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S.V.Matha Prasad vs Bharat Petroleum on 24 March, 2011 cites

M. C. Chockalingam & Ors vs V. Manickavasagam & Ors on 31 October, 1973

" In our opinion, any right which the dealer has over his site was the right which he had acquired in terms of the lease. When that lease expired and when the landlord declined to renew the same and also called upon the erstwhile tenant to surrender possession, the erstwhile lessee could no longer assert that he had any right to the site. His continued occupation of something which he had no right to occupy cannot be regarded as source of a right to the land of which he himself was not in lawful possession. As observed by this Court in the case of M.C. Chockalingam & Ors. Vs. V. Manickavasagam & Ors. (supra), litigious possession cannot be regarded as lawful possession. As rightly pointed out by the Division Bench of the High Court the right referred to in this Rule has necessarily to be regarded as right which is in accordance with law and the right to the site must be one which is capable of being regarded as lawful.
Supreme Court of India Cites 15 - Cited by 176 - P K Goswami - Full Document

State Of U.P. And Anr vs Raja Ram Jaiswal And Anr- on 29 April, 1985

So submitting, learned counsel placed much reliance on a decision reported in AIR 1985 SC 1108 (State of U.P. vs. Raja Ram Jaiswal) wherein it has been held that the High Court cannot proceed to take over the functions of the licensing authority and direct the licensing authority by a mandamus to grant licence, and ultimately pleaded for dismissal of the writ petition at the threshold.
Supreme Court of India Cites 12 - Cited by 98 - D A Desai - Full Document

Swami Motor Transport (P) Ltd.And ... vs Sri Sankaraswamigal Muttand ... on 26 September, 1962

In Swami Motor Transport (P) Ltd. v. Sri Sankaraswamigal Mull (1963 Supp (1) SCR 282) this Court considered the question whether the right of a tenant to apply to a court for an order directing the landlord to sell the land to him for a price to be fixed by it under Section 9 of the Tenants Act is a property right. The court held, that the law of India does not recognize equitable estates, a statutory right to purchase land does not confer any right or interest in the property. The right conferred by Section 9 is a statutory right to purchase land and it does not create any interest or right to the property. The tenant's right to secure only such portion of the holding as may be necessary for his convenient enjoyment is equitable in nature. Under the common law a tenant is liable to eviction and he has no right to purchase the land demised to him at any price as well as under the Transfer of Property Act. The only right of a tenant who may have put up structure on the demised land is to remove the structure at the time of delivery of possession on the determination of the lease. Section 9 confers an additional statutory right to a tenant against whom suit for ejectment is filed to exercise an option to purchase the demised land to that extent only which he may require for convenient enjoyment of the property. The tenant has no vested right in the property instead; it is a privilege granted to him by the statute which is equitable in nature. "
Supreme Court of India Cites 17 - Cited by 42 - Full Document

Bhawanji Lakhamhi & Ors vs Himatlal Jamnadas Dani & Ors on 14 December, 1971

We have already referred to Bhawanji Lakhamshi & Ors. Vs. Himatlal Jamnadas Dani & Ors. (supra) wherein this Court held that the act of holding over after the expiration of the term does not create a tenancy of any kind. A new tenancy is created only when the landlord assents to the continuance of the erstwhile tenant or the landlord agrees to accept rent for the continued possession of the land by the erstwhile tenant. The contention of Mr. L.N. Rao that the landlord's assent should be inferred from the conduct of the landlord who had filed the suit for ejectment, but did not pursue the same, has no force. This suit was withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action, liberty which the Court has granted. The possession of this site by the erstwhile lessee does not ripen into a lawful possession merely because the landlord did not proceed with the suit for ejectment at that time, but reserved the right to bring such a suit at a later point of time. That cannot amount to an assent on his part to the continued occupation of the landlord under cover of a right asserted by the erstwhile lessee. The words "right to the site" in Rule 153(1) (i) must, therefore, in our opinion, be given their full meaning and the effect that unless the person seeking a licence is in a position to establish a right to the site, he would not be entitled to hold or have his licence renewed. We have already rejected the contention of Mr. L.N. Rao that the appellant-tenant is a statutory tenant for the reasons recorded earlier. The lease deed is very clear as to what was leased. The lease was of vacant land. That is evident from the recitals in the plaint, legal notice, lease deed etc. It is, therefore, not in dispute that the lease of land is not covered by the statute, The Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969 in force extending protection to tenants. We now come to the last contention of Mr. L.N. Rao that the first respondent is not entitled to maintain the writ petition as the proceedings initiated by him before the Collector for cancellation of the No Objection Certificate is pending. The said submission cannot be accepted. While granting NOC, the Collector is not concerned about the ownership of the land. He is concerned about the location of the land and its suitability as a place for storage of petroleum. Rule 144 deals with the grant of NOC does not contemplate an enquiry into the ownership of the land nor does it require the Collector to enquire into the nature of the right claimed by the person who has applied for the NOC. We, therefore, uphold the judgment and final order passed by the Division Bench dated 7.10.2003 in Writ Appeal Nos. 1149 & 2140 of 2002 for the reasons given by us in this judgment."
Supreme Court of India Cites 14 - Cited by 126 - K K Mathew - Full Document

Moon Mills Ltd vs Industrial Court Bombay (M.R. Meher) & ... on 28 February, 1967

14. Further, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in The Moon Mills Ltd. vs M.R.Meher, (AIR 1967 SC 1450) had categorically held that writ is legally a matter of sound discretion and would not be issued if there be such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken on conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, which may cause prejudice to the adverse party. Writs so far as they are concerned with the enforcement of the other rights are not issued as a " matter of course." On a careful consideration of the facts of the present case, the only conclusion would be that this is a deserving case where a writ must be issued as sought for as otherwise, as rightly pointed out, much prejudice would result in to the petitioner.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 341 - Full Document
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