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1 - 10 of 14 (0.35 seconds)The Revenue Recovery Act, 1890
Section 60 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
T.V. Anandan And Anr. vs State Of Kerala And Ors. on 6 July, 1981
28. There is yet another contention for the
purchaser/petitioner in W.P.(C)No.16852 of 2009 that the
amount payable by the defaulter to the KSFE does not constitute
arrears of public revenue and as such, Section 44 itself cannot
have any application to the case in hand. There is a decision
rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in A.K. Nanu and
others vs. State of Kerala an others (1987 (2) KLT 921)
and also by a Single Bench of this Court in Anandan vs. State
of Kerala [2009(4) KLT SN 79 (C.No.74)], that merely for
the reason that an institution has been notified under Section
71 of the Revenue Recovery Act, enabling the institution to
recover the dues invoking the machinery under the Revenue
Recovery Act, the nature of the debt will not get automatically
converted into 'arrears of public revenue due on land'. The
W.P. ) Nos.16187 OF 2007, 16852 OF 2009,
21876 OF 2009, 15549 and 37390 of
2010
39
observations made by this Court in the said decisions are in the
particular context and not with reference to applicability of
Section 44. What Section 71 stipulates is that, once a
notification is issued by the Government thereunder, in public
interest, all the provisions of the Act shall be applicable to such
recovery. In other words, what is provided under the Statute
for recovering the arrears of public revenue due on land could be
deployed/made use of, for recovering the dues payable to the
said institutions notified under Section 71, as if it were arrears
of public revenue due on land . Chapter III, where Sections 34
and 44 get enlisted, deals with the procedure for attachment and
sale of the immovable property, which necessarily is in the
course of the recovery proceedings contemplated under the Act
and as such, the scope and application of the Act as to the
procedure for recovering the debt invoking the machinery
thereunder, as understood by the purchaser/petitioner in W.P.
(C)No.16852 of 2009 is quite wrong and misconceived.
Spl. Tahsildar vs Vasu on 24 August, 2006
23. Coming to the scope of demand to be served under
W.P. ) Nos.16187 OF 2007, 16852 OF 2009,
21876 OF 2009, 15549 and 37390 of
2010
32
Section 7 or 34, such a course is stipulated as mandatory before
effecting any attachment of the movables or immovables, as the
case may be. Any attachment of the movables without serving a
demand notice showing the particulars as specified under Section
7 cannot result in a valid attachment. Same is the position with
regard to the immovable property, in view of the clear mandate
under Section 34, as to the procedure to be complied with
before effecting the attachment. But then, the question is
whether any attachment is necessary to invoke the power and
procedure under Section 44, which can only be answered in the
negative, in view of the law declared by a Division Bench of this
Court as per the decision reported in 2006(4) KLT 557 (Spl.
Tahsildar v. Vasu). The only requirement is whether the
stipulations under Section 44 are satisfied, so as to attract the
relevant provision.
Section 3 in The Revenue Recovery Act, 1890 [Entire Act]
State Of Kerala & Anr vs Radhamany on 23 August, 1996
26. As observed by the Apex Court in paragraph '5' of
(1996) 6 SCC 287 (State of Kerala and another vs.
Radhamany), each sub-section under Section 44 is independent
of the transaction dealt with therein. The Apex Court has held
that, to attract sub-section(2) of Section 44, the crucial question
is, as to the date on which the the 'arrears had fallen due' and
when the sale has been effected. Admittedly, in the instant case,
W.P. ) Nos.16187 OF 2007, 16852 OF 2009,
21876 OF 2009, 15549 and 37390 of
2010
36
though the sale was effected only on 03.01.2007, the arrears
had fallen due much earlier, as described in the 'table' given in
paragraph III of the additional counter affidavit
dated14.07.2012 filed by the KSFE and also as discernible from
Exts.R8(a) to R8(e). The distinction between Sub sections (2)
and (3) of Section 44 is that, in the case of the latter, if the
conveyance is effected to a 'near relative' (as defined in the
'explanation') or for grossly inadequate consideration, there is a
presumption, until the contrary is proved, that such transfer is
made 'with intent to defeat or delay the recovery of arrears';
thus enabling the concerned authority to proceed against the
property as if such transfer had not taken place .
The Darcah Committee, Ajmer vs State Of Rajasthan on 24 April, 1961
Later, in AIR 1962 SC 574 (The Dargah
Committee, Ajmer v. State of Rajasthan) a Constitution
Bench of the Apex Court observed in paragraph 5 in the
following terms: