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1 - 10 of 22 (0.55 seconds)The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
Section 11A in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Section 33 in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
Bharat Iron Works vs Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel & Ors on 10 October, 1975
On the same lines is a latter decision of
this Court in the case of Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai
Balubhai Patel & Ors. [(1976) 2 SCR 280] wherein a
Bench of three Learned Judges speaking through
Goswami.J. laid down the parameters of the term
‘victimisation’ as understood in labour laws and as
contemplated by industrial jurisprudence. It has been
observed that ordinarily a person is victimised if he is made
a victim or a scapegoat and is subjected to persecution,
prosecution or punishment for no real fault or guilt of his
own. If actual fault or guilt meriting punishment is
established. Such action will be rid of the taint of
victimisation. The aforesaid observations obviously refer
to factual victimisation. But then follows further
elucidation of the term ‘victimisation’ to the following
effect:
Section 10 in The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [Entire Act]
United Bank Of India vs Tamil Nadu Banks Deposit Collectors ... on 5 December, 2007
24. Thus, it is evident that the certified standing orders at the
management’s establishment mandate a formal inquiry process and do not
permit dispensing with it. In such a case, when the management leads evidence
directly before the Labour Court, then the satisfaction of such evidence is that
of the Labour Court and not of the management. This position of law was well
explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its decision in Union Bank of
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WP.No.2412 of 2003
India v. Tamil Nadu Banks Deposit Collectors Union and another reported
in 2007(12) SCC 585. It was observed in paragraph 8 as follows:-
M/S. Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd vs Shobrati Khan And Others on 29 April, 1959
We may in this connection refer to M/s. Sasa
Musa Sugar Works (P) Limited v., Shobrati Khan
[[1959] Supp.s.C.R. 836], Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its
Workmen and Punjab Nation Bank Limited v. Its
workmen.
Phulbari Tea Estate vs Its Workmen on 6 May, 1959
We may in this connection refer to M/s. Sasa
Musa Sugar Works (P) Limited v., Shobrati Khan
[[1959] Supp.s.C.R. 836], Phulbari Tea Estate v. Its
Workmen and Punjab Nation Bank Limited v. Its
workmen.
M/S. Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd vs Shri Jai Singh And Others on 20 September, 1961
There three cases were further considered by
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WP.No.2412 of 2003
this court in Bharat Sugar Mills Limited v. Shri Jai
Singh, and reference was also made to the decision of
the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Shri Ram Swarath
Sinha v. Belaund Sugar C. [[1954] L.A.C. 697]. It was
pointed out that “the import effect of commission to
hold an enquiry was merely this: that the Tribunal
would not have to consider only whether there was a
prima facie case but would decide for itself on the
evidence adduced whether the charges have really been
made out:. It is true that three of these cases, except
Phulbari Tea Estate’s case were on applications under
Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. But in
principle we see no difference whether the matter
comes before the Tribunal for approval under Section
33 or on a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. In either case if the enquiry is
defective or if no enquiry has been held as required by
Standing Orders, the entire case would be open before
the Tribunal and the employer would have to justify on
facts as well that its order of dismissal or discharge
was proper. Phulbari Ta Estate’s was on a reference
under s. 10, and the same principle was applied there
also, the only difference being that in that case, there
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WP.No.2412 of 2003
was an enquiry though it was defective. A defective
enquiry in our opinion stands on the same footing as
no enquiry and in either case the tribunal would have
jurisdiction to go into the facts and the employer
would have to satisfy the tribunal that on facts the
order of dismissal or discharge was proper.”
[Emphasis added]