Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 7 of 7 (0.81 seconds)Article 311 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
The High Commissioner For India And The ... vs I.M. Lall on 18 March, 1948
'On a careful consideration of the report, and in
particular of the conclusions reached by the Enquiry
Officer in respect of the charges framed against you
the President is provisionally of opinion that a major
penalty viz., dismissal, removal or reduction should be
enforced on you....'
Ultimately, after taking into consideration the
representation made by the concerned government servant
penalty of removal from service was imposed upon him. It was
contended before this Court that in view of the decision of
the Privy Council in High Commissioner for India and High
Commissioner for Pakistan v. I. M. Lall, and Khem Chand v.
Union of India(3) it is well settled that the punishing
authority must either specify the 'actual punishment' or
'particular punishment' in the second show cause notice
otherwise the notice would be bad. Repelling this contention
this Court observed as under:
Union Of India & Ors vs K. Rajappa Menon on 7 October, 1968
"... If in the present case the show cause notice
had merely stated the punishment of dismissal without
mentioning the other two punishments it would still be
open to the punishing authority to impose any of the
two lesser punishments of removal or reduction in rank
and no grievance could have been made either about the
show cause notice or the actual punishment imposed".
The High Court in support of its decision has relied
upon K. Rajappa Menon's case (Supra).
Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Chandigarh vs Suresh Chand And Anr on 21 February, 1978
A welfare State would hardly be interested in pursuing
its employees serving in the lower echelons of service as
would inflict, unbearable burden on him. Further, if the
order by the High Court is not interfered with, the
respondent would have to be reinstated in service but by the
passage of time he would have by now retired on
superannuation also and accordingly he would be entitled to
his salary for the period commencing from date of his
compulsory retirement to the date of his normal retirement
on superannuation. Since we are exercising our extraordinary
jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution, we are not
bound to set aside the order of the High Court directing
reinstatement of the respondent but as he would now only be
entitled to his back wages, we quantify the same at Rs.
10,000/- and direct that the State shall pay the same with
costs quantified at Rs. 1,000/- to the respondent. Such an
approach accords with the demands of social justice, reason
and fair play. [See Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh
Chand & Ors.(1)]
The State shall pay the amount herein directed to be
paid within two months from today and the respondent shall
be entitled to his terminal benefits from the date of his
retirement on superannuation.
Khem Chand vs The Union Of India And Others on 13 December, 1957
This contention was in
terms negatived relying upon Khem Chand's case (Supra) and
it was observed that the procedure which is to be followed
under Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of affording a
reasonable opportunity includes giving of two notices, one
at the enquiry stage and
1251
the other when the competent authority as a result of the
enquiry tentatively determines to inflict a particular
punishment. It is quite obvious that unless the disciplinary
or the competent authority arrives at some tentative
decision it will not be in a position to determine what
particular punishment to inflict and a second show cause
notice cannot be issued without such a tentative
determination. This is of no assistance in the case under
discussion.
Hukum Chand Malhotra vs Union Of India on 12 December, 1958
In criminal and quasi-
criminal jurisprudence where the penalties are prescribed it
is implicit thereunder that a major penalty would comprehend
within its fold the minor penalty. If a major penalty is
proposed looking to the circumstances of the case, at that
stage, after taking into consideration the representation
bearing on the subjects and having an impact on the question
of penalty a minor penalty can always be awarded. In penal
statute maximum sentence for each offence is provided but
the matter is within the discretion of the judicial officer
awarding sentence to award such sentence within the ceiling
prescribed by law as would be commensurate with the gravity
of the offence and the surrounding circumstances except
where minimum sentence is prescribed and Court's discretion
is by legislation fettered. This is so obvious that no
authority is needed for it but if one is needed, a
constitution Bench of this Court in Hukam Chand Malhotra v.
Union of India(1) dealt with this very aspect. Relevant
portion of the second show cause notice which was before
this Court may be extracted:
1