referred to the following cases among others in
support of his contention that consent in such circumstances
may be assumed : Nani Gopal Swami v. Abdul Hamid Choudhury
and Another(1), Adams and Others v. Hon. E.F. Leveson Gower
(2) Christie v. Grieve(3) and W. F. Spencer; John Blundell
v. Charles Harrison(4). There is no doubt that consent need
not be directly proved and a consistent course of conduct in
the canvass of the candidate may raise a presumption of
consent. But there are cases and cases. Even if all this
is accepted we are of opinion that consent cannot be
inferred. The evidence proves only that Mr. Atrey was a
supporter and that perhaps established agency of Mr. Atrey.
It may be that evidence is to be found supporting the fact
that Mr. Atrey acted as agent of Mr. Femandez with his
consent. That however does not trouble us 'because Mr.
Chari admitted that Mr. Atrey can be treated as an agent of
Mr. Fernandez. It is however a very wide jump from this to
say that Mr. Fernandez had consented to each publication ;as
it came or ever generally consented to the publication of
items defaming the character and conduct of Mr. Patil. That
consent must be specific.
Abdul Majeed (Meera Sahib) vs Bhargavan (Krishnan) Member, ... on 23 March, 1962
If they could not be regarded as agents of Mr.
Fernandez we do not see any reason to hold that the
'Maratha' or Mr. Atrey can safely be regarded as agent of
Mr. Fernandez when acting for the newspaper so as to prove
his consent to the publication of the defamatory matter. We
are therefore of opinion that consent cannot reasonably be
inferred to the publications in the 'Maratha'. We are
supported in our approach to the problem by a large body of
case law to which our attention was drawn by Mr. Chari. We
may refer to a few cases here : Biswanath Upadhaya v.
Haralal Das and Others(1), Abdul Majeed v. Bhargavan
(Krishnan) & otherS(2), Rustom Satin v. Dr. Sampoornanand
and Others(3), Sarla Devi Pathak v. Birendra Singh &
OtherS(4), Krishna Kumar v. Krishna Gopal(5), Lalsing
Keshrising Rehvar v. Vallabhdas Shankerlal Thekdi and
Others(6), Badri Narain Singh and Others v. Kamdeo Prasad
Singh and Another (7) and Sarat Chandra Rabba v. Khagendranath
Nath and others(8). It is not necessary to
(1) (1959) Assam 97. (2) A.I.R. 1963 Kerala 18.
(3) 20 E.L.R. 221. (4) 20 E.L.R. 275.
Krishna Kumar vs Krishna Gopal on 7 May, 1963
If they could not be regarded as agents of Mr.
Fernandez we do not see any reason to hold that the
'Maratha' or Mr. Atrey can safely be regarded as agent of
Mr. Fernandez when acting for the newspaper so as to prove
his consent to the publication of the defamatory matter. We
are therefore of opinion that consent cannot reasonably be
inferred to the publications in the 'Maratha'. We are
supported in our approach to the problem by a large body of
case law to which our attention was drawn by Mr. Chari. We
may refer to a few cases here : Biswanath Upadhaya v.
Haralal Das and Others(1), Abdul Majeed v. Bhargavan
(Krishnan) & otherS(2), Rustom Satin v. Dr. Sampoornanand
and Others(3), Sarla Devi Pathak v. Birendra Singh &
OtherS(4), Krishna Kumar v. Krishna Gopal(5), Lalsing
Keshrising Rehvar v. Vallabhdas Shankerlal Thekdi and
Others(6), Badri Narain Singh and Others v. Kamdeo Prasad
Singh and Another (7) and Sarat Chandra Rabba v. Khagendranath
Nath and others(8). It is not necessary to
(1) (1959) Assam 97. (2) A.I.R. 1963 Kerala 18.
(3) 20 E.L.R. 221. (4) 20 E.L.R. 275.
Harish Chandra Bajpai vs Triloki Singh on 21 December, 1956
The learned Judge in the High Court has relied upon Harish
Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh(1) and deduced the
proposition that where the petition sets out the corrupt
practice as a ground, instances of the corrupt practices may
be added subsequently and even after the period of
limitation of filing the petition is over. Following that
case the learned Judge has allowed the
(1) [1957] S.C.R. 370.