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Saiyid Jowad Hussain vs Gendan Singh on 15 June, 1926

There appear to be two answers to the foregoing contention. As we have already observed an order of dismissal passed on a departmental enquiry by an officer in the department and an order passed by another officer next higher in rank dis- missing an appeal therefrom and an order rejecting an application for revision by the head of the department can hardly be equated with any propriety with decrees made in a civil suit under the Code of Civil Procedure by the court of first instance and the decree dismissing the appeal there- from by an appeal court and the order dismissing the revision petition by a yet higher court, as has been sought to be done by the High Court in this case, because the departmental tribunals of the first instance or on appeal or revision are not regular courts manned by persons trained in law although they may have the trappings of the courts of law. The danger of so doing is evident from what has happened in the very case now before us. In the next place, while it is true that a decree of a court of first instance may be said to merge in the decree passed on appeal there- from or even in the order passed in revision, it does so only for certain purposes, namely, for the purposes of computing the period of limitation for execution of the decree as in Batuk Nath v. Munni Dei(1), or for computing the period of limitation for an application for final decree in a mortgage suit as in Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singh (2).
Bombay High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 78 - Full Document

Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja vs State Of Bombay on 20 May, 1952

In Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. The State of Bombay (1) my Lord the Chief Justice, delivering the judgment of the Court, pointed out at page 734 that though the Legislature had power to take away normal rights of, among other things, transfer and revision in a criminal case before the Constitution, that kind of legislation became bad after the Constitution, even if it bad been enacted before, because of the new rights conferred by Art. 14.
Bombay High Court Cites 49 - Cited by 67 - B P Sinha - Full Document

Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. Madurai & Ors vs Sri A.V. Visvanatha Sastri & Ors on 21 October, 1954

The principle was also applied in Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Sri A. V. Visvanatha Sastri (2), Dhirendra Kumar Mandal v. The Superintendent and Remembrance of Legal Affairs to the Government of West Bengal(3), Habeeb Mohamed v. The State of Hyderabad(4) Syed Casim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad (5) and Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay (6). These cases are not exactly in point but the principle is there and it is that principle that I invoke here. On the merits I am clear that the appeal should be dismissed.
Supreme Court of India Cites 18 - Cited by 95 - M C Mahajan - Full Document

Dhirendra Kumar Mandal vs The Superintendent Andremembrancer Of ... on 20 April, 1954

The principle was also applied in Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Sri A. V. Visvanatha Sastri (2), Dhirendra Kumar Mandal v. The Superintendent and Remembrance of Legal Affairs to the Government of West Bengal(3), Habeeb Mohamed v. The State of Hyderabad(4) Syed Casim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad (5) and Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay (6). These cases are not exactly in point but the principle is there and it is that principle that I invoke here. On the merits I am clear that the appeal should be dismissed.
Supreme Court of India Cites 19 - Cited by 20 - M C Mahajan - Full Document
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