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1 - 9 of 9 (0.32 seconds)Section 13 in The General Clauses Act, 1897 [Entire Act]
Section 18A in The Gift-Tax Act, 1958 [Entire Act]
The Income Tax Act, 1961
B.B. Sarkar vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 5 May, 1981
The basic qualification of the gift-tax payable exceeding Rs. 1,000 in respect of each instrument of gift of property cannot be construed, unless violence is done to the language in a manner not intended by the Legislature or not known to grammar, that it would mean all instruments of gift of property. If 'A', taking an illustration, makes ten gifts in respect of each of which the gift-tax payable exceeded Rs. 1,000, then the stamp duty payable in respect of all those gifts would qualify for rebate. But, if gift-tax payable in respect of some of them happened to be below Rs. 1,000, on the plain language of Section 18A, those gifts would become disentitled for the rebate. He then submitted that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in K.P. Varghese (supra) or that of the Calcutta High Court in B.B. Sarkar (supra), would apply only to a case where there is a manifest absurdity. Hence, he pointed out that we are reading an absurdity where none existed, only to suit a particular interpretation.
K.P. Varghese vs The Income Tax Officer,Ernakulam, And ... on 4 September, 1981
We may at this stage say in passing that as per the latest ruling of the Supreme Court in K.P. Varghese (supra), the Head Note or the marginal note to a section, though it cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the section, can be relied upon as indicating, as, what the Supreme Court described, 'the drift of the section', or to show what the section is dealing with. It certainly cannot control the interpretation of the words of a section, particularly when the language of the section is clear and unambiguous. It is to be remembered that it is a part of the statute and, therefore, it has a function to perform and this function is 'prima facie furnishing some clue as to the meaning and purport of the section'. Therefore, though a reference to the marginal note cannot be made for the purpose of construction, it can be relied upon to indicate the drift to the section and as we see, the drift of the section is to allow credit for stamp duty paid in respect of each of the gifts of property made. It is also not proper, as pointed out by the learned departmental representative, to call in aid Section 13 of the General Clauses Act. That section opens with the words 'In all Central Acts and Regulations unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context'. In order that subsections (1) and (2) should apply, there should be repugnancy in the Act. The function of an interpretation clause is not to substitute one set of words for another, or to apply the meaning of the term 'under all circumstances'. It merely indicates the intention of the Legislature that the words could be interpreted in the plural wherever the circumstances require that should be so construed.
Section 26A in Income Tax Rules, 1962 [Entire Act]
Chhotalal Devchand vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay ... on 24 March, 1958
8. Before we part with this point, we may have to refer to the decisions of the Bombay High Court, relied upon. That is the very soul of the argument of the learned conusel for the assessee. Those decisions revolved on the question as to what constitutes an instrument of partnership for the purpose of granting registration under the Income-tax Act. The question was whether there could be several documents embodying the terms and conditions of the partnership to which the partners have agreed or should they all be referred to in one single document. The Court had ruled that it is not necessary that all the terms and conditions that the partners have agreed to should be reduced to writing in one single document. Those conditions and terms could be ascertained from several documents in which case all those documents put together would constitute one instrument as spelling out the conditions and terms of the partnership and, therefore, satisfies the requirements of Section 26A of the 1922 Act which provided that there must be a partnership under an instrument of partnership. The decision given for a totally different purpose, cannot be imported into the interpretation of Section ISA to say that an instrument of gift should be read as several instruments of gifts. The decisions of the Bombay High Court in A, Phiroj & Co. (supra) and Chhotalal Devchand (supra) may perhaps apply in a case where the terms of the gift are embodied in more than one document so that all those documents put together could be regarded as one instrument of gift, but not for the purpose of interpretation as to whether Section ISA would apply to one instrument of gift or several instruments of gifts. If this interpretation is accepted, it would make the connecting link that the gift-tax payable in respect of each of such gifts exceeding Rs. 1,000 (sic) would be a qualification which would never be possible to implement.
A. Phiroj And Co. vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay ... on 21 January, 1965
8. Before we part with this point, we may have to refer to the decisions of the Bombay High Court, relied upon. That is the very soul of the argument of the learned conusel for the assessee. Those decisions revolved on the question as to what constitutes an instrument of partnership for the purpose of granting registration under the Income-tax Act. The question was whether there could be several documents embodying the terms and conditions of the partnership to which the partners have agreed or should they all be referred to in one single document. The Court had ruled that it is not necessary that all the terms and conditions that the partners have agreed to should be reduced to writing in one single document. Those conditions and terms could be ascertained from several documents in which case all those documents put together would constitute one instrument as spelling out the conditions and terms of the partnership and, therefore, satisfies the requirements of Section 26A of the 1922 Act which provided that there must be a partnership under an instrument of partnership. The decision given for a totally different purpose, cannot be imported into the interpretation of Section ISA to say that an instrument of gift should be read as several instruments of gifts. The decisions of the Bombay High Court in A, Phiroj & Co. (supra) and Chhotalal Devchand (supra) may perhaps apply in a case where the terms of the gift are embodied in more than one document so that all those documents put together could be regarded as one instrument of gift, but not for the purpose of interpretation as to whether Section ISA would apply to one instrument of gift or several instruments of gifts. If this interpretation is accepted, it would make the connecting link that the gift-tax payable in respect of each of such gifts exceeding Rs. 1,000 (sic) would be a qualification which would never be possible to implement.
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