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1 - 10 of 13 (0.97 seconds)Section 140 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
Kanwar Singh vs Delhi Administration on 5 August, 1964
Learned Counsel for the appellants, however,
submitted that Section 138 being a penal provision, it
should be strictly interpreted and if there is any omission
by the Legislature, wider meaning should not be given to the
words than what is used in the Section. In our view even
with regard to penal provision, any interpretation, which
withdraws life and blood of the provision and makes it
ineffective and a dead letter should be averted. If the
interpretation, which is sought for, were given, then it
would only encourage dishonest persons to issue cheques and
before presentation of the cheque close that account and
thereby escape from the penal consequences of Section 138.
This Court in the case of Kanwar Singh Vs. Delhi
Administration, (1965) 1 SCR 7 while construing Section 418
Swantraj & Ors vs State Of Maharashtra on 5 February, 1974
Further, while interpreting, the statutory provision
rule dealing with penalty under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,
1940 and the rules in the case of Swantraj and Others Vs.
State of Maharashtra 1975(3) S.C.C. 322, this Court held
that every legislation is a social document and judicial
construction seeks to decipher the statutory mission,
language permitting, making the one from the rule I Heydons
case of suppressing the evil and advancing the remedy.
Court held that what must tilt the balance is the purpose of
the statute, its potential frustration and judicial
avoidance of the mischief by a construction whereby the
means of licensing meet the ends of ensuring pure and potent
remedies for the people. Court observed that this liberty
with language is sanctified by great judges and textbooks.
Maxwell instructs as in these words:
International Ore & ... vs Employees' State Insurance ... on 18 August, 1987
In the case of M/s. International Ore and Fertilizers
(India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Employees State Insurance
Corporation AIR (1988) S.C. 79, this Court referred to
often quoted passage from the decision in the case of
Seaford Court Estates ltd. Vs. Asher (1949) 2 All ER 155
wherein Lord Denning, L.J. observed: The English language
is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our
literature would be much poorer if it were. This is where
the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly
criticized. A Judge, believing himself to be fettered by
the supposed rule that he must look to the language and
nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided
for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other
ambiguity. It would certainly save the judges trouble if
the Acts of Parliament wee drafted with divine pre-science
and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect
appears, a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the
draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of
finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not
only from the language of the statute, but also from a
consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it
and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then
he must supplement the written word so as to give force and
life to the intention of legislature. A judge should ask
himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had
themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they
would have straightened it out? He must then do so as they
would have done.
M/S. Modi Cements Ltd vs Shri Kuchil Kumar Nandi on 2 March, 1998
A judge must not alter the material of
which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the
creases (Emphasis supplied)
Lastly, we would refer to the decision by a
Three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Modi Cements
Ltd. Vs. Kuchil Kumar Nandi (1998) 3 S.C.C. 249 dealing
with a similar contention and interpreting Section 138 of
the Act.