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1 - 10 of 21 (0.28 seconds)Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & ... vs Mst. Katiji & Ors on 19 February, 1987
“The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the
matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in
a number of pronouncements of this Court. See : Ramlal, Motilal
and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd.[3] ; Shakuntala Devi Jain
v. Kuntal Kumari[4] ; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. V.
Nirmala Devi[5] ; Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan[6] ; Collector,
Land Acquisition v. Katiji etc. There is, it is true, no
general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its
counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction
or lack of bona fide on the part of the party or its counsel
there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a
time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the
particularities of its own special facts. However, the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 must receive a
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and
generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be
condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the
party seeking condonation of the delay.”
Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs Rewa Coalfields Ltd on 4 May, 1961
“The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the
matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in
a number of pronouncements of this Court. See : Ramlal, Motilal
and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd.[3] ; Shakuntala Devi Jain
v. Kuntal Kumari[4] ; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. V.
Nirmala Devi[5] ; Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan[6] ; Collector,
Land Acquisition v. Katiji etc. There is, it is true, no
general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its
counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction
or lack of bona fide on the part of the party or its counsel
there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a
time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the
particularities of its own special facts. However, the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 must receive a
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and
generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be
condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the
party seeking condonation of the delay.”
Shakuntala Devi Jain vs Kuntal Kumari And Ors. on 5 September, 1968
“The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the
matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in
a number of pronouncements of this Court. See : Ramlal, Motilal
and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd.[3] ; Shakuntala Devi Jain
v. Kuntal Kumari[4] ; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. V.
Nirmala Devi[5] ; Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan[6] ; Collector,
Land Acquisition v. Katiji etc. There is, it is true, no
general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its
counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction
or lack of bona fide on the part of the party or its counsel
there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a
time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the
particularities of its own special facts. However, the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 must receive a
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and
generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be
condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the
party seeking condonation of the delay.”
Concord Of India Insurance Co Ltd vs Nirmala Devi And Ors on 16 April, 1979
“The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the
matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in
a number of pronouncements of this Court. See : Ramlal, Motilal
and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd.[3] ; Shakuntala Devi Jain
v. Kuntal Kumari[4] ; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. V.
Nirmala Devi[5] ; Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan[6] ; Collector,
Land Acquisition v. Katiji etc. There is, it is true, no
general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its
counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction
or lack of bona fide on the part of the party or its counsel
there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a
time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the
particularities of its own special facts. However, the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 must receive a
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and
generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be
condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the
party seeking condonation of the delay.”
Lala Mata Din vs A. Narayanan on 25 August, 1969
“The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the
matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in
a number of pronouncements of this Court. See : Ramlal, Motilal
and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd.[3] ; Shakuntala Devi Jain
v. Kuntal Kumari[4] ; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. V.
Nirmala Devi[5] ; Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan[6] ; Collector,
Land Acquisition v. Katiji etc. There is, it is true, no
general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its
counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction
or lack of bona fide on the part of the party or its counsel
there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a
time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the
particularities of its own special facts. However, the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 must receive a
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and
generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be
condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the
party seeking condonation of the delay.”
O.P. Kathpalia vs Lakhmir Singh (Dead) And Ors. on 23 July, 1984
In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (dead) and
others[7], the court was dealing with a fact-
situation where the interim order passed by the court
of first instance was an interpolated order and it
was not ascertainable as to when the order was made.
The said order was under appeal before the District
Judge who declined to condone the delay and the said
view was concurred with by the High Court. The
Court, taking stock of the facts, came to hold that
if such an interpolated order is allowed to stand,
there would be failure of justice and, accordingly,
set aside the orders impugned therein observing that
the appeal before the District Judge deserved to be
heard on merits.
State Of Nagaland vs Lipok Ao & Ors on 1 April, 2005
In State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and others[8], the
Court, after referring to New India Insurance Co.
Ltd. V. Shanti Misra[9], N. Balakrishnan v. M.
Krishnamurthy[10], State of Haryana v. Chandra
Mani[11] and Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v.
K.V. Ayisumma[12], came to hold that adoption of
strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect
public justice and it may result in public mischief.
New India Insurance Co. Ltd vs Smt. Shanti Misra, Adult on 10 October, 1975
In State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and others[8], the
Court, after referring to New India Insurance Co.
Ltd. V. Shanti Misra[9], N. Balakrishnan v. M.
Krishnamurthy[10], State of Haryana v. Chandra
Mani[11] and Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v.
K.V. Ayisumma[12], came to hold that adoption of
strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect
public justice and it may result in public mischief.
N. Balakrishnan vs M. Krishnamurthy on 3 September, 1998
Neither leisure nor pleasure has any room
while one moves an application seeking condonation of
delay of almost seven years on the ground of lack of
knowledge or failure of justice. Plea of lack of
knowledge in the present case really lacks bona fide.
The Division Bench of the High Court has failed to
keep itself alive to the concept of exercise of
judicial discretion that is governed by rules of
reason and justice. It should have kept itself alive
to the following passage from N. Balakrishnan
(supra): -