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1 - 10 of 34 (0.62 seconds)Section 406 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 6 in The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 [Entire Act]
Section 27 in The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 [Entire Act]
Section 177 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 125 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Harjeet Singh Ahluwalia vs State Of Punjab And Anr. on 20 May, 1986
In the case of Harjeet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab and Anr., reported in 1986 Cri.LJ 2070, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has observed that the forum of adjudication for the matter of that place where the police has to investigate the commission of the alleged offence, cannot therefore, depend upon the sweet-will of the complainant-wife who may choose to shift to a place other than the place where the alleged offence of criminal breach of trust is said to have been committed. It is, thus, quite obvious that the words "was required to be returned or accounted" have no nexus whatsoever with either the parental home of the wife or any other place where she chooses to reside after the break-down. Neither of the Courts at those places would therefore have jurisdiction to try the offence of criminal breach of trust by virtue of the Sub-section (4) of Section 181 of Cr.P.C. It is, however, undisputed that the Courts at those places can have jurisdiction to try the offence by virtue of the other clauses of Section 181(4) if the case can fall under any of those clauses. The requisite 'requirement' is to be determined on the basis of the stipulation, if any, between the parties, i.e. the complainant and the accused as to where the goods are to be returned or to be accounted for. In the absence of any such stipulation, it would be the place where the goods in question were kept in trust and a breach in respect thereof was committed. Mr. Thakkar has placed reliance on this observation and tacts of this cited decision. The question before the Punjab & Haryana High Court was res Integra and no direct precedent on the point was cited before the Court by either parties. The Punjab & Haryana High Court was dealing with a petition moved under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the F.I.R. registered with the Civil Lines Police Station, Amritsar under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. Marriage is a social institution and it would not only be illogical but imprudent to imagine that there is scope between the parties to marriage i.e. husband and wife, that they may determine the point of requirement or there can be any stipulation between them, anticipating the status of complainant and the accused, as to where the goods, in the eventuality is to be returned. Streedhan being offered to at any time immediately prior to marriage, during marriage ceremony and in immediate subsequent days or weeks of performance of marriage ceremony. Normally, Indian wives are receiving the gifts from close relatives and friends during these days only. So, what would happen to these properties in the event of break-down, cannot be anticipated in advance, and therefore, existence of any such stipulation cannot be expected. Considering the social experience and the relevant social set-up, it can be inferred that in the event of a separation of husband and wife resulting into a break-down, normally wife is at a receiving end. Victimisation, she being a weaker vessel by social force is an accepted outcome. So, the interpretation of Sub-section (4) should be harmonious to the legislative intent. There may be more than one parallel interpretation of a same legal cause depending upon the nature of event or transaction. In a commercial transaction, one can expect a stipulation so as to the property entrusted to or is to be accounted for. In socio-economic transaction, anticipation of such stipulations when a wife has been defrauded or her property has been dishonestly misappropriated or converted for their own use by In-laws, the expectation of existence in stipulation that where the property is required to be returned by the accused persons may result into miscarriage of justice. The ratio of the above-cited decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court has only persuasive value and it is not possible for me to record my agreement with the same.
Satvinder Kaur vs State (Govt. Of N.C.T. Of Delhi) And Anr on 5 October, 1999
In the case of Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of N.T.C. of Delhi) and Anr., reported in 1999 Cri.LJ 4566, the Apex Court has held that in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., F.I.R. cannot be quashed on that ground that police station where the complaint was lodged did not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the offence. Para-8 of the decision, on the contrary helps the present petitioner. The Delhi High Court had quashed the complaint on the ground that the alleged cruelty punishable under Section 498A of I.P.C. was committed at Patiyala where the victim Satvinder Kaur was thrown out of her matrimonial home with four weeks baby girl having only wearing apparels. This decision deals with altogether a different aspects and the Apex Court ultimately held that it was open for the police of Paschim Vihar Police Station, New Delhi to investigate the crime. The Court is supposed to think about the social stability and social order are required to be regulated by proceeding against the offenders wherein it is found that a one single offence is an offence against the Society as a whole.
