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Syedna Taher Saifuddin vs Tyebbhai Moosaji Koicha And Anr. on 20 August, 1952 cites

Punjab Province vs Daulat Singh on 30 January, 1946

[5] Now, the contention of Mr. Banaji on behalf of defendant 1 is that, looking to the language of the Act, it is clear that the mischief aimed at by the Legislature was orders of excommunication or acts of expelling a member from a community and the Legislature wanted to suppress this particular mischief and therefore it provided that after the Act came into force no order of excommnni. cation or no act of expulsion shall be passed or dono by any person whatsoever. Mr. Banaji says that it was not the intention of the Legislature in any way to affect orders of excommunication which had already been passed prior to 1-11.1949. Mr. Banaji emphasises the language used in the Act in the various parts. He points out that the very title of the Act is to prohibit excommunication and the very word "prohibit" implies that what is aimed at is something to be done in the future; and for that purpose reliance is placed on a deci. sion of the Privy Council in Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh, . iN that case the Privy Council was considering the ex. pression "prohibit" used in Sub-section (2) (a) of Section 298, Government of India Act, 1035, and their Lordships construed "prohibit" as meaning the for. bidding of a transaction, and expressed the opinion that such a direction was appropriate only in respect of transactions to take place subsequently to the date of the direction, and that the expression could not include an attempt to reopen or set aside transactions already completed or to vacate titles already acquired, Mr. Banaji is quite right that if the intention of the Legislature was to prevent a particular act or a particular transaction, then the very language used by the Legislature could only apply to acts or transactions in the future. It could not possibly apply to acts or transactions in the past. But, as we shall presently point out, it was not the intention of the Legislature merely to prevent a particular act or transaction.
Bombay High Court Cites 23 - Cited by 45 - Full Document

The State Of Bombay vs Narasu Appa Mali on 24 July, 1951

[18] Then it is contended that the Act is ultra vires because it contravenes Articles 2-5 and 25 of the Constitution. With regard to Article 25, we had to consider a similar question in State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, . What was challenged in that case was the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, and Article 35 was also relied upon in that case. We held in that ease that in considering Article 25 a sharp distinction must be drawn between religious faith and belief and religious practices. What the State protects is religions faith and belief. If religious practices run counter to public order, morality, health or a policy of social welfare upon which the State has embarked, then the religious) practices must give way before the good of the people of the State as a whole. Here also, our view is that the right to escomnmnicate a member of a community is not part of religious faith and belief. At best, it can only bo a religious prac sice, and if in the opinion of the Legislature such a religious practice runs counter to public order, morality, health or a policy of social welfare upon which the State has embarked, then the religious practice must give way and the legislation must prevail against the practice. Mr. Banaji says that in that case Article 26 was not relied, upon, and according to him, even though wo may be bound by that decision, he is in a position to distinguish this case because the present case falls under Article 26 and that article was not before us when we delivered the judgment in that case. Mow, tuni-ing to Article 25, it provides :
Bombay High Court Cites 29 - Cited by 50 - B P Sinha - Full Document
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