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1 - 9 of 9 (0.22 seconds)Article 119 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 30 in The Arbitration Act, 1940 [Entire Act]
Section 17 in The Arbitration Act, 1940 [Entire Act]
The Limitation Act, 1963
Article 158 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 44 in The Arbitration Act, 1940 [Entire Act]
The Arbitration Act, 1940
L. Madan Lal Haveliwala vs L. Sunder Lal And Anr. on 15 April, 1963
After this written-statement was filed, nearly nine months later, the respondent No. 3 filed an application on July 29, 1975 under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act stating that since none of the respondents had made an application to set aside the award or to remit the award for reconsideration he was entitled to judgment and decree in terms of the award passed by the arbitrators on June 6, 1974. The prayer in the application, therefore, called upon the Court to pronounce judgment and pass a decree in accordance with the terms of the award. After this application was made by the respondent No. 3, an application came to be made by the petitioner on November 1, 1976 requesting the Court to treat the written-statement filed by the petitioner as an application under Section 33 and the petitioner made reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Madan Lal v. Sunder Lal [1976] A.I.R. S.C. 1233. In effect the application appears to be one for amendment of the written-statement for the purpose of changing its form into one from a written-statement to an application which is the alternative prayer made by the petitioner, the principal prayer being that the written-statement should be treated as an application itself. The amendment sought was only in the cause title by showing the present petitioner as the applicant and the present opponents as opponents. This application was opposed by the respondent No. 3. The trial Court purporting to make an order on the application (exh. 51) filed by the present petitioner which was the application made on November 1, 1976 held that though the respondent No. 3 had given an application on July 29, 1975 contending that no party had filed an application for setting aside the award and therefore a decree should be passed, the present petitioner who was defendant No. 5 "did not try to check legal position and made efforts to rectify the mistake by filing a separate application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act". The learned Judge observed that "this will show that the defendant No. 5 in spite of noticing the legal posision did not choose to follow the correct procedure and filed his application on November 1, 1976 requesting to treat his written statement exh. 28 as a separate application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act." It was argued before the learned Judge that a written-statement raising objections to the award could be treated as an application under Section 33. Referring to this argument the learned Judge observed:
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