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Kumaran (T.P.) vs Kothandaraman (R.), Commissioner Of ... on 7 October, 1961 cites

The State Of Uttar Pradesh vs Mohammad Nooh on 30 September, 1957

At p. 4 of the report, Das Gupta, C.J. (as he then was), in clear terms has stated that he would have been bound by the observations of the Supreme Court in Musaliar case to hold that even where the original order has been confirmed in appeal and the appeal has been dismissed, the original order ceased to exist and the operative order would be the order by the appellate authority, but that the later pronouncement of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh [A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 86] compelled him to leave out of account the observations of the Supreme Court in Musaliar case as regards merger of an original order in the order made by the superior authority. We have read that decision with considerable care, but with great respect, it is not possible for us to accept the view taken by that High Court.
Supreme Court of India Cites 27 - Cited by 1128 - Full Document

East India Commercial Ltd. vs Collector Of Customs And Anr. on 21 July, 1959

8. There is, however, a recent decision of the Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in East India Commercial, Ltd. v. Collector of Customs and another [A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 1] where it has been held that where the Collector of Customs, whose office is situated within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, passes an order under the Sea Customs Act, levying duty and penalty against the petitioner and that order is confirmed by the appellate authority, namely, the Central Board of Revenue, whose office is located outside the jurisdiction, the original order made by the Collector of Customs is the order continuing to be operative of its own force after the appeal has been dismissed and it is on the strength of this order that the duty is payable, and the appellate authority adds nothing to the force of the original order.
Calcutta High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 4 - K C Gupta - Full Document

Collector Of Customs, Madras vs A.H.A. Rahiman on 16 November, 1956

The decision in Collector of Customs, Madras v. A. H. A. Rahiman [A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 496] is yet one more case where an order of an inferior tribunal was held to be a nullity. There was an appeal therefrom which was dismissed confirming the order of the authority of the first instance. It was held that where the order of the inferior tribunal was a nullity such an order would fall outside the scope of the rule of merger. That was a case where the Collector of Customs passed an order of confiscation and penalty without giving a show-cause notice to the petitioner and without holding any inquiry at all. It was consequently held that the order contravened every principle of natural justice and must be deemed to be a nullity. The High Court of Madras in that case was dealing with several writ appeals in one of which there was no such fundamental defect by way of contravention of principles of natural justice such as the absence of notice or inquiry. In that case the learned Judges observed that where the proceedings of the Collector of Customs were properly initiated after notice to the respondent, the mere circumstance that the order was vitiated by a wrong assumption that the respondent had a branch within the jurisdiction of the High Court, would not make the order a nullity. It is clear, therefore, that every defect in a proceeding does not make the order of the authority of the first instance a nullity. The defect must be concerning either want of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction or a patent violation of the principles of natural justice, such as want of notice or inquiry. It is such a defect which would render an order null and void and which would take the case out of principle of merger. But where an order is passed after due notice of charges and after an inquiry, where the delinquent has given an opportunity to be heard and where he files a detailed statement, even if there is some defect in the course of the proceedings, there would be no question of a nullity. In order to succeed. Mr. Vakil, therefore, has to establish that there was anyone of these infirmities rendering the order of the Commissioner a nullity.
Madras High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 21 - Full Document

