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1 - 10 of 10 (0.31 seconds)Section 3 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
The Limitation Act, 1963
Section 14 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Section 115 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Sangram Singh vs Election Tribunal, Kotah,Bhurey Lal ... on 22 March, 1955
In the same manner, the other decision on which Mr. Vakil relied, viz., Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal Kotah also cannot help the opponent. There it has been laid down in paragraphs 16 and 17 at page 429 of the report as fellows:
Article 163 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs Rewa Coalfields Ltd on 4 May, 1961
13. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the learned trial Judge, with respect to him was in error when he held that the two restoration applications were not barred by limitation. It was obligatory on the plaintiff, in the light of the decision in Ramlal's case (supra), to have exfdained the entire delay between March 5, 1953 and August 8, 1956 and that too to explain the delay day by day. The application for condona tion, 6f delay, Ex. 3, in each of the two restoration applications, which were originally in Gujarati, have been shown to me and I have been taken through the entire application and nowhere in that application has an attempt been made to explain the delay right upto August 8, 1956, when the application for condonation of delay came to be filed. Under these circumstances, it is clear that even if the trial Court was right in condoning the delay between February 3, 1953 and July 10, 1956, still on August 8, 1956., the applications were barred by time and that being the caw, this is a clear case of a subordinate Court assuming jurisdiction to decide the restoration application on merits in clear violation of Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the rned trial Judge, with, respect to him, was in error when he held these restoration applications were filed in time and then proceeded to deal with the restoration applications and after deciding the restoration applications, on merits, allowed those restoration applications. In view, of what has been stated above, it was obligatory on the learned trial Judge to dismiss application for condonation of delay because no sufficient cause was shown for, the entire period between the expiry of the last day of limitation prescribed for presenting the application and August 8, 1956, on which date the cautions were actually filed. It was also obligatory on the learned Judge to hold that the restoration applications were, therefore, barred by time and he ought to have dismissed all the four applications, viz., the two applications for condonation of delay and the two restoration applications.
Kishandas Bakhatmal vs The Municipal Corporation Of The City Of ... on 24 June, 1958
14. Mr. Vakil on behalf of the opponent drew my attention to two decisions. One of these two decisions is Kishandas v. The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad, 60 Bom. L.R. 1357; and there Chagla C.J. has held that commonsense view of the matter should be taken and the procedure should not be permitted to defeat the ends of, justice. These are general observations which have no applicability to the facts of the present case because if the Legislature has prescribed; a period of limitation and has laid down that the Court cannot hear any matter or entertain any matter after the prescribed period of limitation is over, then there is no scope for the Court to take a commonsense view regarding the procedure.
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