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1 - 10 of 29 (0.03 seconds)The Delhi Rent Act, 1995
Mayankutti vs Kunhammad And Fourteen Ors. on 21 December, 1917
To the extent Mayankutti Vs. Kunhammad
( 1917 ILR (41) Mad 641) ( which was relied upon by the High
Court in the judgment under appeal before us) dissented from
Kutti Ali, the said dissent would therefore no longer hold
good.
Ramanand And Ors. vs Jai Ram And Ors. on 19 July, 1920
Where an earlier decree based on title for ejectment
is not executed in time but a fresh suit is however filed on
the same basis against the same defendant for ejectment
relying on the earlier judgment, it has been held that a
second suit does not lie. This is based on the principle
that no second suit lies merely on the basis of an earlier
judgment if the time for execution of the earlier decree has
become barred. The cases relied up by the High Court in
Ramanand and Ors. Vs. Jai Ram and Ors. ( AIR 1921 All.
Vedapuratti And Ors. vs Vallabha Valiya Raja And Ors. on 14 February, 1902
In a Full Bench of five Judges in
Vedapuratti Vs. Vallabha Valiya Raja and Ors. ( 1902 ILR
(25) Mad 300) the above case was held to be wrongly decided.
In that case the first suit for redemption of a mortgage was
decreed but execution got barred by time and a second suit
for redemption was held not maintainable.
Bhaiya Raghunath Singh vs Musammat Hansraj Kunwar on 19 July, 1934
So
far as mortgage cases are concerned, the position stood
settled long back by the decision of the Privy Council in
Raghunath Singh's case as explained in the Full Bench in
Viroopakshan. In fact, this Court approved the Privy
Council judgment in Raghunath Singh and held that a second
suit for redemption was maintainable even if the earlier
decree for redemption stood barred by limitation.
Cheria Veetil Madhavan Variar (Died) ... vs Chathu Nambiar Of Memenda Amsom Kizhal ... on 25 February, 1950
In that case too, the fresh suit was filed within 12
years from the date fixed in the earlier compromise decree.
The possession during the period granted under the
compromise was treated as permissive. A similar situation
arose again in Madhavan Variar vs. Chathu Nambiar [1950 (2)
MLJ 501] before Satyanarayana Rao and Viswanatha Sastri, JJ.
They observed (p.504) that "as the cause of action in the
present suit was different from the cause of action in the
earlier suit, the decision in Mayan Kutti vs. Kunhammad,
had no application". In our view, the decision in Kutti Ali
and in Amina are directly in point and are correctly
decided. Both relate to an earlier suit based on a lease
when the execution of the decree was time barred and the
second suit was based on title. The second suit was held
neither barred by section 47 CPC nor by section 11 CPC.
Mhadagonda Ramgonda Patil & Ors vs Shripal Balwant Rainade & Ors on 22 April, 1988
(see
Mhadaagonda Ramgonda Patil and Ors. Vs. Shripal Balwant
Rainade and Ors. [1988 (3) SCC 298], Maganlal Vs. Jaiswal
Industries, Neemach and Ors. [1989 (4) SCC 344] and Harbans
Singh and Anr. Vs. Guran Ditta Singh and Anr. [1991 (2)
SCC 523]. We, accordingly hold on the above line of cases
that the present suit is not barred by Section 11 or Section
47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Maganlal Etc vs Jaiswal Industries Neemach & Ors on 7 August, 1989
(see
Mhadaagonda Ramgonda Patil and Ors. Vs. Shripal Balwant
Rainade and Ors. [1988 (3) SCC 298], Maganlal Vs. Jaiswal
Industries, Neemach and Ors. [1989 (4) SCC 344] and Harbans
Singh and Anr. Vs. Guran Ditta Singh and Anr. [1991 (2)
SCC 523]. We, accordingly hold on the above line of cases
that the present suit is not barred by Section 11 or Section
47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Harbans Singh Etc vs Guran Ditta Singh Etc on 20 February, 1991
(see
Mhadaagonda Ramgonda Patil and Ors. Vs. Shripal Balwant
Rainade and Ors. [1988 (3) SCC 298], Maganlal Vs. Jaiswal
Industries, Neemach and Ors. [1989 (4) SCC 344] and Harbans
Singh and Anr. Vs. Guran Ditta Singh and Anr. [1991 (2)
SCC 523]. We, accordingly hold on the above line of cases
that the present suit is not barred by Section 11 or Section
47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.