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1 - 9 of 9 (0.24 seconds)The Income Tax Act, 1961
Smt. Surasaibalini Debi vs Phanindra Mohan Majumdar on 27 October, 1964
As far as the case of Surasaibalini v. Phanindra Mohan is concerned, however, the claim was to recover the business, including the premises, and though that suit could perhaps not be said to be for the recovery of specific property, the judgment in the case shows that it has been dealt with as being a suit for the recovery of possession of the business, including the premises, on the footing of the plaintiff's title to the same and, under the circumstances, that case also may well be regarded as a case for the recovery of property in specie. There are, however, two other cases already cited by me above where the same principle has been applied though they were not cases in which specific property was sought to be recovered., but the claim of the plaintiff in them was a pure money claim.
Section 46 in The Indian Contract Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 14 in The Wealth-Tax Act, 1957 [Entire Act]
Basdev vs The State Of Pepsu on 17 April, 1956
As a matter of plain language, the relevant meanings of the term "object" in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd edn.) are, "that to which action, thought, or feeling is directed," or "the thing aimed at." On the other hand, the relevant meaning of the term "motive" in the same Dictionary is, "that which moves or induces a person to act in a certain way." "Motive" is a term of frequent use in criminal law and in that sphere of law it has been defined by the highest Court as "something which prompts a man to form an intention" (Basdev v. State of Pepsu , para. 6.
Section 18 in The Wealth-Tax Act, 1957 [Entire Act]
Kedar Nath Motani And Ors. vs Prahlad Rai And Ors. on 25 September, 1959
There can be no doubt that as far as the cases of Kedar Rath v. Prahlad Rai and Sita Bam v. Badha Bai are concerned, the claim was to recover the property in specie.
Babulal Swarupchand Shah vs South Satara (Fixed Delivery) ... on 8 September, 1959
Those two cases are the leading English case of Bow-makers, Ld., as well as Babulas case decided by a Division Bench, of this Court. Moreover, none of the standard works on the subject makes any distinction of the nature propounded by Mr. Parpia and a reference to Chitty on Contracts (23rd. edn.), p. 439, para. 939, Alison on the English Law of Contracts (22nd. edn.), p. 342 and Cheshire on the Law of Contract (7th edn.), pp. 304-306 shows that the principle in question has been applied to the recovery of money as well as to the recovery of chattels or land and a plaintiff can enforce the recovery of the money, chattels or land if he can frame a cause of action entirely independent of the illegal agreement and is not compelled to rely upon the illegal agreement for the purpose of proving his claim. The distinction which Mr. Parpia sought to make between a money claim and a claim to chattels or land, though ingenious, is without legal foundation as the authorities just referred to by me clearly show. I, therefore, hold that the said principle also applies to a money claim like the one in the present suit, and if it could be shown that the plaintiff can found his cause of action in this suit without relying on the alleged illegality of the agreement, he would be entitled to succeed.
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