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Thiretambala Desikar Gnana Sambanda ... vs Chinna Pandaram Alias Manikkavasaka ... on 20 December, 1915 cites

Fateh Chand And Anr. vs Narsingh Das And Anr. on 16 May, 1912

9. It will be convenient to consider in the first place whether the compromise decree in Original Suit No. 74 of 1901 is valid and binding. As already stated, it was entered into after Sivagnana had purported to dismiss the defendant by Exhibit K and defendant had replied by filing a complaint for defamation and a suit to declare the alleged, dismissal illegal. The Subordinate Judge has found that it was brought about after protracted negotiations and on the independent advice of persons who had the interests of the institution at heart, and not by means of any pressure or oppression on the part of the defendant. If Sivagnana was not in a position to justify the charges he had made against the defendant, it was eminently proper for him to withdraw them, instead of committing the Mutt to further ruinous litigation. I do not, however, consider it necessary to pursue the matter further, because, in my opinion, the consent decree in Original Suit No. 74 of 1901 was binding on Sivagnana and is also binding on the present plaintiff who claims through him and even if there had been any grounds for setting it aside by suit, such a suit became barred during the lifetime of Sivagnana. A consent decree is binding on the parties to the suit until it is set aside just as much as if it had been passed after contest. Fatah Chand v. Narasingh Das 16 Ind. Cas. 988 : 22 C.L.J. 383, citing In Re: South American and Mexican Company, Ex parte Bank of England (1895) 1 Ch. D. 37 : 64 L.J. Ch. D. 189 : 12 R. 1 : 71 L.T. 594 : 43 W.R. 131. The effect of the consent decree in Original Suit No. 74 of 1901 is to establish as against Sivagnana and those who like the present plaintiff claim through him that the defendant had been duly appointed junior Pandarasannadhi and continued to hold that office at the date of the decree. Consequently, unless he was subsequently removed, he was junior Pandarasannadhi at the death of Sivagnana and then became his legal representative and entitled to succeed to his office. As regards the alleged illegality in the compromise decree in so far as it restrains the plaintiff from removing the defendant in case of future misconduct, I do not think that this would be any ground for setting aside the decree altogether in a suit by Sivagnana for that purpose, for it does not affect the consideration obtained by Sivagnana for entering into the compromise.
Calcutta High Court Cites 4 - Cited by 12 - Full Document

Vidyapurna Thirtha Swami, Minor, By ... vs Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami (Died), A ... on 6 January, 1904

In Vidyapuma Tirbha Swami v. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami 27 M. 435 : 14 M.L.J. 105, where the question was whether a Pandarasannadhi forfeited his position as such by reason of lunacy, recourse was had to the analogies of the Canon Law, and applying those analogies to this case, the position of the junior Pandarasannadhi during the lifetime of the elder would appear to be that of a coadjutor with the right of succession, a right of which he cannot be deprived except for grave cause. When an office is held at pleasure the incumbent may be removed even on charges of misconduct without any opportunity of being heard, because he is removable at pleasure without any misconduct at all, but in all other cases, the objection for want of notice", in the language of an old case, can never be got over. The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence if he has any."
Madras High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 58 - Full Document

Ramalingam Pillai vs Vythilingam Pillai on 15 July, 1893

P.C.J. 306 : 20 E.R. 154 and Ramalingam Pillai v. Vythilingam Pillai 20 I.A. 150 : 16 M. 490 (P.C.) : 6 Sar. P.C.J. 351 : 17 Ind. Jur. 578. In the first of these two cases, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee inclined to the view that the ordinary mode of succession in Mutts is by appointment of the successor by the predecessor either by Will or by word of mouth. That is the practice in all the important Mutts in this Presidency. Now, the question is whether this power of appointment carries with it the absolute power of dismissal as was strenuously contended for by Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar, or whether by the appointment a status is acquired by the appointee which is not lost unless removed for good cause. After listening to the very able argument of the learned Vakil for the appellant, I feel no hesitation in holding that the appointer has not the absolute power to dismiss which is claimed for him. Before dealing with the cases cited, I shall refer to what takes place on the nomination of a successor in this Mutt. Exhibit C, the plaint in Original Suit No. 21 of 1900, mentions in paragraph 4 the ceremonies that have to be gone through in selecting a successor and also those which the person selected has to undergo. The most important of these is the abishekam. The rites to be observed on this occasion are described by the plaintiff as his 33rd witness. This may be taken to represent correctly what happens when a junior Pandarasannadhi is anointed. It is also in evidence that the senior Pandarasannadhi himself offers puja to the junior, because by the abisheham the junior attains godhead. The abisheham enables the junior to initiate disciples himself. He performs separate puja to gods Vignesvara, and Subramania. He is called the Sadhaka Acharya, or co-adjuter with the senior. These being the attributes with which the junior is invested, I am unable to accede to the suggestion that he acquires no status and his position is dependent on the good will of the senior. To my mind, by these ceremonies the senior is instituting an heir to himself. It may be that the analogy of the adopted son would not apply in all particulars. I am willing to concede that the right of removing the junior for proved misconduct inheres in the senior. Otherwise a person once anointed must be retained even if he has proved himself utterly unfit to hold the religious office. But the grounds of removal must be such as would disentitle the senior himself to continue in office. Subject to this reservation I am of opinion that the person appointed under a Will and to whom abisheham has been performed becomes the heir-presumptive, entitled to succeed to the headship on the happening of a vacancy.
Madras High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

