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1 - 10 of 17 (1.52 seconds)Article 181 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 178 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 86 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Rahmat Karim vs Abdul Karim on 9 May, 1907
Govind Chunder v. Rungum Money 6 C. 60 : 6 C.L.R. 1908 : 115 P.W.R. 1908; Kedarnath Dutt v. Hara Chand Dutt8 C. 420; Ram Nath Bhattacharjee v. Uma Charan, Sircar 8 C.W.N. 756; Surender Keshub v. Khetter Krishto 30 C. 609; Chola Vadi Kotiah v. Polori Alamelamma 31 M. 71 : 3 M.I.T. 328 : 18 M.L.J. 46; Rahmat Karim v. Abdul Karim 6 C.L.J. 119 : 34 C. 672 : 11 C.W.N. 674. In our opinion, Article 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908 does not govern an application for order absolute under Order XXXIV, Rule 3, of the Civil Procedure Code 1908. In this view also, the application made by the appellant for order absolute of the decree nisi is not barred by limitation.
Govind Chunder Goswami vs Rungunmoney on 18 March, 1880
In other words, the Limitation Act does not profess to provide for all kinds of applications to Courts whatsoever Govind Chunder Goswamy v. Rungunmoney 6 C. 60 : 6 C.L.R. 345; Sital Prosad v. Abdul Rashit 11 O.C. 208.
Tiluck Singh vs Parsotein Proshad on 8 July, 1895
2. In support of the first contention of the appellant, it has been argued that under the law as it stood, before the Civil Procedure Code of 1908, and the Limitation Act of 1908, came into operation, there was no rule of limitation applicable to an application for order absolute of a decree nisi made under Section 86 of the Transfer of Property Act. This position has not been and cannot be controverted on behalf of the respondent, in view of the decision of this Court in Tiluck Singh v. Parsotein Proshad 22 C. 924, which has been accepted as good law in Rahmab Karim v. Abdul Karim 6 C.L.J. 119 : 34 C. 672 : 11 C.W.N. 674. It is manifest, therefore, that the application of the 9th September, 1908, was not open to objection on the ground of limitation. It is contended, however, by the learned Vakil for the respondent that that application was properly dismissed, and the subsequent applications of the 8th July, 1909, and 10i.h February, 1910, are open to objection on the ground of limitation as they were made after the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 had come into force, by which, it is suggested, a fundamental alteration was effected in the law. In answer to this contention, it has been urged by the learned Vakil for the appellant that the applications of 1909 and 1910, should be treated in substance as applications for revival or continuation of the application of the 9th September 1908. In our opinion, this contention is well-founded and must prevail. It is clear, as shown by subsequent events, that on the 9th September, 1908, the decree-holder was competent to apply for order absolute. No doubt, by reason of a fraudulent execution sale, her title had vested in the auction-purchaser, but when the sale was subsequently reversed, the parties were restored to the position which they would have occupied if the sale had never taken law.
Kedarnath Dutt vs Harra Chand Dutt on 9 March, 1882
Govind Chunder v. Rungum Money 6 C. 60 : 6 C.L.R. 1908 : 115 P.W.R. 1908; Kedarnath Dutt v. Hara Chand Dutt8 C. 420; Ram Nath Bhattacharjee v. Uma Charan, Sircar 8 C.W.N. 756; Surender Keshub v. Khetter Krishto 30 C. 609; Chola Vadi Kotiah v. Polori Alamelamma 31 M. 71 : 3 M.I.T. 328 : 18 M.L.J. 46; Rahmat Karim v. Abdul Karim 6 C.L.J. 119 : 34 C. 672 : 11 C.W.N. 674. In our opinion, Article 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908 does not govern an application for order absolute under Order XXXIV, Rule 3, of the Civil Procedure Code 1908. In this view also, the application made by the appellant for order absolute of the decree nisi is not barred by limitation.