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1 - 10 of 11 (0.44 seconds)Article 14 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Budhan Choudhry And Other vs The State Of Bihar on 2 December, 1954
Now, the principles applicable for a determination
whether there has been a proper and valid classification for
purposes of Art. 14 have been the subject of consideration
by this Court in a number of cases, and they were stated
again quite recently in Budhan Choudhry and others v. The
State of Bihar(3), and there is no need to repeat them. The
only point that
(1) [1952] S.C.R. 284. (2) A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 220.
(3) [1955]1 S.C.R. 1045, 1049.
Satish Chandra Anand vs The Union Of India on 13 March, 1953
(IIc). 'it is then contended that the procedure pres-
cribed by the Security Rules for the hearing of the charges
does not satisfy the requirements of Art. 311, and that they
are, in consequence, void. But Art. 311 has application
only when there is an order of dismissal or removal, and the
question is whether an order terminating the services of the
employees under R. 3 can be said to be an order dismissing
or removing them. Now, this Court has held in a series of
decisions that it is not every termination of the services
of an employee that falls within the operation of Art. 311,
1065
and that it is only when the order is by way of punishment
that it is one of dismissal or removal under that Article.
Vide Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India (1), Shyam Lal
v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and the Union of India (2),
State of Bombay v. Saubhagchand M. Doshi (3), and Parshotam
Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (4).
Shyam Lal vs 1. The State Of Uttar Pradesh2. The Union ... on 30 March, 1954
(IIc). 'it is then contended that the procedure pres-
cribed by the Security Rules for the hearing of the charges
does not satisfy the requirements of Art. 311, and that they
are, in consequence, void. But Art. 311 has application
only when there is an order of dismissal or removal, and the
question is whether an order terminating the services of the
employees under R. 3 can be said to be an order dismissing
or removing them. Now, this Court has held in a series of
decisions that it is not every termination of the services
of an employee that falls within the operation of Art. 311,
1065
and that it is only when the order is by way of punishment
that it is one of dismissal or removal under that Article.
Vide Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India (1), Shyam Lal
v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and the Union of India (2),
State of Bombay v. Saubhagchand M. Doshi (3), and Parshotam
Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (4).
The State Of Bombay vs Saubhagchand M. Doshi on 25 September, 1957
(IIc). 'it is then contended that the procedure pres-
cribed by the Security Rules for the hearing of the charges
does not satisfy the requirements of Art. 311, and that they
are, in consequence, void. But Art. 311 has application
only when there is an order of dismissal or removal, and the
question is whether an order terminating the services of the
employees under R. 3 can be said to be an order dismissing
or removing them. Now, this Court has held in a series of
decisions that it is not every termination of the services
of an employee that falls within the operation of Art. 311,
1065
and that it is only when the order is by way of punishment
that it is one of dismissal or removal under that Article.
Vide Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India (1), Shyam Lal
v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and the Union of India (2),
State of Bombay v. Saubhagchand M. Doshi (3), and Parshotam
Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (4).
Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs Union Of India on 1 November, 1957
The question as to what
would amount to punishment for purposes of Art. 311 was also
fully considered in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra).
It was therein held that if a person had a right to continue
in office either under the service rules or under a special
agreement, a permature termination of his services would be
a punishment. And, likewise, if the order would result in
loss of benefits already earned and accrued, that would also
be punishment. In the present case, the terms of employment
provide for the services being terminated on a proper
notice, and so, no question of permature termination arises.
Rule 7 of the Security Rules preserves the rights of the
employee to all the benefits of pension, gratuities and the
like, to which they would be entitled under the rules.
Thus, there is no forfeiture of benefits already acquired.
It was stated for the appellants that a person who was
discharged under the rules was not eligible for re-
employment, and that that was punishment. But the
appellants are unable to point to any rule imposing that
disability. The order terminating the services under R. 3
of the Security Rules stands on the same footing as an order
of discharge under R. 148, and it is neither one of
dismissal nor of removal within the meaning of Art. 311.
This contention also must be overruled.
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
C. Sambandam vs The General Manager, South Indian ... on 13 November, 1951
Indeed, that has been held in Sambandam v. General Manager,
S. I. Ry. (1) and Prasadi v. Works Manager, Lillooah (2) ;
and that is also conceded by .Mr. Ganapathy Iyer. If then
the power to terminate the service under the Security Rules
is different from the power to discharge under R. 148 when
the procedure prescribed therein is not followed, it must be
equally so when, as here, it has been followed, for the
complexion of the rules cannot change according as they are
complied with or not. That means that the Security Rules
have an independent operation of their own, quite apart from
R. 148. We do not, however, desire to express any final
opinion on this question, as Mr. Ganapathy Iyer is willing
that the validity of the orders in question might be
determined on the footing that they were passed under R. 3
of the Security Rules, without reference to R. 148. That
renders it necessary to decide whether the Security Rules
are unconstitutional, as contended by the appellants.
(Ila). The first ground that is urged against the
validity of the Security Rules is that they are repugnant to
Art. 14. It is said that these rules prescribe a special
procedure where action is proposed to be taken against
persons suspected of subversive activities, and that when
the services of an employee are terminated under these
rules, the consequence is to stamp him as unreliable and
infamous, and there is thus discrimination, such as is hit
by Art. 14. It is admitted that if the persons dealt with
under these rules form a distinct class having an
intelligible differentia which bears a reasonable relation
to the purposes of the rules, then there would be no
infringement of Art.14. But it is argued that the expression
" subversive activities" which forms the basis of the
classification is vague and undefined in that even lawful
activities could be roped therein, and that such a
classification cannot be said to be reasonable. Reference
was made to the charges which were served on the appellant
in Civil Appeal No. 46 of 1956 as showing how even lawful
activities
(1) I.L.R. [1953] Mad. 229.