Ramanathan Chetti vs Murugappa Chetti on 12 August, 1903

In Madras, although there is a course of decisions sounding that way, Mr. Justice Bashyam Aiyangar in Ramanathan Chetby v. Murugappa Chetty 27 M. 192 at p. 196 : 13 M.L.J. 241 was not prepared to regard it as settled law. The Bombay High Court has taken a different view. It is not necessary in this case to express any opinion on this question, as I am of opinion that these cases afford us no guidance. The alienation of the office of trustee in most of the cases quoted before us was vitiated by considerations personal to the parties concerned. But where the object of the agreement is to recognise the usage of the institution and to accept the validity of an appointment which but for the conduct of Sivagnana would have in the ordinary course of events given the defendant the right which was secured to him by the decree, I see no reason for holding that the decree based on such an agreement is illegal. I do not, therefore, think it necessary to examine the cases quoted by Mr. Srinivasa Aiyaugar.
Madras High Court Cites 8 - Cited by 45 - Full Document

Raja Kumara Venkata Perumal Raja ... vs Thatha Ramasawmy Chetty And Ors. on 13 February, 1911

If the observations in Kumara Venhala Perumal v. Thatha Ramasawmy Chetty 9 Ind. Cas. 875 : 35 M. 75 : 21 M.L.J. 709 : (1911) 1 M.W.N. 290 : 9 M.L.T. 487 are against the view, I am not prepared to follow them. At the same time, it is well settled that until the decree based on the compromise is recalled, it is binding on the parties to the suit. Lord Esher in The Bellcairn (1885) 10 P.D. 161 : 55 L.J.P. 3 : 53 L.T. 686 : 34 W.R. 55 : 5 Asp. M.C. 503 says: "I agree with Butt, J., that when at a trial the Court gives judgment by the consent of the parties, it is a binding judgment of the Court and cannot be set aside by a subsequent agreement between the solicitors." I take the reason of the rule to be that although the force of a consent decree is derived from the consensus all idem of the parties, it having received additional validity by being accepted by the Court, it cannot be set aside by the consent of the parties as any other contract could have been, but can only be vacated by the Court by a proper proceeding in that behalf. The Court of appeal in In Re: South American and Mexican Company, Ex parte Bank of England (1895) 1 Ch. D. 37 : 64 L.J. Ch. D. 189 : 12 R. 1 : 71 L.T. 594 : 43 W.R. 131 affirmed the principle stated in The Bellcairn (1885) 10 P.D. 161 : 55 L.J.P. 3 : 53 L.T. 686 : 34 W.R. 55 : 5 Asp. M.C. 503. It follows, therefore, that until and unless the compromise decree was set aside, Sivagnana was bound by it and the defendant was entitled to the benefit secured to him under it. I agree with the Subordinate Judge in holding that the compromise is binding on Sivagnana.
Madras High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 34 - Full Document

Samarendra Chandra Deb vs Birendra Kishore on 10 August, 1909

Samarendra Chandra Deb v. Birendra Rishore Deb 35 C. 777 : 8 C.L.J. 1 : 12 C.W.N. 777 : 4 M.L.T. 27, was next relied on. In that case it was found that the Tipera Raj was entitled to nominate his successor as Job Raj from among the members of the family. It was not denied that the person so nominated would succeed to the Raja if he survived him. But it was contended that as the right of succession was contingent upon the plaintiff surviving the reigning prince, a suit for declaration will not lie. There were other important questions raised in the case. The Full Bench, after deciding that the Calcutta Courts had no jurisdiction, held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to a declaration. It is doubtful whether this decision is correct, having regard to the ruling of the Court of Appeal in England in the Law Times Reports and to the provisions of and illustration to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.
Calcutta High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 5 - Full Document
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