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1 - 10 of 17 (0.39 seconds)THE COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT, 2015
Kailash vs Nanhku & Ors on 6 April, 2005
In addressing the said issue, the Supreme Court referred to
its earlier decisions in Kailash v. Nanhku6 and Salem Advocate Bar
Association v. U.O.I.7, which dealt with Order VIII Rule 1 of the
CPC. It was held, in the said decisions, that the mere fact that Order
VIII Rule 1 of the CPC used the word ―shall‖ did not, ipso facto,
render the provision mandatory. Thereafter, the Supreme Court in
Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti5 went on to distinguish
Section 34(5) with Section 29A13 of the 1996 Act. Unlike Section
29A of the 1996 Act which provided [in sub-section (4)] that, if an
award was made beyond the stipulated or extended period contained
in that provision, the mandate of the arbitrator would terminate, it was
observed that Sections 34(5) and (6) of the 1996 Act did not provide
for any consequence of the time provided in Section 34 lapsing. Thus,
the Supreme Court, in Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti5
distinguishes between provisions in which though the word ―shall‖
13
29-A. Time limit for arbitral award. -
Section 23 in THE COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT, 2015 [Entire Act]
Section 5 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
The State Of Bihar vs Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti ... on 30 July, 2018
11. Para 9 of the report contradistinguishes such a case with a
situation in which the applicable provision does not provide for the
consequence of failure to comply with the statutory requirement
within the maximum period envisaged in the provision. It refers to the
judgement of the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in State of
Bihar v. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti5, which dealt with
Section 34(5)12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (―the
12
Application for setting aside arbitral award. -
Salem Advocate Bar Association,Tamil ... vs Union Of India on 2 August, 2005
In addressing the said issue, the Supreme Court referred to
its earlier decisions in Kailash v. Nanhku6 and Salem Advocate Bar
Association v. U.O.I.7, which dealt with Order VIII Rule 1 of the
CPC. It was held, in the said decisions, that the mere fact that Order
VIII Rule 1 of the CPC used the word ―shall‖ did not, ipso facto,
render the provision mandatory. Thereafter, the Supreme Court in
Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti5 went on to distinguish
Section 34(5) with Section 29A13 of the 1996 Act. Unlike Section
29A of the 1996 Act which provided [in sub-section (4)] that, if an
award was made beyond the stipulated or extended period contained
in that provision, the mandate of the arbitrator would terminate, it was
observed that Sections 34(5) and (6) of the 1996 Act did not provide
for any consequence of the time provided in Section 34 lapsing. Thus,
the Supreme Court, in Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti5
distinguishes between provisions in which though the word ―shall‖
13
29-A. Time limit for arbitral award. -