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1 - 10 of 12 (0.37 seconds)Section 66 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Section 40 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Section 2 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Mrs. O.K. Smith vs Mr. H.P. Smith on 28 August, 1931
The Court composed of Avory, Hawke and Lawrence, JJ., relied on the authority of Smith v. Smith and said that it was bound on the authority of that case, to hold that the weekly payments were annual payments within the meaning of rule 19.
Section 9 in The Income Tax Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
The New Piecegoods Bazar Co., ... vs The Commissioner Of Income-Tax,Bombay on 26 May, 1950
Before referring to other authorities of which there is a considerable number, I might with advantage mention the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of New Piecegoods Bazar Co. Ltd., Bombay v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay. Incidentally that decision was given in an appeal from one of the four decisions named by the Tribunal in its appellate order. The case related to the charge created in respect of municipal property tax by section 212 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888, and the question being whether or not the charge was an "annual charge not being a capital charge" within the meaning of section 9 (1) (iv) of the income-tax Act, their Lordships had occasion to decide what a "capital charge" meant and also, to a certain extent, what was meant by an "annual charge." "Capital charge," they held, meant a charge created to secure the discharge of a liability of a capital nature; and an "annual charge," they said, meant a charge to secure an annual liability. We are not concerned, in view of what I have already said, with the true meaning of the expression "capital charge" in the present case. With regard to the expression "annual charge" all the Supreme court actually decided appears to have been that a charge, in order to be a charge, in respect of a payment to be made annually or to secure the discharge of an annual liability and that provided a charge was of that nature, it was, although of a variable or contingent character, none the less an "annual charge." The direct decision in the case does not appear to go beyond excluding the view that if a charge was of a variable character, that is to say, liable to be increased or reduced or of the nature of a contingent charge, it would not be an annual charge, as contemplated by section 9 (1) (iv). What, however, "a payment to be made annually" or "an annual liability" really meant, namely, the positive concept underlying the terms, was not, so far as I can see, explained by the Supreme Court except perhaps indirectly and incidentally in two short paragraphs to which I shall refer later.
City of Bombay Municipal (Supplementary) Act, 1888
Gappumal Kanhaiyalal vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, C. P. & U. P. on 31 August, 1944
It would, therefore, seem that the fact that the alimony was made payable by the consent decree the present case month by month does not prevent it from being "an annual payment" or "annual charge" as contemplated by section 9 (1) (iv). It is not that the assessee was making it an annual payment by the simple device of multiplying the monthly sum by twelve, but the quality of being annual was inherent in the nature of the payment itself. The word "annual," as used in taxing statutes, must be taken to mean payments, in whatever kind of installments paid, made every year in discharge of a liability incident to that year, if it has to be made during more than one year, whether consecutively or otherwise. A payment is annual if, as was pointed our in the last of the cases I mentioned a few moments ago, it has the quality of recurrence in different years, although it might not be in every one of a succession of years. It is also not necessary that its quantum should be fixed by reference to a whole year. The illustration given by Allsop, J., in the case of Gappumal Kanhaiyalal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, C. P. & U. P., appears to me to be as happy as apposite.