Saiyid Jowad Hussain vs Gendan Singh on 15 June, 1926

It is next observed that while it is true that decree of a Court of first instance may be said to merge in the decree passed on appeal therefrom or even in the order passed in revision, it does so only for certain purposes, namely, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for execution of the decree as in Batuk Nath v. Mundi Devi [A.I.R. 1914 P.C. 65] or computing the period of limitation for an application for final decree in a mortgage suit as in Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singh [A.I.R. 1926 P.C. 93]. Their lordships have then observed that the filing of an appeal or revision that the filing of an appeal or revision may put the decree or order in jeopardy but until it is reversed or modified it remained effective. On this basis it was held that the original order of dismissal passed on 20 April 1948 was not suspended by the presentation of appeal by the respondent, nor was its operation interrupted when the Deputy Inspector-General of Police simply dismissed the appeal from that order or the Inspector-General simply dismissed the application for revision. The original order of dismissal was operative on its own strength and it did not gain any greater efficacy from the subsequent orders of dismissal of the appeal or the revision except for the specific purposes mentioned above. It was held that the order of dismissal having been passed before the Constitution and rights having accrued to the appellant State and liabilities having attached to the respondent before the Constitution came into force, the subsequent conferment of jurisdiction and powers on the High Court could have no retrospective operation on such rights and liabilities. In that case, a departmental inquiry was held against a police constable by the District Superintendent of Police. He passed his order of dismissal on 20 December 1948. There was an appeal by the respondent against the order of dismissal but the appeal was dismissed on 7 June 1949. Both these orders were passed prior to the coming into force of the Constitution. A revision application was filed before the Inspector-General of Police on 22 April 1950, and it was contended that the High Court of Allahabad had jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition against the order of dismissal as the order of dismissal became final long after the Constitution came into force at which day the High Court of Allahabad had the power to issue a writ of certiorari. It was in answer to this contention that their lordships remarked at p. 95 of the report that the only effect of the filing of the appeal or revision against the original order would be to put the decree or the order in jeopardy but that until such order was reversed or modified it would remain effective and, therefore, the original order of dismissal passed on 20 April 1948 was neither suspended nor interrupted when an appeal from that order was dismissed or when the revision application was rejected by the Inspector-General of Police. That being so, and the order of dismissal having been passed before the Constitution came into force and rights having accrued to the appellant State and liabilities having attached to the respondent as a result of the original order, the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with such rights and liabilities and such interfering would amount to giving the provisions of Art. 226 a retroactive operation. Strictly speaking, their lordships were not dealing in that case with the principle of merger but were dealing with the question as to when the order of dismissal passed by the inquiry officer in that case acquired finality. As we have observed, the contention raised was that when an order made and that order has been a subject-matter of an appeal and thereafter a revision, it did not become final and operative until the last stage of revision has been gone through and if the revisional order is passed after the Constitution came into force, the High Court would have jurisdiction to interfere with it under Art. 226. It was in answer to this contention that their lordships expressed the view that merely because an appeal was preferred against an order, the order could not be said to have been either suspended or its operation interrupted. It was again in answer to that contention that observations were made that when the order of dismissal was passed certain rights accrued to the State and certain liabilities were incurred by the officer dismissed and these rights and liabilities having accrued to and incurred by before the Constitution came into force, the High Court was not entitled to use its writ power acquired subsequently to interfere with those rights and liabilities.
Bombay High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 78 - Full Document

Chaudhri Abdul Majid vs Jawahir Lal on 7 April, 1914

In Chaudhari Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal [16 Bom. L.R. 395 (P.C.)] their lordships of the Privy Council observed that an order of His Majesty in Council dismissing an appeal for want of prosecution was not an order adopting or affirming the decision appealed from, and therefore, when such an order was made, the only decree capable of execution was the decree appealed from. Answering a contention on behalf of the respondent, the Privy Council stated that the only decree for sale that existed was the decree, dated 8 April 1893, passed by the High Court of Allahabad. The operation of that decree was never stayed and there was no decree of His Majesty in Council in which it had become merged. It is true that in this decision their lordships of the Privy Council were concerned with the question of limitation but the proposition laid down there that limitation would commence from the date of the appellate decree must mean that it was because the decree of the trial Court merged into the appellate decree that the period of limitation could be calculated from the date of the appellate decree. In that case the High Court of Allahabad had dismissed an appeal confirming the decree of the lower Court on 8 April 1893. The decree that was outstanding and operative was the decree therefore of the High Court. The Privy Council had dismissed the appeal against the decree passed by the High Court on the ground of want of prosecution. On these facts it was held that the order of dismissal by the Privy Council could not be order adopting or affirming the decision appealed from and therefore the only decree which was capable of execution was the decree appealed from, that is to say, the decree passed by the High Court of Allahabad in appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court.
Bombay High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 31 - Full Document

Mohamed Oomer, Mohamed Noorullah vs S.M. Noorudin on 13 August, 1951

As observed in Mohamed Oomar Mohamad Noorulah Sahib v. S. M. Noorudin [54 Bom. L.T. 28], it is only on a judicial determination that the order of the lower Court becomes merged in the decision of the Court of appeal. No merger takes place when the Court of appeal does not judicially determine the appeal but dismisses it on a mere preliminary ground, such as limitation or maintainability. If the appellate Court dismisses an appeal on such preliminary ground, then the order that would stand would be the order of the lower Court and not the order of the Court of appeal.
Bombay High Court Cites 5 - Cited by 10 - B P Sinha - Full Document
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