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1 - 4 of 4 (0.33 seconds)Dhanji Singh vs State Of Bihar And Ors. on 20 April, 1979
It is submitted by learned Senior counsel appearing for
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the petitioner that besides the petitioner having a good case on
merits, the orders impugned are not sustainable in law and fit to
be set aside on the ground of the provisions of section 48E of
the B.T. Act not having been followed in its letter and spirit in
so far as the Collector did not refer the matter/dispute to the
Board for settlement of the dispute between the parties as has
been mandated under section 48 (3) of the B.T. Act. It was
submitted that the same had to be done strictly as per provisions
of the B.T. Act and not having been done, the orders impugned
are in teeth of the judgment of this Court in the case of Dhanji
Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors. (1979 PLJR 247).
Ram Narain Singh And Ors. vs State Of Bihar And Ors. on 19 August, 1972
It was pointed out
in the aforesaid Ram Narain Singh's case in
connection with Sub-section (1) of Section 48 E
that, no doubt, the legislature has used the word
'may' which is generally understood as enabling
and not mandatory, but 'when the power
conferred by the statute is coupled with the duty
of the person to whom it is given to exercise it,
then even - though the word 'may' is used, it has
to be construed as imperative'.
Lakshmi Prasad Bhagat And Anr. vs State Of Bihar And Ors. on 9 May, 1978
In my view, although Sub-section (3) of Section
48 E uses the expression 'may' it has to be held
that once a proceeding is initiated under Sub-
section (1) of the Section, the dispute has to be
referred to the Board to be constituted by the
Collector. A bench of this Court in the case of (3)
Lakshmi Prasad Bhagat and another V. The
State of Bihar and others (1979 P. L. J. R. 82-
1978 Bihar Bar Council Journal 750) has held
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that the Collector after initiating the proceeding
has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute without
reference to the Board. I am in respectful
agreement with the said view. If the impugned
order amounts to deciding the dispute itself, then
it has to be held that the Subdivisional Officer
had no such power before it had been referred to
the Board.'
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