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1 - 10 of 12 (0.66 seconds)Section 32 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 306 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 34 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Bhupendra vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 11 November, 2013
The learned counsel
would contend that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Bhupendra Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, is distinguishable on facts. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering a factual scenario in which the
Chemical Analyzer's report was sought but then was awaited and the
defence contended that in the absence of the report of viscera
examination, death due to consumption of poison is not established. The
Hon'ble Supreme court was pleased to articulate that the consumption of
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poison can be established by other evidence, and absence of viscera report
is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution case. The learned counsel for
the accused would urge, that while absence of viscera report may not be
fatal to the prosecution case, if there is no direct ocular evidence on record
to suggest suicidal death due to consumption of poison, a negative viscera
report is certainly fatal.
Shiv Kumar S/O Girdhari Lal vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh on 28 July, 2017
Page 948: The Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Kumar v. State
of U.P.{1966 Cri.App.R (SC) 281} has made similar observations
that the circumstances must have some proximate relation to the
actual occurrence, and that general expressions indicating fear or
suspicion, whether of a particular individual or otherwise and not
directly to the occasion of death will not be admissible.
Pakala Narayana Swami vs Emperor on 19 January, 1939
The declarant need not actually have been
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apprehending death. (AIR 1964 MP 30.)
Page 947: The expression `circumstances of the transaction'
occurring in Section 32, clause (1) has been a source of perplexity
to courts faced with the question as to what matters are admissible
within the meaning of the expression. The decision of Their
Lordships of the Privy Council in Pakala Narayana Swami v.
Emperor (AIR 1939 PC 47) sets the limits of the matters that could
legitimately be brought within the purview of that expression. Lord
Atkin, who delivered the judgment of the Board, has, however,
made it abundantly clear that, except in special circumstances no
circumstance could be a circumstance of the transaction if it is not
confined to either the time actually occupied by the transaction
resulting in death or the scene in which the actual transaction
resulting in death took place. The special circumstance permitted
to transgress the time factor is, for example, a case of prolonged
poisoning, while the special circumstance permitted to transgress
the distance factor is, for example, a case of decoying with intent to
murder.... But the circumstances must be circumstances of the
transaction and they must have some proximate relation to the
actual occurrence.
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs State Of Maharashtra on 17 July, 1984
"4. The legal position relating to the admissibility of evidence
under section 32(1) has come up for consideration before this
court time and again. It is not necessary to multiply the
authorities in this regard as reference to a three judge Bench
decision of this court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of
Maharashtra, (1984)4 SCC 116:[2009 ALL SCR(O.C.C.) 281],
will suffice. Regarding the application of rule under section 32(1)
Evidence Act, Fazal Ali, J. culled out the legal position as follows:
Bhairon Prasad & Others vs State Of U.P. & Others on 3 September, 2010
The evidence which is based on what Saraswati narrated is
hearsay and is not admissible under section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872. The prosecution has not proved that Sarswati committed
suicide. PW1 asserts that deceased Sarswati narrated the instances of
illtreatment when she met her family members. The statements
attributed to the deceased are clearly inadmissible since the death of
Sarswati is neither homicidal nor suicidal. Section 32(1) of Evidence Act,
is an exception to the rule of hearsay and statements of a person who
dies, whether the death is a homicide or a suicide, are made admissible if
the statements relate to the cause of death, or explain circumstances
leading to the death. In view of the finding recorded by the learned
Sessions Judge that suicidal death is not proved, and which finding I am
not inclined to disturb, the statements attributed to deceased Sarswati
are not statements which are admissible under section 32(1) of the
Indian Evidence Act and to the extent the evidence of PW1 and other
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family members is hearsay, the evidence is clearly inadmissible.
10 It would be apposite to refer to the following observations in
Bhairon Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2010 ALL SCR 213: