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1 - 10 of 35 (0.30 seconds)Section 139 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
The Central Excise Act, 1944
Oudh Sugar Mills Ltd., Etc. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 17 October, 1969
In our view, therefore, the present demand of Rs.32,07,422/-, which has been confirmed against Nova by the impugned order, is not based on evidence which, as this Tribunal has repeatedly emphasized in cases of clandestine manufacture and clearance, would justify a finding against the appellant (GSL). Unless there is conclusive evidence that Nova did actually manufacture DTY and clandestinely clear them without payment of duty, liability cannot be placed on GSL on the basis of conjectures and surmises, as the Honble Supreme Court emphatically declared in the Oudh Sugar Mills case (supra). We are of the view that there is no tangible evidence produced by the department to establish that GSL has clandestinely manufactured and cleared DTY on which the present demand has been made. We, therefore, set aside the demand of Rs.32,07,422/- as being illegal and unjustified.
Swadeshi Polytex Ltd. vs Cce on 10 January, 2005
Reliance is placed on the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in Swadeshi Polytex (supra) and Lakshman Exports Ltd (supra) and to the earlier decisions of the Honble Delhi High Court in J &K Cigarettes case as clinching the issue in favour of the assessee. Reference is made in the said decision to the importance of Section 9D of the Act, the validity of which was also upheld in the said decision.
Lakshman Exports Ltd. vs Cce on 1 July, 1996
Reliance is placed on the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in Swadeshi Polytex (supra) and Lakshman Exports Ltd (supra) and to the earlier decisions of the Honble Delhi High Court in J &K Cigarettes case as clinching the issue in favour of the assessee. Reference is made in the said decision to the importance of Section 9D of the Act, the validity of which was also upheld in the said decision.
R.K. Cigarettes Pvt. Limited, Mr. R.K. ... vs Cce on 23 March, 2007
Reliance is placed on the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in Swadeshi Polytex (supra) and Lakshman Exports Ltd (supra) and to the earlier decisions of the Honble Delhi High Court in J &K Cigarettes case as clinching the issue in favour of the assessee. Reference is made in the said decision to the importance of Section 9D of the Act, the validity of which was also upheld in the said decision.
M/S. Telestar Travels Pvt. Ltd. & Ors vs Special Director Of Enforcement on 13 February, 2013
We agree with the aforesaid submissions of the ld.Senior Advocate that the decisions cited by the Adjudicating Authority on this aspect are clearly distinguishable. They do not lay down the proposition that cross-examination is not a right, but only that it would depend on the facts of each case. During the hearing held before this Tribunal, and while replying to the submissions on this issue made before us by the ld.Senior Advocate, the learned Special Counsel for the department made reference to the recent decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Telestar Travels Pvt Ltd v Special Director Enforcement, 2013 (289) ELT 3 (SC) as supporting the order rejecting cross-examination. In the said case, the Adjudicating Authority had relied upon the statements of two persons and communication received from Indian High Commission in London. These statements under reference were challenged as being inadmissible in evidence as the appellants request for an opportunity to cross examine these witnesses had been unfairly declined thereby violating the principles of natural justice. On the other hand, it was argued by the department that right of cross examination was available to a party under the Evidence Act which has no application to adjudication proceedings under the FERA and Adjudicating Rules framed thereunder. We have perused the said judgment of the Honble Supreme Court and also heard the submissions of the ld. Senior Advocate. The Honble Supreme Court held that it is evident from Rule 3 of the Adjudicating Rules framed under Section 79 of the FERA that Rules of Procedure do not apply to adjudication proceedings. At the same time, as pointed out by the ld. Senior Advocate, the Honble Supreme Court proceeded to say as under:
Surjeet Singh Chhabra vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 October, 1996
That does not, however, mean that in a given situation, cross examination may not be permitted to test the veracity of a deposition sought to be issued against a party against whom action is proposed to be taken. It is only when a deposition goes through the fire of cross-examination that a Court or Statutory Authority may be able to determine and assess its probative value. Using a deposition that is not so tested, may therefore amount to using evidence, which the party concerned has had no opportunity to question. Such refusal may in turn amount to violation of the rule of a fair hearing and opportunity implicit in any adjudicatory process, affecting the right of the citizen.
After referring to the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Surjeet Singh Chhabra v UOI, 1997 (89) ELT 646 and M/s Kanungo & Co v CC, 1983 (13) ELT 1486, the Honble Supreme Court (in para 20), while dealing with the case at hand, held that reliance had been placed upon certain documents produced by the two persons as referred to above. The documents were permitted to be inspected by the appellants. Production of document duly confronted to the appellant was in the nature of production in terms of Section 139 of the Evidence Act, where the witness producing the document is not subjected to cross examination. Such being the case, refusal of the Adjudicating Authority to permit cross examination of the witnesses producing the document, cannot even on the principles of Evidence Act, be found fault with. It was, therefore, held that no prejudice was caused to the appellant nor was demonstrated by the appellant before the Honble Supreme Court or before the Courts below. We agree with the submissions of the ld.Senior Advocate that the said decision of the Honble Supreme Court does not support the proposition that rejection of request for cross examination of witnesses whose statements have been relied upon, does not amount to violation of principles of natural justice. On the other hand, the observations extracted above demonstrate to the contrary. As far as the facts before the Honble Supreme Court were concerned, production of the documents being in the nature of production of documents under Section 139 of the Evidence Act, their cross examination was prohibited by the said Section itself. In the present case, witnesses who have given the statements are not persons who were asked to produce documents under Section 139 of the Evidence Act. Their statements were recorded as witnesses. This decision, therefore, does not help the contention put forward by the learned Special Counsel. For the above reasons, we hold that there has been a denial of natural justice in the facts of the present case. The impugned order, as is evident, strongly relies on the statements of VN Parab and on the documents seized from GSL and explained by the witnesses whose statements were recorded. GSL had sought permission to cross-examine two persons for reasons which had been broadly stated by them. In the letter requesting for cross-examination, GSL had clearly explained the reasons for cross-examination. In the present case, as we would be dealing with later, de hors the documents and the statements, there was no material to establish the case made out against GSL. The decisions cited by the ld. Senior Advocate categorically reject the proposition that cross-examination can be refused in cases like the present. We also agree with the ld.Senior Advocate that the decisions cited by the ld. Special Counsel for the Revenue does not lay down any law to the contrary.
Deena Paints vs Cce on 23 November, 2000
(ii) In Deena Paints v CCE : 2001 (43) RLT 805, raw materials and finished products were found lying in the factory in excess of what was entered in the statutory records, at the time of search of the factory. The foreman of the factory deposed that he had been working in the factory for 26 years and was keeping daily account of production in his diary, which he had handed over to the officers. He was responsible for the manufacturing the finished product out of the raw material. The Manager of the factory, who had been working in the factory for 20 years and looking after the Central Excise work of the factory and the day-to-day production deposed that the Note Book recovered from the Foreman contained details of production, which were genuine and correct. It was argued by the appellants in that case that the department has not brought on record any evidence that the appellants had procured additional raw material and manufactured the goods. It was, also argued by the appellants that the department has not brought on record any evidence about clandestine removal of the goods without payment of duty. It was also submitted that there was no evidence placed on record to show that appellants received any amount of sale proceeds of the goods. It was therefore, contended by the appellants that duty was not demandable in the absence of any proof or records. It was submitted that clandestine manufacture and clandestine removal of the goods without payment of duty should have been proved properly, which was not done. It was further contended that the figures recorded in the diary maintained by the Foreman were not corroborated by any other evidence.