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1 - 10 of 16 (0.33 seconds)Section 104 in Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 [Entire Act]
Section 133 in Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 [Entire Act]
Government of India Act, 1935
Union Of India vs T. R. Varma on 18 September, 1957
In this connection he has relied upon Union of India v. T.R. Verma , Venkutaswaran v. R.S. Wadhvani , Thansingh v. Superintendent of Taxes , British I.S.N. Co. v. Jajit Singh , Champalal v. I.T. Commr. W.B. and J.M. & Co. v. Agrl. I.T. Officer Assam . The cases relied upon by the learned Advocate General broadb lay down that the parties who applies for a writ, should before he approaches the court has exhausted other remedies upon to him under the lay, as the existence of the alternative remedy is ordinarily a bar to the entertainment of a petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution. This wide proposition, however, is subject to two broad exceptions. If the officer or authority who takes the action impugned or where the order prejudicial to the petitioner has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice then he existence of alternative remedy will not operate as a bar to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226. The above proposition has its support in a Supreme Court decision.
Thansingh Nathmal And Ors vs A. Mazid, Superintendent Of Taxes on 3 February, 1964
In this connection he has relied upon Union of India v. T.R. Verma , Venkutaswaran v. R.S. Wadhvani , Thansingh v. Superintendent of Taxes , British I.S.N. Co. v. Jajit Singh , Champalal v. I.T. Commr. W.B. and J.M. & Co. v. Agrl. I.T. Officer Assam . The cases relied upon by the learned Advocate General broadb lay down that the parties who applies for a writ, should before he approaches the court has exhausted other remedies upon to him under the lay, as the existence of the alternative remedy is ordinarily a bar to the entertainment of a petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution. This wide proposition, however, is subject to two broad exceptions. If the officer or authority who takes the action impugned or where the order prejudicial to the petitioner has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice then he existence of alternative remedy will not operate as a bar to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226. The above proposition has its support in a Supreme Court decision.
Champalal Binani vs The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, West ... on 4 December, 1969
In this connection he has relied upon Union of India v. T.R. Verma , Venkutaswaran v. R.S. Wadhvani , Thansingh v. Superintendent of Taxes , British I.S.N. Co. v. Jajit Singh , Champalal v. I.T. Commr. W.B. and J.M. & Co. v. Agrl. I.T. Officer Assam . The cases relied upon by the learned Advocate General broadb lay down that the parties who applies for a writ, should before he approaches the court has exhausted other remedies upon to him under the lay, as the existence of the alternative remedy is ordinarily a bar to the entertainment of a petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution. This wide proposition, however, is subject to two broad exceptions. If the officer or authority who takes the action impugned or where the order prejudicial to the petitioner has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice then he existence of alternative remedy will not operate as a bar to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226. The above proposition has its support in a Supreme Court decision.
Burmah Shell Oil Storage &Distributing ... vs The Belgaum Borough Municipality on 16 November, 1962
In that case the Company objected to the levy of octroi on the goods which were sent b) it out of the octroi limits for the outside ultimate consumers and claimed refund of the amount charged as octroi. Clause (4) of Sub-section (1) of Section 73 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act which was under consideration in that case was just analogous to Sub-section (2) of Section 104 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. The words 'use or sale' were substituted for the words 'for use' by the Bombay Act of 35 of 1954. The Supreme Court examined the scheme of the taxation under the Bombay Boroughs Act and the Rules and bye laws made by the Municipality for, the levy of octroi. After examining the history of octroi the Supreme Court held 'Octrois were tax on goods brought into the local area for consumption, use or sale and that they were leviable in respect of goods put to some use or other in the area but only if they were meant for such user. "The Supreme Court further specifically clarified that the word sale was, included only in, 1964 in order to bring the description of the octroi in the Act in line with the Constitution. While doing so the Supreme, Court further, observed that the expression consumption 'and use' together, connote, the bringing in of the goods and animals not with a view to taking them out again but a view to their retention either for use without using them up or for consumption in manner which destroys, wastes or uses them up. The Supreme Court further held that the sale by it directly to consumer or dealers was merely the means for putting the goods in the way of use or consumption and that the words therein does not mean that all the acts of consumption must take place in the area of the Municipality. The Court further held as follows:
Andhra Industrial Works, A. P vs Chief Controller Of Imports And Ors on 26 April, 1974
9. The first preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Municipal Council is that the petitioner is a firm and is the before not competent to bring the writ petition. It is submitted that the petitioner firm is neither a natural nor a juristic person and the before it is wholly incompetent to move this Court by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel for the Municipal Council has not been able to substantiate his contention by any provision of law or an) authority on the point. On the other hand, Mr. Hastimal the learned Counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to a Supreme Court decision viz. Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller Imports AIR 1974 SC 1939 to rebut the contentions raised on behalf of respondent Municipal Council. have gone through the Supreme Court decision cited by Mr. Hastimal and I am satisfied that that decision squarely negatives the contention raised on behalf of respondent Municipal Council. In that decision it has been held that a registered partnership firm is competent to move the High Court under Article 226.
R. Abdul Quader And Co vs Sales Tax Officer, Hyderabad on 21 February, 1964
23. Mr. Hastimal contended that although the respondent No 2 had paid the octroi to the Municipal Council but the, same has been realised by it and, therefore, he is entitled under law to get a refund from the Municipal Council. No authority has been cited in support of this proposition. It cannot be lost sight of that the petitioner himself has realised the octroi by adding it to the retail price. Mr. Hastimal, however conttnded that the petitioner had charged the retail price at a lower rate in exclusion of the octroi duty. This it self is a question of fact and there is very precarious evidence to arrive at firm decision. At any rate there being no privity of obligation between the petitioner and the respondent Municipal Council the petitioner cannot ask for a refund in the absence of any statutory rules authorising him to do so. Abdul Quader & Co v. S.T. Officer and Rallis India Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1970 (26) STC 254. relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioners have no relevance as they are based on entirely different facts and are ,wholly distinguishable. There the State wanted to realise the amounts unauthorisedly collected by the dealers from the purchaser. The Government had no authority to recover such amounts realised by the dealers.