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1 - 10 of 10 (0.20 seconds)Balbhaddar Singh vs Badri Sah on 26 March, 1926
8. Now, when did the prosecution proceedings terminate in this case? We consider that the answer must be that they terminated on the 13th July, 1931, when the District Magistrate dismissed the revision petitions and that this answer is given by the decision in Balbhaddar Singh v. Badri Sah (1926) 51 M.L.J. 42 : I.L.R. 1 Luck. 215 (P.C.). Until those petitions were dismissed the prosecution case was before the Court. And it seems to us that it does not lie in the mouth of the respondent prosecutor to say that the proceedings had terminated so far as the second appellant was concerned on his discharge and so far as the first appellant was concerned on his acquittal. The proceedings had not terminated, because he took further steps with a view to securing their conviction.
B. Madan Mohan Singh vs B. Ram Sunder Singh on 9 December, 1930
On the other hand in Madan Mohan Singh v. Ram Sundar Singh (1930) I.L.R. 52 All. 553, the Allahabad High Court held that an application for revision of an order discharging an accused person could be deemed to be a continuation of the prosecution, or a fresh prosecution in itself, and therefore when the suit was instituted within one year of the dismissal of the application for revision it was in time, notwithstanding that more than 12 months had elapsed from the date of discharge. The learned Judges, however, remarked that in a case where the prosecution ended in acquittal the language of Article 23 left no room for argument with regard to the commencement of limitation, as the article specifically provides that limitation is to run from the date of acquittal. We consider that in these cases the real significance of an application for revision has not been realised and we are unable to accept the Allahabad High Court's reading of Article 23.
Purshottam Vithaldas Shet vs Ravji Hari Athavle on 23 March, 1922
In Purshottam Vithaldas Shet v. Ravji Hari Athavale (1922) I.L.R. 47 Bom, Macleod, C.J. and Kanga, J., decided that the period of limitation ran from the date of the order of discharge on the ground that the cause of action would not be suspended because further proceedings might be taken either by the Government or by the complainant in order to get the order of discharge set aside.
Section 417 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 435 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
A.T. Sankaralinga Mudaliar vs Narayana Mudaliar And Ors. on 25 April, 1922
4. The learned Advocate for the respondent in this connection has laid great stress on Rule 263 of the Criminal Rules of Practice and Orders of this Court. That rule states that when a District Magistrate is of opinion that an order of acquittal is wrong, and that such order should be set aside, he should request Government to prefer an appeal under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and should not report the case for the orders of the High Court under Section 438 of the Code. But this rule does not say that he shall not report such cases to the High Court for its orders. If it did the rule would be ultra vires the powers of the Court. The rule has been framed for the guidance of District Magistrates in suitable cases, and cannot be read as saying that a District Magistrate shall never refer an acquittal to this Court. That this Court can revise an order of acquittal was recognised by a Full Bench of this Court consisting of Schwabe, C.J., Oldfield and Coutts-Trotter, JJ., in Sankaralinga Mudaliar v. Narayana Mudaliar (1922) 43 M.L.J. 369 : I.L.R. 45 Mad. 913 (F.B.). The learned Chief Justice in the course of his judgment pointed out that where there is an appeal by the Public Prosecutor or the Crown from an acquittal the Court sets its face against revision; but where a private prosecutor, having no power to appeal comes to the Court in revision it certainly is open to the Court to hear him.
The Limitation Act, 1963
Tanguturi Sriramulu And Rao Bahadur K. ... vs Nyapathi Subba Rao Panthulu Garu And ... on 24 February, 1919
9. The learned Advocate for the respondent says that in any event the suit is barred so far as the first appellant is concerned, as he was acquitted and Article 23 provides that time shall run from the date of the acquittal. This argument ignores the wording of the article and the reason for the rule that so long as proceedings are pending the accused shall not be allowed to sue. The wording "when the plaintiff is acquitted" cannot be divorced from the words "or the prosecution is otherwise terminated". In our opinion the article provides that time shall run when the plaintiff is acquitted or when the prosecution comes to an end in some other manner. If the acquittal is followed by other proceedings the prosecution is terminated not by the acquittal but by the order passed in the subsequent proceedings and this construction was placed on the article by a Bench of this Court consisting of Bakewell and Phillips, JJ., in Tanguturi Sriramulu v. Nyapathi Subba Rao Panthulu (1919) 57 I.C. 635 : A.I.R. 1920 Mad. 151.
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