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1 - 10 of 13 (0.61 seconds)Article 21 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 300A in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 5 in The Railways Act, 1989 [Entire Act]
J.K. Construction Engineers And ... vs The Union Of India (Uoi) Through ... on 28 February, 2006
The petitioner has also placed a Single Bench judgment reported at (2002)
2 CHN 473 (S.K. Chatterjee & Sons v. Union of India) in the context of the railways
taking forcible possession of a tea stall upon the failure of the licencee to pay the
licence fees. It was observed in such judgment that until an eviction order was
passed against the licencee under the 1971 Act, the licencee was entitled to
remain in possession of the railway property. The judgment in S.K. Chatterjee &
Sons has recently been held to be per incuriam by a Single Bench of this court in
an unreported judgment rendered on July 10, 2012 in W.P No. 12581(W) of 2012
on the ground that it failed to notice Section 147 of the Railways Act.
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
State Of West Bengal & Ors vs Vishnunarayan And Associates (P) Ltd. & ... on 19 March, 2002
The petitioner refers to a judgment reported at (2002) 4 SCC 134 (State of
W.B. v. Vishnunarayan & Associates (P) Ltd) for the proposition that eviction by
force by the State would be impermissible if it is not mandated by law. Paragraph
20 of the report has been placed:
Article 32 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
State Of U.P. & Ors vs Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh Etc on 17 January, 1989
In the judgment reported at (1989) 2 SCC 505 (State of U.P. v. Maharaja
Dharmander Prasad Singh), which has been placed by the petitioner and also
referred to in Vishnunarayan & Associates (P) Ltd, the Supreme Court recognised
that just as an ordinary lessor, with the best of title, had no right to resume
possession extra-judiciary by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or
earlier termination of the lease, the State as lessor could equally not do so. It was
observed that the State is under an additional inhibition stemming from the
requirement that all actions of government and governmental authorities should
have a 'legal pedigree'. The court emphasised that possession could by resumed
by any government in respect of any government property "only in a manner
known to or recognised by law."