S.I. Rooplal And Anr vs Lt. Governor Through Chief Secretary ... on 14 December, 1999
14. Mr. Thakkar has drawn the attention of this Court to a decision in the case of Sub-Inspector Rooplal and Anr. v. Lt. Governor through Chief Secretary, Delhi and Ors., reported in AIR 2000 SC 594 and has submitted that this Court should take a consistent view which has taken in the case of Girdharilal Tenumal Motwani (supra) which is a fundamental principle that every Presiding Officer of a Judicial Forum should know and follow the consistency in interpretation of law and this alone can lead to public confidence in the justice delivery system. A Co-ordinate Bench of a Court cannot pronounce judgment contrary to declaration of law made by another bench and it can only refer it to a Larger Bench if the Presiding Judge is in disagreement with the view expressed or pronouncement made earlier. But in view of the different set of facts and the fact that a wife has prosecuted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 406 of I.P.C. only, this Court is able to look at the law from another angle and with different dimension. The accused of the offence of misappropriation and/or criminal breach of trust can be prosecuted in terms of Section 181(4) of Cr.P.C. in a Court within whose jurisdiction the property so misappropriated or converted to the use of the accused dishonestly are lying, the property was required to be returned or accounted by the accused persons. It is settled legal position that all the three requirements under Sub-section (4) of Section 181 of Cr.P.C. are disjunctive. There is Court at one place would have jurisdiction to try such offences. Undisputedly, the complainant had married to accused No. 1 at Vadodara, and thereafter, the complainant accused No. 1 prohibited and stayed at Adipur, Dist. Kutchh. There was litigation between them at Kutchh-Bhuj. as proceedings for divorce were initiated by accused No. 1 at Kutchh-Bhuj. On 7-1-1995 a decree for divorce has been passed and the appeal on the day on which learned Judicial Magistrate First Class decided the application Exh. 9 was pending. Prior to the date of decree of divorce, the complainant had initiated maintenance proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. in the Court of learned J.M.F.C., Halol and in the application Exh. 9 preferred by the accused persons in the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner-wife they have accepted that on 23-5-1994, the maintenance application was allowed and the complainant-wife was granted maintenance of Rs. 500/- per month and the said amount was being paid by accused No. 1. In the divorce proceedings between the complainant and the accused No. 1, the complainant had not filed any application under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act. It is one of the say of the accused that the complainant-wife had never issued any notice to return her streedhan and other personal properties. It is not the say of the accused persons that streedhan properties and other personal properties of the complainant wife has been returned to her during the proceedings pending in the Court of J.M.F.C., Halol dealing with the maintenance application under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. or divorce proceedings before the Court of Assistant Judge, Kutchh-Bhuj. It is true that denial to return such streedhan properties etc. was made at Bhuj during the pendency of the divorce proceedings and the date of filing of the complaint in the Court of learned J.M.F.C., Halol for the offence under Section 406 of I.P.C. may look a delayed complaint. But the question brought before this Court by the revisioner-wife is limited. The grievance of the complainant is that the learned Sessions Judge by impugned order has erroneously held that the learned J.M.F.C., Halol dealing with the Criminal Case No. 1877 of 1999 has no jurisdiction and the original complaint be returned to the complainant directing her to present it in appropriate Court. Learned Counsel appearing for the accused Mr. Thakkar has tried to submit that this complainant-wife has filed a civil suit fqr maintenance in the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.) at Vadodara under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act and in that suit, the address of the petitioner-complainant is shown to be a place located within the city of Vadodara. Certified copy of such civil suit or say the declaration of address has not been brought before this Court. Even if it is accepted for the sake of arguments that the Civil Suit filed in the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.) Vadodara would not affect the merits of this matter. Undisputedly, the marriage has taken place at Vadodara. So, for the sake of convenience, the complainant of that suit may give the local address convenient to her and the parties. One important aspect should not lose sight of that the accused No. 1-respondent husband had appeared and contested the proceedings initiated in the Court of learned J.M.F.C., Halol. There are positive averments in the complaint that the complainant-wife is residing with her parents and her ordinary place of residence is shown to be Kanjari Road, Halol, Dist. Panchmahals. So, it would be wrong to say that this address has been wrongly shown by the complainant only with a view to harass the accused persons and to drag them to a litigation on false averments to a distant and inconvenient place. It is neither the say nor the submission that dispute as to the territorial jurisdiction to try and deal with the maintenance proceedings was raised. On the contrary, it transpires that the order, granting maintenance was complied with by the accused. Mr. Thakkar during the course of oral submissions has attempted to give some examples whereby he demonstrated that in absence of specific contract or understanding between the parties, the Court, where the accused reside or the property is required to be returned or accounted for by the accused persons should not assume jurisdiction which invite tremendous hardship and inconvenience and it may tempt the complainant wife to come and settle in the farthest corner of the country only with a view to file some complaints. This Court is not able to agree with the hypothetical premises put forward by Mr. Thakkar. With increase of mobility and other social-radical changes and fast mode of transportation, it is possible that in some exceptional cases, the accused may be dragged to litigation at a distant or an inconvenient place. But it is always obligatory on the part of the complainant to establish to the satisfaction of the Court that he or she is resident of a particular place and that the property was required to be returned or accounted for to him/ or her by the accused persons. When the Court is not in an agreement that the town Halol is not an ordinary place of resident of the present complainant than the hypothetical submission cannot be accepted. On the contrary, the averments made by the accused persons in the application Exh. 9 indicate that the ordinary place of resident of the complainant is town Halol only. Revision Application filed before the learned Sessions Judge, Godhra, also indicates that the address of the present petitioner complainant is Kanjari Road, Halol.