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1 - 10 of 13 (0.20 seconds)Section 1 in The Suits Valuation Act, 1887 [Entire Act]
Rules Under The Suits Valuation Act
Rachappa Subrao Jadhav Desai vs Shidappa Venkatrao Jadhav Desai on 3 December, 1918
The defendant then took up
the matter in appeal to the Privy Council in Rachappa Subrao
Jadhav v. Shidappa Venkatrao Jadhav(2), and there, his
contention was that, in fact, on its true valuation the suit
was triable by the Court of the Subordinate Judge of the
Second Class, and that the District Court was the proper
Court to entertain the appeal. The Privy Council held that
this objection which was " the most technical of
technicalities " was not taken in the Court of first
instance, and that the Court would not be justified " in
assisting an objection of that type," and that it was also
untenable. Before concluding, it observed:
The Suits Valuation Act, 1887
Rajlakshmi Dasee vs Katyayani Dasee on 8 August, 1910
In Rajlakshmi Dasee v. Katyayani Dasee(1), the facts were
that one Katyayani Dasee instituted a suit to recover the
estate of her husband Jogendra in the Court of the
Subordinate Judge, Alipore, valuing the claim at Rs. 2,100,
whereas the estate was worth more than a lakh of rupees.
The suit was decreed, and the defendants preferred an appeal
to the District Court, which was the proper Court to
entertain the appeal on the plaint valuation. There, the
parties compromised the matter, and a consent decree was
passed, recognising the title of the defendants to portions
of the estate. Then, Rajlakshmi Dasee, the daughter of
Jogendra, filed a suit for a declaration that the consent
decree to which her mother was a party was not binding on
the reversioners. One of the grounds urged by her was that
the suit of Katyayani was deliberately under-valued, that if
it had been correctly valued, it was the High Court that
would have had the ,competence to entertain the appeal, and
that the con,sent decree passed by the District Judge was
accordingly a nullity. In agreeing with this contention,
the High Court observed that a decree passed by a Court
which had no jurisdiction was a nullity, and that even
consent of the partes could not cure the defect. In that
case, the question was raised by a person who was not a
party to the action and in a collateral proceeding, and the
Court observed:
Shidappa Venkatrao Jadhav vs Rachappa Subrao Jadhav on 26 June, 1912
In Shidappa Venkatrao v. Rachappa Subrao(1) the plaintiffs
instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge,
First Class, for a declaration that he was the adopted son
of one Venkatrao and for an injunction restraining the
defendant from interfering with his possession of a house.
The plaint valued the declaration at Rs. 130 and the
injunction at Rs. 5, and the suit was valued for purposes of
pleader's fee at Rs. 69,016-9-0 being the value of the
estate. The suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge, and
against his decree the defendant preferred an appeal to the
District Court, which allowed the appeal and dismissed the
suit. The plaintiff took up the matter in second appeal to
the High Court, and contended that on the valuation in the
plaint the appeal against the decree of the Subordinate
Judge lay to the High Court, and that the appeal to the
District Court was incompetent. This contention was upheld,
and the decree of the District Judge was set aside. It will
be seen that the point in dispute was whether on the
allegations in the plaint the value for purposes of
jurisdiction was Rs. 135 or Rs. 69,016-9-0, and the decision
was that it was the latter. No question of over-valuation
or under-valuation arose,' and no decision on the scope of
section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act was given.
As a result of its decision, the High Court came to
entertain the matter as a first appeal and affirmed the
decree of the Subordinate Judge.
The Court-fees Act, 1870
Naduvil Edom Karnavan And Manager Kelu ... vs Cheriya Parvathi Nethiyar And Ors. on 30 January, 1923
The question, therefore, is, can a decree passed on appeal
by a Court which had jurisdiction to entertain it only by
reason of under-valuation be set aside on the ground that on
a true valuation that Court was not competent -to entertain
the appeal? Three High Courts have considered the matter in
Full Benches, and have come to the conclusion that mere
change of forum is not a prejudice within the meaning of
section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. Vide Kelu Achan v.
Cheriya Parvathi Nethiar (1), Mool Chand v. Ram Kishan (2)
and Ramdeo Singh y. Baj Narain (3). In our judgment, the
opinion expressed in these decisions is correct. Indeed, it
is impossible on the language of the section to come to a
different conclusion. If the fact of an appeal being heard
by a Subordinate Court or District Court where the appeal
would have lain to the High Court if the correct valuation
had been given is itself a matter of prejudice, then the
decree passed by the Subordinate Court or the District Court
must, without more, be liable to be set aside, and the words
"unless the overvaluation or under-valuation thereof has
prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on
its merits" would become wholly useless. These words
clearly show that the decrees passed in such cases are
liable to be interfered with in an appellate Court, not in
all cases and as a matter of course, but only if prejudice
such as is mentioned in the section results. And the
prejudice envisaged by that section therefore must be
something other than the appeal being heard in a different
forum. A contrary conclusion will lead to the surprising
result that the section was enacted with the object of
curing
(1) I.L.R. 46 Mad. 631.
Mool Chand Moti Lal vs Ram Kishan And Ors. on 5 January, 1933
The question, therefore, is, can a decree passed on appeal
by a Court which had jurisdiction to entertain it only by
reason of under-valuation be set aside on the ground that on
a true valuation that Court was not competent -to entertain
the appeal? Three High Courts have considered the matter in
Full Benches, and have come to the conclusion that mere
change of forum is not a prejudice within the meaning of
section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. Vide Kelu Achan v.
Cheriya Parvathi Nethiar (1), Mool Chand v. Ram Kishan (2)
and Ramdeo Singh y. Baj Narain (3). In our judgment, the
opinion expressed in these decisions is correct. Indeed, it
is impossible on the language of the section to come to a
different conclusion. If the fact of an appeal being heard
by a Subordinate Court or District Court where the appeal
would have lain to the High Court if the correct valuation
had been given is itself a matter of prejudice, then the
decree passed by the Subordinate Court or the District Court
must, without more, be liable to be set aside, and the words
"unless the overvaluation or under-valuation thereof has
prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on
its merits" would become wholly useless. These words
clearly show that the decrees passed in such cases are
liable to be interfered with in an appellate Court, not in
all cases and as a matter of course, but only if prejudice
such as is mentioned in the section results. And the
prejudice envisaged by that section therefore must be
something other than the appeal being heard in a different
forum. A contrary conclusion will lead to the surprising
result that the section was enacted with the object of
curing
(1) I.L.R. 46 Mad. 631.