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1 - 10 of 22 (0.82 seconds)The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946
Section 10 in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
The Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948
Section 2 in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
Cooper Engineering Limited vs Shri P. P. Mundhe on 20 August, 1975
In the present case, the Industrial Tribunal has done nothing but followed/ the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court by permitting the employer to lead evidence to justify the dismissal. A perusal of the observations above clearly shows that the Supreme Court disapproved the efforts of any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the Labour Court by questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter if worthy can be agitated even after the final award, it was keeping these observations in view that this Court had observed at the initial stage that the petition ought to be withdrawn with the rider that the same issues can be agitated at the time when the final award is given. However, Mr. Rele insisted that the legal issues involved in the present case need to be decided at this stage only. I have done my modest best.
National Asphalt Products ... vs N.M. Kothari And Ors. on 12 October, 1976
"It is already been noted in the instant case that the material indicates that the industrial dispute under section 2-A of the Act has arisen on the next day of the order of termination and even the co-workers of Ravi Soren were agitated about the termination and had threatened industrial unrest the matter was referred to conciliation but such proceeding failed and the failure report was duly submitted to the Government. This
dispute also related to the status of complaining woman in the family of the deceased worker. Thus the dispute in essence was an individual dispute, though supported by some of the workmen. Therefore, whether the dispute referred to in the order of reference is an industrial dispute within the meaning of Clause 2 (k) or section 2-A of the said Act is of no consequence so far as the power of the Tribunal to adjudicate the same is concerned. The facts of this authority are almost similar to the instant case. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that this authority would not solve the problem as the parties would not know as to the nature of the dispute before the tribunal decides the issue and it would/ may effect their rights and liabilities. There is no merit in the submission. In the instant case the Company knew from the very beginning that industrial dispute under section 2-A of the Act has arisen as the concerned workman namely Ravi Soren had demanded reinstatement on the next day of the termination of service. With respect, we fully agree to the proposition of law as laid down in National Asphalt Production Construction Co. case, 1977 Lab.l.C. 1300 (supra)."
D.P. Maheshwari vs Delhi Admn. & Ors on 14 September, 1983
The misery which a dismissed employee faces has been highlighted by the Supreme Court again in the case of D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and others, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 153. In the opening paragraph of the aforesaid judgment the Supreme Court has emphasised that neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. As noticed earlier, in the present case all the issues which have been agitated by the Bank could well have been agitated after the final award had been given. The Court is not oblivious of the fact that it is in the interest of the petitioner Bank to challenge the Part-I Award for two reasons, (i) Delay of the final adjudication and thus putting financial and mental pressure on the workman, (ii) Avoidance of the payment of legal dues in the event the award is made against the Bank. If the Award had been challenged when the respondent had been ordered to be reinstated
in service, the petitioner would only get stay of the Award by complying with section 17-B of the Act. This eventuality can be avoided by challenging the Part-I Award. In my view, adoption of this kind of course by managements is to be discouraged. Inspite of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, the present petition was admitted and operation of the Part-I Award was stayed. In view of the fact that the proceedings have been pending against the respondent for the past 5 years it would be in the interest of justice that the Tribunal is directed to dispose of the complaint finally within fixed period.