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Mohan Lal vs Kunwar Sen on 26 October, 1951 cites

B. Manmohan Lal And Ors. vs B. Raj Kumar Lal And Ors. on 31 October, 1945

5. On appeal by the defendant, this decree was affirmed by the lower appellate Court, although the learned Civil Judge remarked that the question of the arrears and the question of the defendant's ejectment could be determined only in the execution proceedings. That was on the authority of the case in --'Makhan Lal v. Shankar Lal', 1944 All L W 591 (A), since overruled.
Allahabad High Court Cites 33 - Cited by 17 - Full Document

Raj Narain vs Sita Ram Sri Kishen Das on 3 November, 1950

To suits pending on the date of the commencement of the Act, however, the rule contained in Section 15 of the Act would apply. This latter section expressly provides that, in suits pending on the date of the commencement of the Act, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 3. 'Ex facie', it may be argued that the section, being confined only to the grounds mentioned in Section 3, excludes and has nothing to do with a suit based on grounds other than those mentioned in that section, and it was on this interpretation of Section 15 that the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant argued that the section could not help the plaintiff-respondent who had sued for the defendant's eviction on a ground other than those mentioned in Section 3. Learned counsel for the latter, however, relied on the authority of the Bench decision of this Court in -- 'Raj Narain v. Sita Ram Shri Kishen Das', AIR 1952 All 584 (B), to which I was a party, and contended that the present case is governed by Section 15. In that case Section 15 was interpreted to mean that, where a suit for ejectment on a ground other than those mentioned in Clauses S (a) to (f) of Section 3 of the said Act, had been filed prior to the commencement of the Act a decree could no doubt be passed if the plaintiff had obtained the permission of the District Magistrate. On this point the following passage occurs in the 'judgment of the Bench :
Allahabad High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 10 - Full Document

Manzoor Ali Usmani vs Mt. Lal Devi And Anr. on 11 September, 1950

12. Mr. S. B. L. Gaur, on behalf of the defendant-appellant, however, contended that the permission in this case, having been obtained by the plaintiff-respondent during the pendency of this appeal and not prior to his filing the suit, cannot stand him under Section 15 of the said Act. He pointed out that the permission relied upon by the landlord in both the cases referred to above had been obtained, prior to the institution and not during the pendency of the suit. That undoubtedly is a fact, but I do not consider that this was the 'ratio decidendi' of the judgments in those cases. In the first place, if the word 'suits' in Section 15 includes 'appeals' as already held by this Court, so that the 'suit' in this case was pending on the date of the commencement of the Act, and if, as held in the two cases mentioned above, a decree for eviction can be passed an such case even on a ground outside Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 3 if the landlord has obtained the permission of the District Magistrate, it must necessarily follow that the permission may be of a date subsequent to the institution of the suit. In the second place, the language of the section itself, unlike that of Section 3, explicitly shows that the existence of a ground under any one of the aforesaid clauses or, as held in those rulings, of the permission of the District Magistrate is a condition precedent not to the institution of a suit but to the passing of a decree for eviction. In contradistinction to the words "no suit shall without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil court" in Section 3, we have in Section 15 the words "no decree for eviction shall be passed". Indeed, the said words in Section 3, would have carried no meaning if repeated in Section 15 of the Act, and the Legislature in the latter section, therefore, only required a certain circumstance to exist before 'a decree for eviction could be passed'. On the bare language of Section 15 that circumstance was the existence of "one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 3" and, under the two Bench decisions referred to above, it could also be a permission of the District Magistrate on a ground other than those grounds.
Allahabad High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 5 - Full Document
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