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1 - 10 of 13 (0.57 seconds)State Of Andhra Pradesh vs N. Radhakishan on 7 April, 1998
"19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined
principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where
there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings.
Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to
be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts
WP(C) 8171 & 8423 of 2008 Page 17 of 39
and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter
is that the court has to take into consideration all the
relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to
determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest
administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be
allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay
is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The
delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary
proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and
he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary
loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any
fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering
whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings
the court has to consider the nature of charge, its
complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. It
the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent
employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen
as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in
pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic
principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted
with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly,
efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates
from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed.
Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to
take their course as per relevant rules but then delay
defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged
officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the
delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in
conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the
court is to balance these two diverse considerations."
The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Bani Singh And Another on 5 April, 1990
30. Similarly, in State of M.P Vs Bani Singh, 1990 (Supp) SCC 738, at
page 740 the subject matter of irregularities were allegedly taken place
in 1975-77 and the Department was aware of the said irregularities.
The investigations were allegedly going on since then. The Apex Court
had held that it is unreasonable to think that the Department would
WP(C) 8171 & 8423 of 2008 Page 18 of 39
have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings.
In para 4 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court had observed as
under:
Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors vs R.S. Nayak & Anr on 10 December, 1991
33. Similarly, in the case of State of Punjab and Ors. Vs. Chaman Lal
Goyal (1995) 2 SCC 570 the delay was taken into consideration and the
principles enunciated in the case of A.R. Antulay (supra) were reiterated
and it was held that "it is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding
must be conducted soon after the irregularities are-committed or soon
after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse
of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such
delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus
not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of
proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and
misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court
may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too
long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such
delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending
himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted, Wherever such a plea is
raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the
said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other
words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing."
Sate Of Punjab And Ors vs Chaman Lal Goyal on 31 January, 1995
33. Similarly, in the case of State of Punjab and Ors. Vs. Chaman Lal
Goyal (1995) 2 SCC 570 the delay was taken into consideration and the
principles enunciated in the case of A.R. Antulay (supra) were reiterated
and it was held that "it is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding
must be conducted soon after the irregularities are-committed or soon
after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse
of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such
delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus
not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of
proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, mala fides and
misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court
may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too
long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if such
delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending
himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted, Wherever such a plea is
raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the
said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other
words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing."
Shri M.L. Tahiliani vs D.D.A. on 31 May, 2002
In the matter of Shri M.L. Tahiliani Vs. D.D.A. 98 (2002) DLT 771,
this Court had quashed the charge sheet which was issued 4 days
before the retirement of the petitioner in regard to an alleged incident
which had taken place 10 years back. The accused had joined the DDA
in the post of Assistant Engineer in October 1969 and was promoted to
the post of an Executive Engineer on 1.12.1978. It was alleged that he
was in charge of the Housing Division-XII, which was for the internal
development at Avantika. The estimate cost of the works was Rs.
1,56,660/- and it was to be completed between 17.5.1983 and
16.7.1983. The work was, however, abandoned/rescinded and was
subsequently executed at the risk and costs of the original Contractor.
The Counter-Claim for Rs. 86,194/- was filed against the original
Contractor but was rejected by the Arbitrator. The Memorandum of
Charges was issued on 25.11.1985, to which the petitioner replied on
30th January 1986, i.e. within two months. However, no progress was
made by the DDA for one full decade, but strangely another
Memorandum was issued on 9.4.1996. This was again replied to by the
petitioner on 30.8.1996 and was followed by Reminders dated
17.12.1996 and 8.9.1997. The impugned Charge-Sheet was issued on
22.10.1997, i.e. just four days prior to the petitioner's retirement.
Except stating that the matter was being investigated, no explanation
was given by the concerned authorities as to why it took the DDA
eighteen long months to prepare a Charge-Sheet in a matter which had
WP(C) 8171 & 8423 of 2008 Page 22 of 39
been lingering for ten long years. This Court had concluded that the
only possible conclusion is that the inordinate delay in the inquiry
deserves that it be quashed. This Court, in the facts and circumstances,
had held as under:
Mahender Singh vs Union Of India And Anr on 2 August, 1991
According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the
judgment of Mahender Singh (supra) supports the plea taken by the
petitioners in view of the fact that the respondent had been dismissed
by order dated 23rd January, 2001, as a measure of penalty and
WP(C) 8171 & 8423 of 2008 Page 11 of 39
subsequently, the respondent was deemed to be under suspension as
per Rule 3(6) of the AIS(D&A) Rules 1969 from the order of dismissal.
Union Of India And Another vs Tulsiram Patel And Others on 11 July, 1985
44. The Tribunal also carefully considered if the order dated 23rd
January, 2001 dismissing the respondent by invoking Article 311 (2) (c)
of the Indian Constitution was justified. The Tribunal observed that
Article 311 (2) (c) is invoked in circumstances of expediency, or in cases
involving the security of the state, when in view of the facts and
circumstances of the case, it is considered impracticable to hold an
inquiry. However, the Tribunal observed that in the present matter,
there was no expediency, nor was there any issue of security. The
matter was examined in detail by the SCOI and the findings of the same
had become public and over a period of nine years nothing had taken
place, nor had any fresh material brought on record, so as to imply a
threat to the security, in order to justify resorting to Article 311 (2) (c) of
the Constitution of India. The Tribunal also carefully analysed the law
laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgments of Union of India &
Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel, 1985 SCC (L&S) 672; A.K. Kaul & Anr. v. Union
of India & Anr. (1995) 4 SCC 73; Union of India & Anr. v. Balbir Singh
& Anr. JT 1998(3) SC 695; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC
1 and the OM dated 26th July, 1980 which lays down the procedure for
dealing with the cases of the Government servant engaged in or
associated with subversive activities in so far as the applicability of
proviso to Article 311 (2) is concerned and ultimately held that the order
of dismissal dated 23rd January, 2001 was not sustainable in law. The
relevant portion of the Tribunal‟s reasoning is as follows:
A.K. Kaul & Anr vs Union Of India & Anr on 19 April, 1995
44. The Tribunal also carefully considered if the order dated 23rd
January, 2001 dismissing the respondent by invoking Article 311 (2) (c)
of the Indian Constitution was justified. The Tribunal observed that
Article 311 (2) (c) is invoked in circumstances of expediency, or in cases
involving the security of the state, when in view of the facts and
circumstances of the case, it is considered impracticable to hold an
inquiry. However, the Tribunal observed that in the present matter,
there was no expediency, nor was there any issue of security. The
matter was examined in detail by the SCOI and the findings of the same
had become public and over a period of nine years nothing had taken
place, nor had any fresh material brought on record, so as to imply a
threat to the security, in order to justify resorting to Article 311 (2) (c) of
the Constitution of India. The Tribunal also carefully analysed the law
laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgments of Union of India &
Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel, 1985 SCC (L&S) 672; A.K. Kaul & Anr. v. Union
of India & Anr. (1995) 4 SCC 73; Union of India & Anr. v. Balbir Singh
& Anr. JT 1998(3) SC 695; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC
1 and the OM dated 26th July, 1980 which lays down the procedure for
dealing with the cases of the Government servant engaged in or
associated with subversive activities in so far as the applicability of
proviso to Article 311 (2) is concerned and ultimately held that the order
of dismissal dated 23rd January, 2001 was not sustainable in law. The
relevant portion of the Tribunal‟s reasoning is as follows:
Union Of India & Anr vs Balbir Singh & Anr on 5 May, 1998
44. The Tribunal also carefully considered if the order dated 23rd
January, 2001 dismissing the respondent by invoking Article 311 (2) (c)
of the Indian Constitution was justified. The Tribunal observed that
Article 311 (2) (c) is invoked in circumstances of expediency, or in cases
involving the security of the state, when in view of the facts and
circumstances of the case, it is considered impracticable to hold an
inquiry. However, the Tribunal observed that in the present matter,
there was no expediency, nor was there any issue of security. The
matter was examined in detail by the SCOI and the findings of the same
had become public and over a period of nine years nothing had taken
place, nor had any fresh material brought on record, so as to imply a
threat to the security, in order to justify resorting to Article 311 (2) (c) of
the Constitution of India. The Tribunal also carefully analysed the law
laid down by the Supreme Court in the judgments of Union of India &
Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel, 1985 SCC (L&S) 672; A.K. Kaul & Anr. v. Union
of India & Anr. (1995) 4 SCC 73; Union of India & Anr. v. Balbir Singh
& Anr. JT 1998(3) SC 695; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC
1 and the OM dated 26th July, 1980 which lays down the procedure for
dealing with the cases of the Government servant engaged in or
associated with subversive activities in so far as the applicability of
proviso to Article 311 (2) is concerned and ultimately held that the order
of dismissal dated 23rd January, 2001 was not sustainable in law. The
relevant portion of the Tribunal‟s reasoning is as follows: